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Abstract
This thesis investigates whether women's empowerment aﬀects children's wellbe-
ing in two developing countries: Mexico and India. The ﬁrst chapter provides
a background on women's empowerment. The second chapter evaluates a condi-
tional cash transfer (CCT) program, which provides poor women in Mexico with
tools to be better mothers, in terms of its impact on birthweight. The third chap-
ter analyses whether empowered women, referred as those who have progressive
gender attitudes, are more likely to have a ﬁrstborn girl in Delhi, India.
Speciﬁcally, the second chapter evaluates PROGRESA-Oportunidades, a pro-
gram that pays mothers cash in exchange of their investment in their children's
human capital: education, health, and nutrition. Using quantile regressions, the
chapter ﬁnds a positive and signiﬁcant program eﬀect, but babies at the upper tail
of the conditional birthweight distribution seem to have beneﬁted the most. More-
over, maternal smoking during pregnancy is associated with a 459-gram decrease
on birthweights at the 20th percentile of the conditional distribution, completely
wiping out any program beneﬁts. This eﬀect is not picked up by least squares
regression estimates, which is the technique used by previous literature on the
subject.
The third chapter turns to India, a country that has lost millions of girls to
sex-selective abortions. The chapter ﬁrst constructs a women's empowerment
(progressivity) index using a latent factor model, and then assesses whether pro-
gressive women are more likely to have a ﬁrstborn girl in Delhi. The latter territory
has, unlike the Indian average, 'missing' women even among ﬁrst order births. The
results show that a one-standard deviation increase in the progressivity index is
associated with a 5.8-percentage point increase in the likelihood of a ﬁrstborn girl
relative to women who have not yet given birth.
x
1 Chapter 1: Introduction
The international community recognizes the lack of gender equality in the world
and the need to achieve it in order for countries to prosper (World Bank (2007),
World Economic Forum (2012)). The United Nations' Population Fund (UNFPA),
for instance, states in its oﬃcial website1 that: discrimination against women
and girls -including gender-based violence, economic discrimination, reproductive
health inequities, and harmful traditional practices - remains the most pervasive
and persistent form of inequality; and that empowering women is an indispens-
able tool for advancing development and reducing poverty. Because of this, pro-
moting gender equality and empowering women is one of the eight United Nations'
Millennium Development Goals aimed at ending world poverty by 2015.2
1.1 Two notions of women's empowerment
Despite the term empowerment being widely used in the international develop-
ment discourse, it still does not have a unique deﬁnition that everyone agrees
with. In fact, it does not have a ﬁxed translation in languages such as Spanish3
and Italian for example. Furthermore, not everyone thinks that women's empow-
erment can be clearly deﬁned; for many feminists, for instance, the value of the
1See http://www.unfpa.org/gender/ (accessed on the 19th of March 2013).
2The Millennium Development Goals were oﬃcially established in the United Nations Mil-
lennium Declaration in 2000 and consist of eight goals: eradicating extreme poverty and hunger;
achieving universal primary education; promoting gender equality and empowering women; re-
ducing child mortality rates; improving maternal health; combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and
other diseases; ensuring environmental sustainability; and developing a global partnership for
development. All United Nations member states and several international organizations agreed
to meet these goals by 2015 (see http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/bkgd.shtml).
3Some authors use the word potenciamiento, others poderio, and others the neologism
empoderamiento (Stromquist (2002)).
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concept lies precisely in its 'fuzziness' (Kabeer (1999)).
Initially, empowerment was most commonly associated with alternative devel-
opment strategies involving local, community-based movements and their disen-
chantment with mainstream, state-led development practice. Speciﬁcally, social
activists saw empowerment as a grassroots endeavour designed to inspire the poor
and marginalized, including women, to challenge the status quo (Parpart et al.
(2002)). Nonetheless, the idea of bringing women into the development process,
and of focusing on their role in that process, emerged in the early 1970s in the
USA with the Women in Development approach (Koczberski (1998), Adato et al.
(2000)).
At that point, several (mainly female) development practitioners and researchers
noticed that Third World women were ignored in the development eﬀorts of major
aid donors (e.g. the United Nations, the World Bank, the Food and Agriculture
Organisation, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID),
etc.), and that the economic situation of those women had barely improved over
the years (Koczberski (1998)). Because of this, they began to push for greater
representation of women in mainstream development agencies, and to demand
that women be taken into account in those agencies' aid programs.
As a result, in 1972 the United Nations designated 1975 as the International
Women's Year, highlighting the need to involve women in development practice
(Koczberski (1998)). Likewise, the 1973 Percy Amendment to the US Foreign
Assistance Act required the USAID to give particular attention to those pro-
grams, projects and activities which tend to integrate women into the national
economies of foreign countries.4 Such integration however simply meant to in-
corporate women into the existing development practice under orthodox notions
4Quoted in Koczberski (1998, 396).
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of development, as if that would automatically improve their lives (Koczberski
(1998)).
The Gender and Development analysis that emerged in the late 1970s then fo-
cused on how the dynamics and structures of gender relations and gender inequal-
ities aﬀect women's health, sexuality, education, means of livelihood, and other
aspects of their lives (Rowlands (1998)). The concept of women's empowerment
then derives from the fact that power relations are embedded in relationships be-
tween men and women, in other social relationships in which women participate,
and within institutions that aﬀect women's lives (households, the state, labour
markets, etc.) Empowering women thus implies a shift in those power relations
in favour of women (Adato et al. (2000)).
The term empowerment itself was ﬁrst used by Sen and Grown in Development,
Crises and Alternative Visions: Third World Women's Perspectives, a publication
that was widely distributed at the Third World Women's Conference in Nairobi in
1985, and which became a book in 1987. By the late 1980s, activists and theorists,
had started to discuss the need of a new development approach that highlighted
the role of culture and socio-economic inequalities in women's subordination (see,
for instance, Sen and Grown (1988)5, and Young (1993)), and saw the need of
women to become empowered so they can challenge patriarchal and political-
economic inequalities (Parpart et al. (2002, 10)).
As poverty moved up the scale of international priorities, and top-down, state
led development practice continued to fail to alleviate it, the World Bank launched
its New Poverty Agenda in 1990. The term empowerment, and participation
to secure it, entered the mainstream development discourse. Nonetheless, while
empowerment is now often understood as a process of transformation involving
5This book was ﬁrst published by the Monthly Review Press in New York in 1987.
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the acquisition of capabilities, as well as changes in subjectivity that enable agency
to be exercised (Molyneux (2006, 429))6, major aid agencies tend to think of it
only as a means to improve the productivity within the status quo, rather than to
foster social transformation (Parpart et al. (2002)). Because of this, they usually
emphasize only a reformative, rather than the transformative, nature of women's
empowerment in their discourse.
Thus in general, there are now two notions of female empowerment, each of
them involving diﬀerent underlying capacities and freedoms for women. One of
them is the instrumentalist notion, which emphasizes women's altruism and
dedication to the collective family welfare, as well as their thrift, risk-aversion,
industriousness and sense of civic responsibility (Kabeer (1999)). In this frame-
work, empowering women may entail helping them to acquire abilities to beneﬁt
their families; women's empowerment is thus instrumental to achieve relatively
altruistic purposes, and is therefore less likely to be resisted within the household.
An alternative notion of female empowerment is the selﬁsh / self-interest one,
which focuses much more on the conﬂictual element of gender relations. In this
case, empowerment is put to the service of meeting women's own needs, and
may thus attract greater resistance in society. Empowering women may thus
involve making them more conscious of their duties to themselves, and of their
own physical, emotional, and mental welfare. In this context, what is valued as
evidence of altruism (women's tendency to put the needs of others in the family
before their own) in the ﬁrst model, is interpreted in this model as evidence of
women's internalization of their own subordinate status (Kabeer (1999)).
As the instrumentalist notion of women's empowerment builds on claimed
synergies between feminist goals and oﬃcial development priorities (e.g. lower
6Note however that this is not the only deﬁnition of empowerment available in the literature,
and other deﬁnitions will be given in this thesis later on.
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fertility, infant mortality, and malnutrition, etc.), it is the one that has received
more attention in the discourse and practice of mainstream development agen-
cies. In contrast, advocacy for feminist goals in intrinsic terms has not been as
successful, perhaps in part because it would require policy makers to reﬂect about
power relations, and the social injustice that is inherent to the prevailing eco-
nomic system. In any case, the popularity of women's empowerment as a goal
in the development agenda of major aid donors, and the latter's concern with
cost-beneﬁt analyses, has required its quantiﬁcation (Kabeer (1999)).
Clearly, what indicators are used to measure empowerment depends on the
precise concept that the researcher has in mind. Indeed, some authors argue
that instrumental empowerment does not really represent empowerment. In this
context, the notion of power is crucial. Kabeer (1999), for instance, suggests that
a way to think of it is in terms of the ability to make choices; to be disempowered
thus means to be denied choice. Empowerment is then deﬁned as a process of
change by which those who have been denied the ability to make strategic life
choices (e.g. whether or not, and who, to marry, whether to have children, etc.)
acquire such ability.
Likewise, Basu and Koolwal (2005) contend that the extent to which women
control their own bodies and health may be a better indicator of empowerment
than any measures of female altruism. Indeed, they argue, some examples of
conditioning and pressure leading to desirable (maternal) behaviour cannot auto-
matically be labelled as empowerment or exercise of free choice. Because of this,
Kabeer (1999) suggests accounting for structural parameters in the analysis of
individual choice by qualifying the latter in terms of the conditions in which it
takes place, its contents, and its consequences. Similarly, Fierlbeck (1997) asserts
that women would be much more likely to expand their ability to make choices
5
if they were to view themselves as individuals rather than members of a social
group. Lastly, Jackson (1996, 497) shares that it may well be true that women
prioritize children's needs, but there is a sense in which one might wish them to
be a little less selﬂess and self-sacriﬁcing.
The divide between instrumental versus selﬁsh empowerment can further be
seen in the empirical literature by noting that studies diﬀer in whether they use
female empowerment as a dependent, or as an independent variable; and if the
latter, in the sort of, or whose, outcome(s) they analyse. That is, if one thinks
of women's empowerment as an `instrument' then, almost by deﬁnition, one will
use it as an independent variable; as an instrument for something else, the latter
being one's real concern (e.g. fertility rates, child mortality and malnutrition,
etc.) Alternatively, if one is more interested on the selﬁsh notion of empowerment,
then one could, for instance, use an indicator of whether or not a woman chose
her spouse, and use it as a dependent / independent variable.
Needless to say, if empowerment is used as an independent variable, the
strength and sign of the association between it and the outcome under inves-
tigation will depend on what the latter is, as well as on how exactly empower-
ment is being operationalized. The dependent variable could, for instance, be
either a measure of children's wellbeing, or of women's own welfare outcomes (e.g.
their health, nutrition, share of household work and resources like food, leisure,
etc.) On the other hand, empowerment could be measured using altruistic and/or
`selﬁsh' behaviours on the part of women. These decisions will inﬂuence the cor-
relation between female empowerment and a given achievement. Indeed, Basu
and Koolwal (2005) show that there may be potential trade-oﬀs between women's
own health versus child health, resulting from the presence of the two diﬀerent
notions of female empowerment.
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This thesis explores the impact of women's empowerment on the welfare of
children. In particular, the second chapter relates to the instrumentalist no-
tion of empowerment, and the third chapter to the selﬁsh one. More speciﬁ-
cally, the second chapter evaluates the Mexican conditional cash transfer program
PROGRESA-Oportunidades7 in terms of its impact on the birthweight of babies
born into enrolled households. The program claims to empower women (Adato
et al. (2000)) by paying cash to mothers in exchange of them investing in their
children's human capital: education, health, and nutrition.
Moreover, the mother of the family herself must obtain preventive healthcare
twice a year, and attend talks on health, hygiene and nutrition every two months.
Pregnant beneﬁciaries must also attend a number of antenatal care visits and
are, along with breastfeeding women, entitled to receive nutritional supplements
(SEDESOL (2009)). Using quantile regressions, the second chapter ﬁnds a positive
and signiﬁcant program eﬀect at various points of the birthweight distribution.
There is thus evidence that the program successfully empowers women by giving
them resources to become better mothers and beneﬁt their children, such that the
latter are born with higher weight.
The third chapter turns to India, a country where the persistence of gender
inequality manifests itself in its millions of 'missing' women. The term, coined by
Amartya Sen (1990), refers to the fact that millions of women are lost every year to
sex-selective abortions and excess mortality relative to males. Because of this, sex
ratios are unnaturally male biased in countries like India. In this context, the third
chapter ﬁrst estimates an index of the selﬁsh notion of women's empowerment,
referred as progressivity, including, among others, indicators of whether or not
7PROGRESA is an acronym for Programa de Educacion, Salud y Alimentacion (Education,
Health and Nutrition Program); the program's name changed to Oportunidades (Opportunities)
in 2002. Each of those names on their own, or PROGRESA-Oportunidades will be used
interchangeably throughout this thesis.
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women control their own bodies and access to healthcare for themselves. The
chapter then explores the eﬀect of progressivity on the sex of the ﬁrst child, and
on the duration to ﬁrst birth in Delhi. The focus on this territory is due to the
fact that, unlike the national average, it has a deﬁcit of girls already among ﬁrst
order births.
The results show that a one-standard deviation increase in the progressiv-
ity/empowerment index is associated with a 5.8 percentage point increase in the
likelihood of a ﬁrstborn girl, compared to women who have not yet given birth.
Additionally, more progressive women do not experience longer ﬁrst birth inter-
vals which, together with the ﬁrst result, is consistent with those women being
less inclined to sex-select their ﬁrst child.
Lastly, the chapter estimates the ﬁrstborn's sex equation for two other Indian
states: Kerala and Punjab, and ﬁnds no eﬀect of individual empowerment. This
result is understandable in the case of Kerala as that state has a balanced child
sex ratio. On the other hand, the result for Punjab highlights the importance
of the gender context, which may serve to negate the eﬀect of individual-level
empowerment on well-being achievements.
This thesis contributes to the literature on women's empowerment by pro-
viding empirical examples of how the two types of empowerment, instrumental
and selﬁsh, can aﬀect children's welfare. Moreover, the third chapter analyses
women's empowerment as a dependent variable ﬁrst, and then as an independent
variable. In the latter case it also analyses two demographic outcomes. The ﬁrst
one is child-based, the ﬁrstborn's gender; and the second one is mother-based:
the duration to ﬁrst birth. Furthermore, the child outcome also aﬀects women's
health, as it is the product of a pregnancy, and it may have major implications for
the mother, and for society as a whole, if that baby happened to be the ﬁrstborn
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due to previous abortion(s).
Given this interplay between child's, mother's, and society's welfare, the third
chapter introduces a new term to the literature: progressivity. Progressivity can be
seen as closely related to the selﬁsh notion of female empowerment as it highlights
only conﬂictual elements of gender relations. Nevertheless, it crucially diﬀers in
that it stands on purely humanist grounds. That is, it is based exclusively on per-
ceptions and behaviours of women that could be defended from a human rights
perspective, even though they are likely to be contested within the household.
The need for introducing the new term is also due to the existent conceptual de-
bates regarding what constitutes empowerment and what does not; the diﬀerence
between women's empowerment and autonomy; and the debate on whether
full autonomy/empowerment is really beneﬁcial for women and thus, whether
it should be sought/supported. These issues are discussed in Subsection 1.3.3.
In sum, this thesis contributes to the female empowerment literature by draw-
ing attention to the fact that, although interventions that aim at empowering
women in an instrumental way can bring about beneﬁts for children, they may
leave the unequal gender context unchallenged or even reinforce it, such that
women's own individual welfare might be decreased. Additionally, this thesis pro-
vides a case study that illustrates how women's (em)power(ment) can contribute
to lessen prevailing gender inequalities; but at the same time, it highlights the rel-
evance of the gender context in enhancing or negating the eﬀect of individual-level
empowerment on well-being outcomes that impact humanity as a whole.
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1.2 PROGRESA-Oportunidades and instrumen-
tal empowerment
1.2.1 The anti-poverty program
As the World Bank (2007, 10) asserts, studies from around the world show that:
the greater the mothers' control over resources, the more resources households
allocate to children's health, nutrition, and education. Moreover, better mater-
nal education also beneﬁts children through improved hygiene practices, better
nutrition, lower fertility rates, and hence higher per child expenditures. All this
together contributes to future growth and poverty reduction. It is under this
instrumentalist logic that the conditional cash transfer program PROGRESA-
Oportunidades was introduced in Mexico in 1997. The program is targeted at
those living in extreme poverty and ﬁrst began operating in rural communities;
it has gradually expanded to urban areas such that it currently serves 20 per-
cent of all households in Mexico (5.8 million families). Oportunidades is thus the
main government anti-poverty program in Mexico, both in terms of budget and
coverage.8
PROGRESA is one of the New Anti-poverty Programs that have been intro-
duced in Latin America in the last decades, and that see integrating women as
a way to secure broader development objectives (Molyneux (2006)). Those pro-
grams are part of the New Social Policy approach that originated in the 1990s as
state-led development approaches continued to fail to alleviate poverty. At that
8The program's budget suggested by the president in Mexico (i.e., it still has to be ap-
proved by congress) for the ﬁscal year 2014 (1 January - 31 December) is around 5859 million
USD, including evaluations and operation costs (http://www.24-horas.mx/presta-bid-a-mexico-
10-del-presupuesto-de-oportunidades/). Mexico's Central Bank's (www.banxico.org.mx) oﬃcial
average exchange rate for the period January-August 2013 (12.66 Mexican pesos per USD) was
used to obtain the ﬁgure in USD.
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point, the state was accused of nurturing a culture of welfare dependency and
thus, of being a major cause of the development failure. In order to increase eﬃ-
ciency and cost-sharing, international development agencies like the World Bank
thus started to formulate and support social policies in which beneﬁciaries bear
some of the costs of development. Cost recovery, co-ﬁnancing, co-management
schemes, and programs entailing some sort of community work became popular
tools to promote self-help in development projects (Molyneux (2006)).
Oportunidades designates the mother of the family as the beneﬁciary on behalf
of her household. This is in contrast to previous anti-poverty programs in Mexico
and implies that the cash transfers, and the main responsibilities associated with
them, are given directly to mothers. The program's designers justify this feature
alluding to a growing literature (e.g. Thomas (1990), Haddad (1999)) showing
that resources controlled by women are more likely to translate into greater im-
provements in child health and nutrition than resources controlled by men (Adato
et al. (2000)). Gomez de Leon and Parker (2000) explain that this may be due to
women being more responsible with money and more concerned with the welfare
of their children, such that they spend more on their family.
Additionally, program staﬀ argues that PROGRESA empowers women by in-
creasing their control over resources and thus their bargaining power (Adato et
al. (2000)). A program policy document, for instance, reads:
PROGRESA seeks to improve the condition of women and empower the decisive
role they play in family and community development. The aim in this regard is to satisfy
their healthcare and nutritional needs, while providing them with information and skills
to promote their advancement.9
The program works as follows. The mother of the family receives a cash
transfer every two months conditional on her household fulﬁlling certain duties.
9Quoted in Adato et al. (2000, 46).
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The grant consists of two components. First, scholarships are paid for each child
in school between grades 3-1210 (usually ages 8 to 18); children must have a
minimum of 85 percent attendance at school, and should not repeat a grade more
than twice. The stipend increases as children progress in school and starting from
grade 711 is 10 percent higher for girls than for boys (see Table 1.1). There is
however an upper limit for the scholarship component of the transfer (SEDESOL
(2013)).12
The second component is a ﬁxed (i.e., independent of the household's demo-
graphic composition and place of residence) amount13 that is intended to buy
food, and that is conditional on family members obtaining preventive healthcare.
This means adults attending biannual health check-ups, and talks on health, hy-
giene and nutrition once a year; the latter increases to six times per year in the
case of the mother of the family. Beneﬁciary women must also take their children
for health check-ups at: 7, 28, and 60 days after birth; once per month for ages 2
months-2 years; once every 4 months for ages 2-4 years; and once every 6 months
10In 1997, compulsory education in Mexico used to start at grade 1 of primary school, when
children are normally 6 years old. At that time, the scholarship used to be oﬀered only between
grades 3-9. In 2001 however, it was expanded to include the three upper high school grades
(10-12). Furthermore, it is also currently available for children enrolled in school grades 1 and
2 residing in localities with less than 2500 inhabitants (SEDESOL (2013)).
11That is, at the onset of middle education, when females generally start dropping out of
school (Molyneux (2006)).
12For the second semester of 2012, such cap was set at about 97 USD per month for families
with children enrolled in primary and lower secondary school; and at 178 USD for families with
children enrolled in upper secondary school (SEDESOL (2013)). Mexico's Central Bank's oﬃcial
average exchange rate for that period (13.06 pesos per dollar) was used to obtain the ﬁgures in
US dollars (see http://www.banxico.org.mx/SieInternet/)
13This amount was set at about 34 USD for the second semester of 2012 (see SEDESOL
(2013) and http://www.banxico.org.mx/ for the exchange rate). Given this minimum amount
of the transfer and the cap set for the scholarships, the program's subsidy could represent
between 29 and 178 (18 and 114) percent of the minimum income necessary for a single per-
son residing in a rural (urban) area not to be labelled oﬃcially as poor in Mexico in De-
cember 2012. Oﬃcial poverty statistics, including monthly per capita poverty lines, in the
country are provided by Mexico's National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development
Policy (CONEVAL) (see http://www.coneval.gob.mx/Medicion/Paginas/Lineas-de-bienestar-y-
canasta-basica.aspx). The oﬃcial average exchange rate for December 2012 (12.87 pesos per
dollar) was used to obtain the ﬁgures in US dollars (see http://www.banxico.org.mx/).
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for ages 5-18 years. Likewise, pregnant women in beneﬁciary households must
attend at least ﬁve health check-ups, and lactating women two (see Table 1.2).
The latter two groups of women, along with under 2-year-olds and malnourished
children younger than 5 years, are also provided with nutritional supplements
(SEDESOL (2009)).
Additionally, the mother of the family must attend monthly meetings with
promoters14 where program information is conveyed, and undertake 29 hours of
unpaid communal work per month. The latter is organised by doctors, nurses
and/or program promoters, and typically involves cleaning and painting schools
and health facilities, and clearing rubbish (Molyneux (2006)). Failure to comply
with any of the program duties can lead to having the household's registration as
a beneﬁciary cancelled (SEDESOL (2009)).
1.2.2 Program evaluation
The selection of beneﬁciaries into the program in rural areas consists of three steps:
1) identifying the poorest localities in Mexico; 2) selecting the eligible (poorest)
households in those localities; and 3) having a community assembly approve the
list of beneﬁciaries (INSP (2006)).
Due to logistical and ﬁnancial constraints PROGRESA-Oportunidades has
been introduced in phases. At the program's inception, the Mexican govern-
14Promoters are beneﬁciary women who volunteer and are (oﬃcially) elected by other beneﬁ-
ciaries to serve as a liaison between the latter and PROGRESA oﬃcials. They receive training
and meet with beneﬁciaries at least once per month to talk about the program. They are thus
elected community voluntary workers who take on leadership roles. Note however that in some
localities beneﬁciaries have denounced the fact that promoters have in reality not been elected
by them but by the national incumbent political party, PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party),
of which promoters happen to be members (Red Nacional de Promotoras y Asesoras Rurales
(2000)).
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ment capitalized on these constraints and randomly selected 506 poor localities
in seven Mexican states (Guerrero, Michoacan, Hidalgo, Puebla, Queretaro, San
Luis Potosi and Veracruz)15 to participate in an evaluation sample. Out of them,
320, the early intervention group, were randomly selected to start receiving ben-
eﬁts from May 1998 and the rest, the original control or delayed intervention
group, started to enrol in September 1999, and to receive beneﬁts soon thereafter.
The program's quantitative evaluation then consisted of periodically inter-
viewing all households in the 506 localities between November 1997 and Novem-
ber 1999, and then again in the autumn 2003 (see Table 1.3). As by then all
506 localities had been incorporated into the program, a new control group was
created by matching each of the original localities to a locality that had not yet
enrolled using propensity score matching (Todd (2004)).
PROGRESA-Oportunidades has been widely evaluated. In fact, the Mexican
government commissioned an independent organization, the International Food
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), headquartered in Washington D.C., to under-
take the oﬃcial program evaluation. Quantitative studies, which for the most
part use the quasi-experimental data described above, have generally found that
the program does improve outcomes related to the three human capital compo-
nents (education, health and nutrition) that it seeks to better. Nevertheless, an
extra 0.6 million Mexicans were living in poverty in 2012 compared to 12 years
earlier16 (two years after program beneﬁts started to be distributed), which casts
doubts about the program's success as an anti-poverty strategy.
15During the ﬁrst phase of operation, the program was running in the following eight states
(out of a total of 31 states plus Mexico City which, administratively, is a (the) federal district):
Campeche, Coahuila, Guanajuato, Hidalgo, Puebla, Querétaro, San Luis Potosí, and Veracruz.
16This information was taken from the oﬃcial webpage (http://www.coneval.gob.mx) of Mex-
ico's National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy (Consejo Nacional de
Evaluacion de la Politica de Desarrollo Social (CONEVAL)), which is the institution in charge
of providing oﬃcial poverty statistics in the country.
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Because of this, it is important to note three things. First, data from the
evaluation sample, coming from a handful of Mexican states, are not representative
of the whole population under PROGRESA.17 Second, even if extrapolation of
results was possible, what we learn from them are only marginal eﬀects, such that
the level of the variable that is being analysed may still be too low even after
treatment under the program. That is, beneﬁciaries might, for instance, not live
in extreme poverty anymore, but still be poor18 or, beneﬁciary children might be
taller than similar non-PROGRESA children, but still be stunted. Third, several
studies report a lack of transparency in the selection of beneﬁciaries, such that
families that deserved to be included in the program because they were poor
enough are not, and some which should not be included are (Red Nacional de
Promotoras y Asesoras Rurales (2000); Pastrana 2005)).19
More critical evaluations have thus resulted from studies that do not use the
17For instance, three states with large proportions of people living in poverty, as well as
indigenous people, Yucatan, Oaxaca and Chiapas, are not included in the evaluation sample.
This is very relevant as it is precisely in rural areas in those states, plus Guerrero, where
qualitative evaluations ﬁnd malnutrition prevalence to be unacceptable high (Pastrana (2005)).
18In Mexico, oﬃcial poverty statistics are provided by the National Council for the Evalua-
tion of Social Development Policy (Consejo Nacional de Evaluacion de la Politica de Desarrollo
Social (CONEVAL)) based on data from the Socioeconomic Characteristics Section (Modulo
de Condiciones Socioeconomicas (MIC)) of the National Survey on Households Income and Ex-
penses (Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso-Gasto en los Hogares (ENIGH)). The latter is gathered by
the National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Informatics (Instituto Nacional de Estadís-
tica, Geografía e Informática (INEGI)). The CONEVAL deﬁnes poverty as living on an income
below the welfare line, and with at least one of six basic social deprivations (CONEVAL (2013)).
The welfare line equals the cost of a per capita basic basket of goods, which is updated by the
CONEVAL every month, and that includes the (per capita) basic food basket. In July 2013, the
former was set at 188 (120) USD for urban (rural) residents (http://www.coneval.gob.mx). On
the other hand, the six basic social deprivations are (lack of): food security; access to health
services; education (access and years completed); housing (accounting for both size and quality);
access to basic services in the dwelling (water, electricity, and sewerage); and access to social
security. A person living in extreme poverty is in turn deﬁned as one living on an income below
the minimum welfare line, which equals the cost of the basic food basket, and with at least three
social depravations (CONEVAL (2013)). In July 2013, such line was set at 91 (65) USD in cities
(the countryside), respectively (see http://www.coneval.gob.mx).
19This has unintentionally disrupted the social fabric in some localities by creating social
tensions (Pastrana (2005)). As for the presence of not poor enough beneﬁciary families in the
evaluation sample, studies, including the second chapter in this thesis, generally exclude those
observations from their analyses.
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evaluation sample to assess the program. Those studies are often qualitative in
nature and analyse information obtained through interviews with (focus) groups
of beneﬁciaries, non-beneﬁciaries, promoters, doctors, etc. in PROGRESA local-
ities. Likewise, other analysts evaluate Oportunidades by looking at aggregated
outcomes (i.e. for the whole population), either within localities under the pro-
gram20 or for the whole country.21 Given that Oportunidades is the most expensive
anti-poverty program in Mexico's history, such assessments are relevant.
This section presents an overview of the main ﬁndings regarding the three
human capital components that PROGRESA seeks to improve, as well as those
involving more aggregated outcomes such as poverty and migration. Subsection
1.2.4.2 in turn reviews the link between Oportunidades and women's status /
empowerment. Both sections include, whenever possible, evaluations of the type
described in the previous paragraph. Note however that the literature review in
this chapter is not exhaustive as Oportunidades has been, and continues to be,
widely evaluated.
1.2.2.1 Nutrition
In terms of nutrition, the program has been found to be associated with an in-
crease in total food consumption (Ruiz-Arranz et al. (2006)); caloric acquisition
(Hoddinott and Skouﬁas (2004), Ruiz-Arranz et al. (2006)); diversity of food
20An example of this kind of evaluations is the one undertaken by the National Institute
of Public Health (Instituto Nacional de Salud Pública (INSP)) and the Centre for Research
and Higher Studies in Social Anthropology (Centro de Investigación y Estudios Superiores en
Antropología Social (CIESAS)) in 2004, henceforth INSP-CIESAS evaluation, which is well
referred in Pastrana (2005).
21That is, instead of estimating marginal eﬀects by comparing control and treatment groups,
these studies look at the proportion of people (not only children) who are still living in poverty,
extreme poverty, malnourished, illiterate, etc.
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consumption (Ruiz-Arranz et al. (2006)); and dietary quality (Hoddinott and
Skouﬁas (2004)).
Speciﬁcally, Hoddinott and Skouﬁas (2004) construct a variable measuring
caloric availability in the household based on food consumption data. They ﬁnd
that beneﬁciary households experienced a median increase in caloric acquisition
of 6.4 percent after having been 18 months under the program. The increase
came mainly from calories from vegetable and animal products, such that dietary
quality improved.
On the other hand, Ruiz-Arranz et al. (2006) evaluate the impact of PRO-
GRESA and PROCAMPO -another CCT program in Mexico that depends on
agricultural production, on food consumption (expenditures), caloric availability,
food diversity, agricultural home production, and food purchases paid in cash.
They ﬁnd that both programs boost total food consumption and caloric intake
in similar proportions. Speciﬁcally, food purchases increase by 31 (33) cents for
every Mexican peso received under PROGRESA (PROCAMPO). Nonetheless,
in the case of PROGRESA, increased food security is achieved through market
purchases, whilst under PROCAMPO it is attained through investment in agricul-
tural home production. PROGRESA thus increases diversity in food consumption
and the degree of access to retail food markets.
The above studies use mean estimates to reach their conclusions. Nevertheless,
using simulations, Djebbari and Smith (2008) ﬁnd evidence of substantial variation
in program impacts on per capita consumption (measured as the sum of both food
and non-food expenditures). After examining several plausible assumptions, they
ﬁnd that only a small fraction of individuals may experience a fall in consumption
as a result of PROGRESA.
Similarly, Chavez-Martin del Campo (2006) uses bootstrap simulations to ﬁnd
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that the impact of PROGRESA on both total expenditure and food purchases
exhibits a lot of heterogeneity. Speciﬁcally, assuming rank preservation, the pro-
gram eﬀects are found to be positive within the treated population, but larger
for better-oﬀ households. This result, referred as distributionally regressive in
the paper, is consistent with Djebbari and Smith (2008) who, under the same
assumption, ﬁnd that those with the highest consumption levels in the absence of
PROGRESA experience the largest program eﬀects. Intuitively, this result makes
sense given that the conditioned-on good, human capital, is a normal good. These
studies thus draw attention to the importance of exploring the impact of PRO-
GRESA beyond simple mean eﬀects.
1.2.2.2 Health
Oportunidades has also been found to be associated with better child health out-
comes. This includes lower morbidity rates (Gertler (2004)); higher rates of growth
(see, for instance, Gertler (2004), Habicht et al. (2004), Behrman and Hoddinott
(2005), Leroy et al. (2008), Fernald et al. (2008), and Fernald et al. (2009)); lower
risk / prevalence of stunting (see, for instance, Behrman and Hoddinott (2005)
and Fernald et al. (2008)); lower risk / rates of anemia (e.g. Gertler (2004),
Habicht et al. (2004)); lower body mass index and overweight prevalence (Fer-
nald et al. (2008)); higher birthweight (Barber and Gertler (2008, 2010)); better
development (e.g. cognitive, motor and language skills) (Fernald et al. (2008));
and improvements in children's behaviour (see, for instance, Ozer et al. (2009)
and Fernald et al. (2009)).
The program's impact on adult's health has also been explored. However, in
that case some of the results depend on the subsample that is being analysed.
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Fernald et al. (2008a), for instance, ﬁnd PROGRESA to be associated with
lower body mass index, obesity prevalence, blood pressure, and prevalence of
uncontrolled hypertension among adults aged 30-65 years. In contrast, Fernald
et al. (2008b) ﬁnd that the opposite occurs among adults aged 18-65 years.
Likewise, Urquieta et al. (2009) ﬁnd that Oportunidades is positively associated
with increased skilled attendance at delivery only among a subsample of women.
1.2.2.2.1 Children's health
This subsection details the results regarding child health outcomes. Gertler (2004)
ﬁnds PROGRESA to be associated with lower morbidity among children aged 1-6
months born into beneﬁciary families, and among those in families who have been
under the program for two years, and who were 2-37 months old at the program's
onset. Additionally, children who had been under the program for one year were
25.5 percent less likely to be anaemic, and grew about one centimetre more than
similar non-PROGRESA children. No signiﬁcant program eﬀect was found on the
probability of being stunted.
Habicht et al. (2004) in turn ﬁnd that age- and length-adjusted height was
1.1 cm greater among children who were younger than 6 months at the program's
onset, lived in the poorest households, and had been under the program for 14-17
months (depending on when exactly their household was interviewed). More-
over, the paper also ﬁnds that after one year of program exposure, the mean
haemoglobin value (age-adjusted rate of anaemia) was higher (lower) among chil-
dren in the early intervention group, than in the delayed intervention group; those
diﬀerences had disappeared after two years, when both groups had been under
the program for at least one year.
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Likewise, Behrman and Hoddinott (2005) ﬁnd that children who did receive
the PROGRESA nutritional supplements,22 and who were 12-36 months old at
the program's onset experienced a one sixth-increase in mean growth (height-for-
age z-scores) per year, and a lower probability of stunting after 14-17 months
under the program. That height increase corresponds to about one centimetre,
and the eﬀect is slightly larger for children from poorer households and poorer
communities, but whose household head is more educated than average. Lastly,
the paper estimates that the increase in adult height alone could result in a 2.9-
percent increase in lifetime earnings.
On the other hand, Leroy et al. (2008) ﬁnd that, after two years of program
exposure, urban children who were younger than 6 months at the program's onset
grew 1.5 cm more, and gained an additional 0.76 kg, than similar non-PROGRESA
children. Importantly, the eﬀect on height was larger among children in the poor-
est intervention households. No program eﬀect was found on older children (6-24
months old at baseline).
Fernald et al. (2008) in turn analyse several health and development outcomes
among children aged 24-68 months who were born into and raised by beneﬁciary
households. They ﬁnd that a doubling of cash transfers23 is associated with im-
proved growth (height-for-age z-score); as well as lower prevalence of stunting,
body-mass index for age percentile, and overweight prevalence; and better motor,
22This detail is crucial as often there were children who were meant to receive the supplement
but for some reason did not receive it. Reasons for this may be that the health clinic ran out of
supplements, or that there was no one at the clinic to provide them. Other issues not considered
in the paper but that have been pointed out by qualitative evaluations are that often, even if
the mother receives the supplement for her child, the family is so poor that the supplement is
shared by the whole family; alternatively, the family may have some animals, and thus uses the
supplement to feed them in order for them to grow bigger and be sold at higher prices ((Pastrana
(2005)).
23This means comparing two beneﬁciary households which diﬀer in that by 2003 one of them
had received a total amount of cash that was twice what the other one had received, either
because the former enrolled earlier in the program, or due to its demographic composition.
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cognitive, and language development.
Likewise, Ozer et al. (2009) investigate the prevalence of (mother-reported)
behavioural problems among 4-6-year-olds after 4-5.5 years of program exposure.
They ﬁnd Oportunidades to be associated with a 10 percent decrease in aggres-
sive/oppositional symptoms, but no eﬀect on anxiety/depressive symptoms nor
on total behavioural problems. There was also no diﬀerential eﬀect by gender or
ethnicity (indigenous / non-indigenous).
Similarly, Fernald et al. (2009) ﬁnd that an additional 1.5 year of program
exposure (i.e. early versus delayed treatment) is associated with reduced be-
havioural problems (measured using an adapted version of the Strengths and Dif-
ﬁculties Questionnaire) among 8-10 year-olds who had been under the program for
8-9.5 years. No diﬀerential eﬀect was found on children's height- nor body mass
index-for-age z-scores, nor on cognitive and language development. However, 18
months of additional program exposure before the age of 3 was associated with
a 1.5-cm growth (height-for-age z-score) increase for children whose mothers had
no education.
Barhan (2013) in turn uses municipality-level data to show that PROGRESA
has led to a 17-percent decline in infant mortality among beneﬁciary children in
rural areas. No program eﬀect was found on neonatal mortality.
Lastly, Barber and Gertler (2008, 2010) investigate the impact of Oportu-
nidades on mean birthweight. They ﬁnd that babies born into households that
had already received their ﬁrst cash transfer are on average 127.3 grams heavier.
Nevertheless, it may be particularly important to explore the possibility of hetero-
geneous program eﬀects in this case as previous literature has shown that being
born with low weight (less than 2.5 kilograms) can negatively aﬀect a child's de-
velopment and probability of survival (see, for instance, Boardman et al. (2002),
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Behrman and Rosenzweig (2004), Friede et al. (1987), McCormick, (1985), McIn-
tire et al. (1999)). Learning whether children at the bottom of the birthweight
distribution have beneﬁted from Oportunidades is thus very relevant.
Chapter 2 in this thesis evaluates the impact of PROGRESA-Oportunidades
on the whole birthweight distribution. Using quantile regressions, the paper ﬁnds
that the program has had a positive eﬀect on birthweight, but babies at the upper
tail of the conditional birthweight distribution appear to have beneﬁted the most.
Speciﬁcally, the program impact varies from 135 grams on birthweights at the
20th percentile of the conditional distribution to 207 grams on birthweights at
the 80th percentile.
Furthermore, the paper uncovers the large deleterious eﬀect of maternal smok-
ing on lower quantiles. In particular, smoking decreases birthweights at the 20th
percentile of the conditional distribution by 460 grams, completely wiping out
any program beneﬁts. This eﬀect is not picked up by least squares regression
estimates.
It is however important to mention that previous evaluations have reported
that weight readings for under-ﬁve year-olds are sometimes inaccurate because of
two main reasons. First, children are weighted with clothes; and second, health
personnel do not usually calibrate the scales as they ignore how to do it (Pastrana
(2005)). This may explain why the INSP-CIESAS evaluation ﬁnds that a large
number of nutritional disorders among PROGRESA children remain undiagnosed.
Speciﬁcally, that evaluation cross-checked around 15,000 observations from the
two main public health providers in Mexico: the Health Ministry (SS) and the
Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS). They found that 40 (30) percent of
under-ﬁve year-olds registered as having normal weight in SS (IMSS) clinics were
actually undernourished; and 29 (21) percent of them were overweight. Moreover,
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among those who were registered as undernourished, 30-60 percent (depending on
their malnutrition level) were not given adequate treatment. The latter percent-
ages were similar for both health providers (Pastrana (2005)).
Importantly, whilst most of the children found to be malnourished were living
in rural areas, the majority of overweight children were urban residents. Assuming
that this tendency will continue, researchers at the National Institute of Public
Health (INSP) estimate that the incidence of malnutrition in the countryside
(especially in states like Guerrero, Oaxaca, Chiapas and Yucatan) would reach
acceptable levels only by 2050, and in indigenous communities by 2080 (Pastrana
(2005)), even in the presence of Oportunidades.
1.2.2.2.2 Adults' health
Regarding adults' health outcomes, Fernald et al. (2008a) analyse a sample of
30-65 year-olds who had been exposed to Oportunidades for 4-5.5 years. They
ﬁnd that body mass index, obesity prevalence, blood pressure, and prevalence of
uncontrolled hypertension were all slightly, though not signiﬁcantly, lower among
adults from intervention communities, compared to those in control localities.
Likewise, the former reported better ﬁtness outcomes (e.g. being able to exert
some physical eﬀort without suﬀering fatigue) than the latter.
In contrast, Fernald et al. (2008b), using the doubling of cash transfers com-
parison that has already been described, ﬁnd that the program actually worsened
most of the above outcomes (body mass index, grade I and II obesity, overweight
prevalence, and diastolic blood pressure) among 18-65 year-olds after the same
length (4-5.5 years) of program participation. These results are very relevant as
Mexico has recently been recognized as being the world's fattest nation, with
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32.8 percent of its population classed as obese.24
On the other hand, Andalon (2009) ﬁnds no eﬀect of Oportunidades on smok-
ing among adults after an average of four years under the program. The paper
does not ﬁnd an income eﬀect on adult male smoking either. In contrast, it
concludes that PROGRESA might have increased slightly the smoking rates of
adolescents in treated households.
Urquieta et al. (2009) in turn explore the eﬀect of Oportunidades on the
probability of obtaining skilled attendance at delivery during the ﬁrst 14 months
of the program being oﬀered. They ﬁnd that women who had a birth short before
the program's inception, and the next one under treatment were 11.4 percentage
points more likely to obtain skilled attendance while delivering the latter child.
However, no program eﬀect, or even a negative one, is found when the whole
sample is taken into account.
Ozer et al. (2011) ﬁnd Oportunidades to be associated with lower levels of
self-reported symptoms of depression (including lower frequency of stressful situ-
ations and higher perceived sense of control during the previous week(s)) among
rural women after 4-5.5 years of program exposure. In particular, Oportunidades
was associated with a 1.7-point decrease in the Center for Epidemiologic Studies'
Depression Scale (whose range is 0-60), compared to women in the control group.
The authors thus conclude that reducing poverty can have positive indirect eﬀects
on women's mental well-being.
Lastly, Barham and Rowberry (forthcoming) show that in the short-run (1-2.5
years of treatment), PROGRESA is associated with a 4 percent decline in average
senior (aged 65 and older) mortality due to diabetes and infectious diseases.
24See http://www.huﬃngtonpost.co.uk/2013/07/10/obesity-mexico-united-states-fattest-
country_n_3571988.html
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1.2.2.3 Education
As scholarships are a basic component of Oportunidades, the latter's eﬀect on
educational outcomes has been widely studied. In a nutshell, the program has
been found to be associated with higher school attendance (see, for instance,
Buddelmeyer and Skouﬁas (2003) and Cattaneo and Lalive (2009)); increased time
devoted to homework (Behrman et al. (2012)); higher enrolment rates (Behrman
et al. (2000), Schultz (2004), Behrman et al. (2005), Todd and Wolpin (2006)
and (2008), Dubois et al. ((2012), Attanasio et al. (2010), and Behrman et al.
(2012)); lower dropout rates and school re-entry (e.g. Behrman et al. (2005) and
De Janvry et al. (2006)); better school performance, i.e. less grade repetition
(Behrman et al. (2005)), and higher probability of passing grades (Dubois et al.
(2012); and higher educational attainment (Schultz (2004), Cho (2005), Behrman
et al. (2005) and Bando et al. (2005)).
More speciﬁcally, Attanasio et al. (2010) show that PROGRESA is associ-
ated with higher school enrolment rates, especially among children above primary
school; Todd and Wolpin (2006) ﬁnd such an association for children in each age
group, and Dubois et al. ((2012) for children at each school grade. Schultz (2004)
in turn divides the analysis by school grade and gender, and ﬁnds a positive pro-
gram eﬀect for both genders, with the impact being often larger for girls than
for boys. In contrast, Behrman et al. (2005) unveils a program eﬀect only for
children older than 11 years, with the largest impact being for those enrolled in
grades where the subsidies are the greatest. The latter ﬁnding is consistent with
Schultz (2004).
Additionally, Schultz (2004) and Behrman et al. (2005) estimate that the
accumulated eﬀect of increased schooling from grades 1-9 implies an average in-
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crease in educational attainment of 0.66-0.68 years,25 which in turn would imply
an 8 percent increase per year in real terms in the beneﬁciaries' future wages
(Schultz (2004)). On the other hand, Cho (2005) ﬁnds that the program eﬀect
on educational attainment is greater for children in larger families, as well as for
older female children. Finally, Bando et al. (2005) show that, while prior to the
program indigenous children had a lower average school attainment than similar
Spanish-speaking / bilingual children, that gap has been reduced after treatment
under PROGRESA.26
Oportunidades has also been found to be associated with lower dropout rates
among children aged 11-14 years (especially among those transiting from pri-
mary to secondary school), and with school re-entry among dropouts (Behrman
et al. (2005)). Moreover, De Javry et al. (2006) show that PROGRESA largely
decreases, or even completely counteracts, the negative eﬀects of shocks (e.g. un-
employment or illness of the household head, or severe natural disasters) on school
participation. Likewise, Cattaneo and Lalive (2009) show that the program in-
creases school attendance among eligible children, and that non-eligible (not poor
enough) children acquire more schooling when the subsidy is introduced in their
village. Behrman et al. (2005) however do not ﬁnd such evidence of spillover
eﬀects.
As for school performance, Behrman et al. (2005) uncover a negative associa-
tion between Oportunidades and grade repetition among 6-10 year olds. Likewise,
Dubois et al. (2012) show that the program positively aﬀects the likelihood of
passing grades for primary school children.
25This would represent a 10-percent increase in mean educational attainment among 18 year
olds, who currently have only 6.8 years of schooling on average.
26As an aside, note that the authors also ﬁnd that while children in indigenous households
had a greater probability of working before the onset of Oportunidades compared to Spanish-
speaking / bilingual children, this probability is reversed after treatment.
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Children in beneﬁciary households who were themselves too young (0-8 years
old) to be eligible for direct scholarship support at the program's inception (1997)
also seem to have beneﬁted from PROGRESA. In particular, Behrman et al.
(2009) show that a 4-5.5-year household-level program participation is associated
with: reductions in the school-starting age among children who were 1-2 years
old in 1997; increases in grades of completed schooling and progressing on time
among children who were 3-5 years in 1997; and increases in schooling grades
among children who were 6-8 years pre-program.
Finally, Behrman et al. (2012) show that Oportunidades has also been suc-
cessful in cities, where families had to register their interest in the program, and
then be deemed to be eligible. In this context, the paper ﬁnds that program
treatment increases school enrolment, educational attainment, and time devoted
to homework in the short-run (1-2 years of exposure).
Nevertheless, it is important to mention that some qualitative evaluations have
stressed the fact that often, although beneﬁciary children oﬃcially attend school
and pass school grades, they in fact do not. Teachers however agree to tick their
attendance and pass them in exchange of a bribe, which families can now aﬀord
to pay with their PROGRESA money (Pastrana (2005)).
1.2.2.4 Other program impacts
Being PROGRESA-Oportunidades an anti-poverty program, it is crucial to eval-
uate whether it has helped to reduce poverty. In this sense, such an eﬀect has
indeed been found (see, for instance, Bando et al (2006) and Skouﬁas and di Maro
(2008)), especially among indigenous people (Cardenas-Rodriguez et al. (2004)).
Moreover, using simulations, Davis et al. (2004) show that the program would
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allow households to cope during severe macroeconomic crises, like the one Mexico
experienced in 1995; and that it would help to reduce the post-crisis rural poverty
gap. This result is consistent with Skouﬁas (2007) who ﬁnds PROGRESA to be
associated with a reduction in the vulnerability of households' consumption to
income ﬂuctuations.
Likewise, Gertler et al. (2012) show that Oportunidades is associated with
increases in productive investments in microenterprises, animals, and land, all of
which increase households' income generation ability. The latter in turn is found
to be associated with a 34-percent increase in households' consumption after 5.5
years under the program. Moreover, Angelucci and de Giorgi (2009) contend that
ineligible households in treated villages also beneﬁt from the program, as they
too increase their consumption. In particular, they receive gifts and loans from
eligible households, or beneﬁt by reducing their savings.
Despite these ﬁndings, note that while the percentage of people living in
poverty and extreme poverty in Mexico may have decreased since the launch of
PROGRESA, the number of people living in those conditions may have actually
increased. That is, while 24.1 percent of the population lived under the minimum
welfare line27 in 2000, only 20 percent of the population were in that condition in
2012. This is equivalent to 23.7 and 23.5 million people, respectively. Likewise,
the ﬁgures regarding poverty were 53.6 and 45.5 percent in 2000 and 2012 re-
spectively.28 This means 52.7 and 53.3 million people respectively. Furthermore,
the United Nations' Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
27This means living on a per capita income, at the household level, lower than the required
amount to acquire the (per capita) basic food basket (CONEVAL (2013)).
28Note that these ﬁgures are not quite comparable as the deﬁnition and measurement of
poverty changed in 2010. In 2000, there were three diﬀerent types of poverty. The one that
is the most similar to the current poverty deﬁnition, which is given in footnote 18, is the assets
poverty. The latter was deﬁned as living on a per capita income, at the household level, lower
than the necessary amount to cover one's basic food, health, education, clothes, shoes, housing
and public transportation costs (see www.coneval.gob.mx).
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(ECLAC) has recently found that the only Latin American country, among those
for which data is available, where poverty increased in the last year was Mexico.
Speciﬁcally, according to the Commission's estimates, the percentage of people
living in poverty, as a percentage of the total population in Mexico, increased
from 36.3 in 2010, to 37.1 percent in 2012 (ECLAC (2013)).29
Even if we disregarded the ECLAC's estimates, as well as the number of people
living in (extreme) poverty according to the CONEVAL, and concentrated only
in the percentages provided by the latter, there are still, in my view, two serious
problems with Oportunidades. First, the reductions in poverty might not be self-
sustainable. That is, given that poverty deﬁnitions relate, in a nutshell,30 to
whether or not one has an income high enough to cover one's basic needs such
as food, education, health, housing, etc., and that Oportunidades provides funds
to cover some of those needs then, by deﬁnition, the number of people living in
(extreme) poverty should decrease, as long as the program targets the poor.
The question however is whether people who under the program are not ex-
tremely poor anymore, but just poor, or who are not poor at all anymore,
would remain above the (minimum) welfare line, if the program was cancelled.
Given that the program does not generate employment opportunities for school-
leavers, and even less for their parents, and that Mexico's economy has had a very
mediocre growth for three decades now, the most likely answer is no; beneﬁciaries
29Moreover, the same percentage was only 31.7 in 2006. Similarly, 8.7, 13.3, and 14.2 percent
of the total population in Mexico was living in a condition of extreme poverty or indigence
in 2006, 2010, and 2012, respectively. All ﬁgures are based on data from household surveys
conducted in the respective countries. Similar to the CONEVAL's methodology, the ECLAC
measures poverty as a synthetic multidimensional index that includes income measures as well as
a set of indicators of unmet basic needs. The latter include water and sanitation (lack of access
to improved water sources and lack of a toilet facility); energy (lack of electricity and using
a cooking fuel that is hazardous to health); dwelling (including makeshift housing materials
and crowding); and education (including non-attendance at school and non-achievement of a
minimum level of education) (ECLAC (2013)).
30For a detailed description of how poverty is oﬃcially deﬁned and measured in Mexico, please
refer to footnote 18.
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would go back to their (extreme) poverty condition overnight.
The second problem is equally serious, if not more. Note that, given that
the economy has not been growing much for decades, a large proportion of the
Oportunidades budget has come from international loans. Therefore, not only the
apparent31 improvements might not be permanent, but Mexico is accumulating a
large amount of debt32 in order to obtain them. Furthermore, those debt contracts
are such that the loans have to be repaid in a single payment, in 2025 and 2027
for instance. If the country does not have the necessary money to ﬁnance the
program now, it is not clear whether it will have it then, unless it starts having a
more sustained and higher growth rate.
In any case, the fact is that malnutrition coexists with obesity in Mexico,
that both are rampant,33 and that 53.3 million Mexicans live in poverty. The
latter will be impossible to eradicate unless its structural causes are attacked.
A more sustainable way to ﬁght poverty might thus be to promote and support
31Apparent because it has already been pointed out, for instance, that beneﬁciary children
are probably not even attending school and acquiring knowledge, and that young children may
not even be properly weighted (see Pastrana (2005)).
32Speciﬁcally, the program's annual budget for the ﬁscal year (1 January-31 Decem-
ber) 2009 and 2010 was around 1812 and 3076 million USD, respectively (using the oﬃ-
cial average exchange rate for each of those years (13.5 and 12.63 pesos per USD respec-
tively) provided by Mexico's Central Bank (www.banxico.org.mx)), including external evalua-
tions and operation costs (http://sipse.com/archivo/aumentan-presupuestos-a-seguro-popular-
y-oportunidades-11549.html). Likewise, the program's budget suggested by the Mexican pres-
ident for the ﬁscal year 2014 (i.e., it still has to be approved by congress) is approximately
5859 million USD. The Mexican government received a 1503.75 million USD loan from the
World Bank in 2009 (http://Oportunidades.mx/Portal/wb/Web/), and a 1250 million USD
one in 2010 (http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=99345) to ﬁnance Oportunidades. Furthermore,
a 600 million USD loan has already been agreed with the Inter-American Development Bank
for the ﬁscal year 2014 (http://www.24-horas.mx/presta-bid-a-mexico-10-del-presupuesto-de-
oportunidades/). All three loans have to be repaid in a single payment in 2025, 2027, and 2025,
respectively. In between, a variable (Libor-based) interest rate is payable. These are only some
of the loans that have been received from international organizations throughout the years to
fund Oportunidades.
33According to the INSP-CIESAS evaluation, 66 percent of the rural population is
malnourished (Pastrana (2005)). At the same time, in July 2013 Mexico was found
to be the country where the largest proportion of the total population is classiﬁed
as obese (http://www.huﬃngtonpost.co.uk/2013/07/10/obesity-mexico-united-states-fattest-
country_n_3571988.html)
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productive projects among poor people, to provide them with loans, training and,
crucially, to improve rural infrastructure. Road construction, for instance, may
have more development spillover eﬀects than transferring small amounts of cash
to poor people. Roads would reduce transportation costs and thus help farmers
to distribute and commercialize their products cheaper and easier. That would
increase their incomes and strengthen their productive units. They themselves
would then decide, and be able, to keep their children in school and provide them
with more nutritious food.
Finally, this subsection will review the literature on the impact of PROGRESA
on migration ﬂows. Angelucci (2004) and Rubalcava and Teruel (2006) ﬁnd a pos-
itive program eﬀect on international migration (to the USA). This is consistent
with theoretical predictions as the program helps to reduce household credit con-
straints. Nonetheless, Davis et al. (2005) ﬁnd the opposite eﬀect in the short-run.
Both results may coexist. That is, the program may decrease migration in the
short-run -while adolescents receive their scholarships-, and increase it in the long-
run -when the subsidy stops after high-school-, if former beneﬁciaries cannot ﬁnd
jobs in Mexico.
The latter is very likely, as qualitative evaluations point out. For instance, a
report by the Red Nacional de Promotoras y Asesoras Rurales (2000)34 ﬁnds that
around 85 percent of young beneﬁciaries were unable to ﬁnd work in their com-
munities. This result is consistent with Pastrana (2005) and Molyneux (2006).
Moreover, the latter study highlights that beneﬁciaries had the intention of mi-
grating to the USA after concluding their studies. The author thus points out that
without attention to rural livelihoods, Oportunidades risks educating the young
for the US labour market (Molyneux (2006, 444)). Lastly, the program eﬀect on
34This report was based on a survey of 309 beneﬁciaries and 60 interviews with promoters,
teachers and health professionals in eight PROGRESA localities.
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internal migration has been found to be positive by Rubalcava and Teruel (2006),
but non-existent according to Angelucci (2004) and Davis et al. (2005).
1.2.3 Women's status, autonomy and empowerment
1.2.3.1 Conceptual framework for empirical purposes
As it was pointed out in the introduction, there is not a unique deﬁnition of
empowerment that everyone agrees with. Kabeer (1999) however provides a con-
ceptual framework that is useful when trying to measure empowerment. In her
view, empowerment involves three dimensions: resources (pre-conditions), agency
(process) and achievements (outcomes), that jointly determine the meaning of
an indicator and thus its validity as a proxy for empowerment. In particular,
resources serve to enhance the ability to exercise choice, and include access and
future claims to material, human, and social resources. Agency in turn is the abil-
ity to deﬁne one's goals and act upon them even against the opposition of others;
it thus includes decision making, negotiation, manipulation, resistance, reﬂection,
and analysis.
This framework highlights that access to resources does not automatically
translate into women's empowerment; that is, into changes in the choices that
women are able to make. Likewise, better outcomes for women may not necessarily
be the result of women's increased empowerment / agency. Thus for instance,
PROGRESA increases women's access to (monetary) resources, but this may not
necessarily translate into women deciding how to spend that money. Furthermore,
in case we do observe better outcomes for women as a result of the program (e.g.
improved mothers' health, or an increase in the purchase of ladies clothing), could
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this unambiguously be interpreted as evidence of women's empowerment, i.e. as
the result of women's agency? Not necessarily as increased access to resources may
not translate into women deciding and acting more freely because they may face
opposition from their husbands. In that case, the former may choose to negotiate
with the latter, or even give up the full grant to them.
It is thus crucial to learn whose agency was involved in translating resources
(the cash transfers) into impact. Otherwise, better women's outcomes may rep-
resent, for instance, women's increased purchasing power, and/or their greater
role in decision-making about the distribution of household resources, and/or the
greater weight given by household heads (husbands) to women's well-being in
recognition of the latter's role in bringing in economic resources. On the other
hand, even if increased access to resources translated into greater women's ability
to make choices, the latter may not necessarily mean an overall improvement in
women's well-being (e.g. their health, the relationship with their spouses, etc.)
The next sections will review the empirical literature dealing with these issues.
Adato et al. (2000) provide another useful framework while trying to measure
empowerment. In particular, they break down empowerment into three diﬀerent
types, each of them having several underlying characteristics. These are:
 Personal empowerment: self-conﬁdence, self-esteem, sense of agency, sense
of `self' in a wider context, and dignity.
 Empowerment in close relationships: ability to communicate, negotiate, ob-
tain support, defend self/own rights, and a sense of `self' in the relationship.
 Collective empowerment: group identity, collective sense of agency, group
dignity, self-organization and management, and dignity.
33
On the other hand, it is important to mention that some researchers have drawn
distinctions between women's empowerment and female autonomy. Dixon-Mueller
(1998, 3), for instance, deﬁnes autonomy as an individual's capacity to act inde-
pendently of the authority of others, and female empowerment as the capacity
of individual women or of women as a group to resist the arbitrary imposition of
controls on their behaviour or the denial of their rights, to challenge the power
of others if it is deemed illegitimate, and to resolve a situation in their favour.
Other authors use the word process to diﬀerentiate between the two concepts.
Basu and Koolwal (2005, 16), for instance, assert that empowerment is a process
through which women become able to resist contrary pressures and take charge
of their own lives. Given these deﬁnitions, the empowered woman is presumably
the autonomous woman, and indeed, both concepts are usually operationalized
in the literature using the same indicators. Several studies thus use both terms
interchangeably (e.g. Jejeebhoy (2000), Kishor (2005), Basu and Koolwal (2005)).
In this context, this chapter will include both, studies referring to women's au-
tonomy as well as those measuring women's empowerment while reviewing the
empirical literature.
Additionally, Chapter 3 in this thesis introduces the notion of progressivity,
which is deﬁned as favouring the advancement of society towards improved con-
ditions.35 Since we are talking about women, this concept may be rephrased as
favouring the advancement of women towards improved conditions in society.
Furthermore, given that empirically progressivity highlights only conﬂictual el-
ements of gender relations (see Subsection 1.3.3.2.1), it may be seen as closely
related to the selﬁsh notion of women's empowerment.
35Given the dictionary deﬁnition of the adjective progressive
(http://www.wordsense.eu/progressive/), this would be the deﬁnition of the respective
noun progressivity.
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Nevertheless, progressivity crucially diﬀers in that it stands on purely humanist
grounds. That is, it is based exclusively on attitudes and behaviours of women
that could be defended from a pure human rights perspective, even though they
are likely to be contested within the household. Like this, the words progressivity
/ progressiveness emphasize the progressive, forward, as opposed to backward or
retrograde, nature of certain beliefs and attitudes towards gender roles. Subsection
1.3.3.2.1 provides a rationale for the introduction of this new concept.
Likewise, note that there is a lack of consensus regarding whether women's
education should be blindly equated to women's empowerment. On the one hand,
in a context of low female school enrolment rates in developing countries, em-
powerment has often been used to mean mere participation in the formal system.
Duﬂo (2012, 1053), for instance, deﬁnes empowerment as improving the ability of
women to access the constituents of development -in particular health, education,
earning opportunities, rights, and political participation.
Nonetheless, Stromquist (2002, 24) argues against such approach as it as-
sumes that the experience and knowledge attained in schooling automatically
prepare girls to assess their worth and envisage new possibilities, while in reality,
it may prepare them to accept established traditional gender roles. It is thus not
evident that schooling raises consciousness about the need to challenge asymmet-
rical gendered power which, in Stromquist's (2002) view, is more important for
determining women's agency, than the simple ability to code and decode print.
Therefore, whether or not education is empowering depends on the objectives
particular educational programs seek, the forms they take, and the instructional
modes they use. This debate is further reviewed in Subsection 1.3.3.2.1.1.
In any case, note that most empirical studies on women's empowerment include
education as a socio-economic characteristic rather than as a direct indicator of
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empowerment. Because of this, education is not included in women's empower-
ment/autonomy indeces. Instead, it might be seen as a determinant of direct
measures of empowerment (either indeces or individual indicators) and so, be in-
cluded in a table or equation showing correlations between those empowerment
setting variables (women's education, employment, co-residence with in-laws,
age at marriage, etc.) and direct measures of empowerment (e.g. Jejeebhoy
(2000), Frankenberg and Thomas (2001), Matthews et al. (2005), and Alfano et
al. (2011)).36
Alternatively, when no such correlation is shown ﬁrstly, education is then
simply used as an additional covariate in the main equation. It is then referred
in the text as an indicator of women's (socio-economic) status (e.g. Kishor and
Nietzel (1996) and Sathar and Kazi (2000)); as an enabling factor / indirect
/ proxy measure of empowerment (e.g. Kishor (2000)); or as a simple socio-
demographic characteristic (e.g. Hindin (2005)).
1.2.3.2 Measurements
Studies diﬀer in the dimensions (resources, agency and achievements) of em-
powerment which they focus on. Access to economic resources, as well as inher-
itance and property rights for women, may potentially be used as indicators of
the resource dimension of empowerment. However, as the PROGRESA example
in the previous subsection shows, access indicators simple point out to poten-
tial options available to women rather than to actual choice and so, they might
36Subsection 1.3.2 details the variables that Matthews et al. (2005) and Alfano et al (2011)
use as direct measures of empowerment. On the other hand, Jejeebhoy's (2000), Frankenberg
and Thomas' (2001), and Kishor and Gupta's (2009) empowerment indicators focus mainly on
women's participation in intra-household decision-making such as expenditures in food, chil-
dren's education, seeking healthcare for children, etc.
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not be meaningful measures of empowerment. Because of this, it is important
to relate any potential indicator to all three empowerment dimensions in order
to determine whether it is in fact a meaningful empowerment indicator (Kabeer
(1999)).
Consider, for instance, the following reality in India, where the law was changed
after independence to give Hindu men and women equal inheritance rights. De-
spite this legal change, Agarwal (1994) and Das Gupta (1987) account for the
diﬃculties (involving even been murdered) that women in the state of Punjab
face whenever they ask the law, rather than customary practices, to be applied.
The legal change thus failed to change traditions and customary law, such that
increased access to resources did not translate into changes in individual agency
and choice.
Because of this, researchers generally introduce some aspect of agency into em-
powerment indicators. Speciﬁcally, the concept of control has been widely used.
Kishor (2000, 124), for instance, deﬁnes empowerment as women's increased con-
trol over their own lives, bodies, and environment; and identiﬁes women's ability
to access information, take decisions, and act in their own interests, or the inter-
ests of those who depend on them as essential aspects of empowerment (Kishor
(2000, 119)). Like this, contrary to Basu and Koolwal's (2005) ﬁndings, Kishor
(2000) is, by deﬁnition, denying the possibility that there might be trade-oﬀs
between women's self-interest and their children's, and that empowerment may
aﬀect those interests diﬀerently depending on how exactly it is measured.
As Kabeer (1999) notes, control thus turns out to be as elusive to deﬁne
and measure as empowerment. For instance, in the literature control has been
used to mean having a say in relation to a resource (e.g. household budget);
choice (e.g. choosing own spouse); self-reliance (e.g. women's ability to support
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themselves without their husbands' help); and decision-making (having the ﬁnal
say) on various issues, which go from everyday decisions (e.g. purchase of food),
to once in a lifetime choices (e.g. selecting a marriage partner).
Other authors have structured empowerment / autonomy indicators into dif-
ferent spheres / domains as follows.
 Economic security: whether women: can support themselves without
their husbands' help (Kishor (2000)); make economic contributions to the
household; control their own income; and have assets / savings to use under
their own name and control (Alfano et al. (2011)).
 Decision-making: whether women have a say on:
Household decisions:
 Household budget (Kishor (2000)) / expenses / purchases (e.g. Cleland
et al. (1994), Sathar and Kazi (2000), Kritz et al. (2000)); and how to
spend husband's income (Kritz et al. (2000))
 Food purchased (Razavi (1994), Morgan and Niraula (1995), Sathar
and Kazi (2000)) / cooked (Kishor (2000))
 Purchase of clothes, jewellery and gifts for wife's relatives (Sathar and
Kazi (2000))
 Purchase of small items of jewellery (Jejeebhoy (2000))
 Purchase of major household goods (e.g. Jejeebhoy (2000), Becker
(1997), Sathar and Kazi (2000), Hashemi et al. (1996))
 Sale and purchase of assets (e.g. land) (Razavi (1994) and Kritz et
al. (2000)); purchase of major assets (Hashemi et al. (1996)); major
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market transactions (Morgan and Niraula (1995)); inputs, labour and
sale in agricultural production and other income-generating activities
(Razavi (1994)); and sale and purchase of livestock (Sathar and Kazi
(2000))
 Visits to friends and relatives (e.g. Cleland et al. (1994), Kishor (2000))
 Children's health: seeking healthcare for sick children (e.g. Razavi
(1994), Jejeebhoy (2000), Kritz et al. (2000), Kishor (2000))
 Children's rearing (Kritz et al. (2000))
 Children's education (whether or not to enrol them, type of school,
and how much education) (e.g. Razavi (1994), Cleland et al. (1994),
Kishor (2000), Kritz et al (1997), Sathar and Kazi (2000), Jejeebhoy
(2000))
 Children's marriage (e.g. Sathar and Kazi (2000), Kritz et al. (2000))
Strategic life choices:
 Number of children to have (e.g. Morgan and Niraula (1995), Becker
(1997), Sathar and Kazi (2000), Kritz et al. (2000))
 Use of family planning methods (e.g. Kishor (2000), Kritz et al. (2000))
 Wife working outside home (e.g. Morgan and Niraula (1995), Kritz et
al (1997), Becker (1997), Sathar and Kazi (2000))
 Mobility in the public domain: whether women can go alone to: the
market; the ﬁeld; the next village; the health centre; and to visit relatives
(e.g. Kishor (2000), Alfano et al. (2011)).
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 Participation in the public domain: participation in public action; par-
ticipation in organizations; speaking out in meetings; political and legal
awareness.
 Beliefs and perceptions: belief in daughters' education; perceptions of
own capabilities; beliefs in women's independence and rights; beliefs in equal
access to food, education, healthcare, and decision-making for women.
 Domestic violence: incidence of male violence (e.g. Jejeebhoy (2000),
Sathar and Kazi (2000)); fear from husband (Sathar and Kazi (2000)).
Answers to these questions are usually either given equal weights and combined
into a single index (i.e. ranging from 0 to 5 if there are 5 measurements within a
given sphere), or entered separately as dummy variables in a regression.
1.2.4 Does PROGRESA empower women?
1.2.4.1 Potential impact
Oportunidades centres on the development needs of children -both born and
unborn, but crucially depends upon women performing their traditional social
role as caregivers for its success. Women are entitled to receive cash beneﬁts,
but in return must ensure their children's regular attendance at school, regularly
take them for health check-ups, attend monthly meetings with promoters and
bimonthly health talks, and undertake unpaid work (SEDESOL (1999)). The
program thus eﬀectively makes cash transfers conditional on `good motherhood',
where the latter cannot include women missing a clinic appointment or a workshop
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because they were at work (Bradshaw and Quirós Víquez (2008)). PROGRESA
readily assumes that any actions that improve children's well-being are not a
`burden' for women, and that any `costs' that the latter bear are part of the
mothering role (Bradshaw and Quirós Víquez (2008)).
Indeed, women in beneﬁciary households must be self-sacriﬁcing mothers; at-
tending to the own needs of those women is not PROGRESA's main goal. This is
a clear example of the instrumentalist version of empowerment: women's altruism
is put at the service of their children's needs. Still, as Adato et al. (2000) suggest,
Oportunidades might empower women by:
 Giving them cash. This may increase women's intra-household bargaining
power, their decision-making autonomy regarding household expenditure,
and enhance their status in their communities.
 Directing the beneﬁts toward expenditures that normally fall within women's
decision-making domains (e.g. food). This may increase the number of de-
cisions that women make within the food / cooking sphere, but it might also
expand the decision-making domains in which women participate.
 Educating women about health, nutrition, hygiene, and family planning.
 Giving girls higher school bursaries compared to boys. This should encour-
age girls and parents to support female education and thus, increase girls'
chances of a better position in the future (in the household, labour market,
etc.)
Additionally, PROGRESA may empower women in other indirect ways. For in-
stance:
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 Increasing women's mobility. That is, by giving women opportunities to
leave their houses, and sometimes their communities, without their husbands
in order to fulﬁl their program obligations.
 Providing opportunities for women to communicate with each other and
talk about their concerns. Although it is not oﬃcially encouraged by the
program, this might occur, for instance, during the health talks, the meetings
with promoters, the community work, etc.
 Changes in the community gender context. Gender attitudes might change
when the government chooses to hand in money directly to mothers -rather
than fathers, and when girls' education is emphasized.
 Enabling women to develop conﬁdence with speaking out in groups. This
might be especially true in the case of promoters who have to speak out
during their monthly meetings with beneﬁciaries.
On the other hand however, given the new attention and time demands that
PROGRESA puts on women, the program may also unintentionally increase social
tensions within households (Adato et al. (2000)).
1.2.4.2 Actual impact
1.2.4.2.1 Impact on girls
By providing higher grants for girls since the onset of secondary education
(grade 7, usually 12 years of age), PROGRESA may have a diﬀerential eﬀect on
girls' schooling compared to boys'. As Subsection 1.2.2.3 has made clear, this
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in fact seems to be the case. In particular, Schultz (2004) estimates that the
accumulated eﬀect of increased schooling from grades 1-9 would imply a 0.72-year
increase on the average educational attainment of girls, compared to a 0.64-year
increase on boys'. Likewise, Behrman et al. (2000) estimate that the program
is positively associated with increased enrolment rates among 12-14 year-olds in
the short-run (between the years 1997-1999), and that the respective estimates
for females are larger than those for males.
Given the positive eﬀect of Oportunidades on schooling described in Subsection
1.2.2.3, one may expect to see a negative program impact on overall child labour.
In this respect, Parker and Skouﬁas (2000) do ﬁnd such evidence, both on paid
and unpaid work. Nevertheless, the authors also ﬁnd that a substantial number
of beneﬁciary children continue to combine work and school.
In particular, girls' reductions in work are less than their increase in school
enrolment, which implies that their leisure time is reduced under PROGRESA.
This is consistent with other paper's ﬁndings. Speciﬁcally, although no signiﬁcant
reduction in adults' labour market participation rates (see also Bando et al (2006)
and Skouﬁas and di Maro (2008)) nor in their leisure time (see also Skouﬁas and
di Maro (2008)) is found, there is evidence that satisfying program obligations
has put a burden on women's time resources, and that the latter's participation
in domestic chores has been slightly reduced under the program.
More recently, Behrman et al. (2011) ﬁnd that an additional 1.5 years (i.e.
5.5 versus 4 years) of program exposure is associated with an average increase in
schooling grades completed among children aged 9-15 years at the program's onset
(1997), of about 2.4 percent for boys, and 2.7 percent for girls. Likewise, greater
program exposure decreases the proportion of boys working by 4.1 percent, but
there is no signiﬁcant eﬀect for girls.
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The paper also compares children who have been under the program for 5.5
years to similar children with no program exposure. The results show that boys
aged 9-12 years pre-program (1997) accumulate 0.9-1 additional grades of school-
ing. Older children (13-15 years old in 1997) accumulate 0.5. Nevertheless, al-
though the respective eﬀect on girls aged 9-12 years pre-program is also positive,
it is smaller, being 0.7-0.8, and there is no eﬀect for older girls.
Additionally, the authors ﬁnd that young boys' (aged 9-10 years in 1997) wage
labour force participation rate decreases by 30 percent as a result of the program.
There is no overall impact for older boys (aged 13-15 pre-program), but there
are important reductions in agricultural work, implying some substitution from
agricultural to non-agricultural work.
In contrast, there is no eﬀect on young girls' (9-12 year old pre-program) wage
labour participation, but Oportunidades is associated with a 20 percent increase
in older girls' (13-15 years old in 1997) employment, for which there was no pro-
gram impact on schooling. It might thus be that these girls are substituting in
the labor market for their younger male siblings, who do experience increases
in their schooling as well as work reductions (Behrman et al. (2011)). The au-
thors present evidence that that increase may come from non-agricultural labour.
Lastly, regarding PROGRESA's impact in urban settings in the short-run (1-2
years), Behrman et al. (2012) ﬁnd a negative program eﬀect only on boys' work-
ing rates.
1.2.4.2.2 Impact on mothers
1.2.4.2.2.1 Positive impacts
Adato et al. (2000) analyse patters of intra-household decision making and
control of resources based on interviews with focus groups of beneﬁciaries, non-
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beneﬁciaries, and promoters in PROGRESA localities. Speciﬁcally, they investi-
gate the probability that the husband (wife) decides on his (her) own, relative to
the probability that the decision is made jointly by both spouses, regarding eight
diﬀerent issues. These are: how to spend women's PROGRESA income; household
expenditures (on food, child clothing, durables, and house repairs); and children's
health / education (taking the children for medical attention, telling them to go
to school, and giving them permission to leave the house).
They ﬁnd that the only domain in which women, both beneﬁciaries and non-
beneﬁciaries, report to make decisions on their own is on food purchases. Never-
theless, cash transfers slightly decrease the probability of husbands being the sole
decision maker in ﬁve areas: children's medical attention, school attendance and
clothing, food expenditures, and major house repairs. These changes are largely
consistent with PROGRESA's focus on children's healthcare, nutrition, and edu-
cation. Furthermore, treatment under PROGRESA increases the probability that
a woman decides on her own on the use of her extra income, relative to deciding
jointly with her husband. No spillover eﬀects were found on the decision making
patterns of non-beneﬁciaries.
Likewise, Lechene and Attanasio (2002) reject the unitary model of intra-
household distribution of resources among PROGRESA families. In particular,
the paper concludes that a wife's relative income share is a positive and signiﬁcant
determinant of her decision making power in her household.
On the other hand, Rivera et al. (2006) ﬁnd that overall domestic violence (i.e.
including any type of) is 1.9-5.9 percentage points less prevalent among women
residing in cities and who have been enrolled in Oportunidades for about 3 years,
depending on the control group used (eligible for beneﬁts but not enrolled, or not
eligible). The same is true for psychological violence. Likewise, physical, sexual,
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and economic violence is less prevalent among beneﬁciaries compared to similar
non-eligible women. Nonetheless, the authors highlight the need to investigate
who these women are. That is, to ﬁnd out how they have managed to fulﬁl the
cost-sharing responsibilities that the program demands from them for already
three years.
Maldonado et al. (2006) in turn interview focus groups of husbands in bene-
ﬁciary households, and ﬁnd that in all cases violent husbands rose up in a home
where domestic violence was prevalent. In their current home, tense situations
appear mainly due to money, sickness, sexuality, religion and decision making.
In general, husbands do not report money from PROGRESA as an issue trilling
violence, as they understand that that money is given to their wives explicitly to
fulﬁl their maternal duties towards their children. Therefore, they think that it
is appropriate that mothers receive and manage that money. Furthermore, they
admitted their appreciation for the program as the latter relieves them from some
of the pressure they feel for ensuring their families well-being.
Similarly, Angelucci (2008) ﬁnds that PROGRESA-Oportunidades decreases
husbands' alcohol abuse by 15 percent, and that small transfers decrease husband
violence by 37 percent for all households. However, large transfers increase the
aggressive behaviour of husbands with traditional views of gender roles, perhaps
because they see their identity threatened. In the latter case, the evidence is
inconsistent with the standard unitary, collective, and bargaining models of intra-
household allocation.
On the other hand, Molyneux (2006) ﬁnds evidence that the program has had
some impacts on personal empowerment. In particular, women felt that their
self-esteem was enhanced as a result of the stipends, and some even felt that they
acquired more status in their neighbourhoods, with shopkeepers treating them
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as creditworthy. Moreover, women felt that, by giving the resources to them,
and choosing them to take on PROGRESA's responsibilities rather than men, the
government recognizes their importance to the family's welfare, and their higher
level of responsibility with money and towards the family compared to men (Adato
et al. (2000)).
Lastly, some promoters mentioned that participating in the collective program
activities generated elements of personal empowerment in them. Speciﬁcally, they
recognized having gained increased freedom of movement, more conﬁdence speak-
ing out in groups, awareness of their situation as women, increased knowledge as
a result of the health talks and in general, opening their minds.37 They also
described increased opportunities to talk to other women about their concerns,
and to ﬁnd common experiences (Adato et al. (2000)).
1.2.4.2.2.2 Negative impacts
Participation in PROGRESA places extra time demands on women and in-
creases their workload. Women's duties include: travelling and waiting to receive
their grants; attending monthly meetings with promoters; attending health talks;
taking their children to schools and health clinics; attending their own healthcare
appointments; undertaking community work; and doing household work that was
previously done by some of the children who are now attending school (Adato et
al. (2000)).
In this context, some women report having experienced problems with their
husbands due to the time they spend out of the house to fulﬁll their program
responsibilities. Women thus try to minimize conﬂict by being certain to do their
housework (cleaning, cooking, and attending upon their children and husbands),
37Quoted in Adato et al. (2000, 7).
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as well as their work outside home (e.g. helping their husbands in the family's
agricultural plot), before leaving the house. This increases their time burdens,
but it is the price they are willing to pay to maintain intra-household harmony
(Adato et al. (2000)).
Similarly, Espinosa (2006) uses data from Oportunidades and focus groups
interviews and ﬁnds that most beneﬁciaries combine their usual domestic chores
with multiple economic activities. She then highlights the precariousness in which
these women's work takes place, and the fact that their labour market participa-
tion rate remains constant across age groups. The latter is in contrast to what
happens among the general population, where women's participation in the labour
force decreases during the childbearing period.
The author thus denounces that the fact that the program assigns the cost-
sharing responsibilities to women risks to introduce, leave unchallenged, and even
reinforce the restrictive interpretation of women's social role as mere and sole
caregivers, and their lower position in gender hierarchies. Additionally, Molyneux
(2006) notes that Oportunidades ' cost-sharing responsibilities may have large op-
portunity costs by preventing women from engaging in paid work.
Furthermore, in some communities, women and doctors denounced that men
take women's PROGRESA money. This is very relevant as it would inﬂuence the
type of goods that are purchased with that money, and for whom they are. It
also has implications for household power relations and the extent to which the
program is, or is not, changing them (Adato et al. (2000)).
On the other hand, some women reported that they are exercising broader
decision-making authority as a result of PROGRESA, and that they are experi-
encing a sense of new empowerment by no longer having to ask their husbands
for money each time they need to buy something. Nevertheless, these women also
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noted that if they now buy, for instance, shoes for the children, whereas previously
they used to receive money from their husbands to that end, husbands now give
them less money than they used to. This situation has implications for women's
net beneﬁt from the program (Adato et al. (2000)).
Finally, note that there is no evidence that PROGRESA has brought about
a change in attitudes and beliefs towards gender roles. For instance, although
women strongly support their daughters' education, when they are asked to com-
pare the importance of girls' education to that of boys', they, as well as fathers,
tend to favour boys'; the reasons being men's responsibility as breadwinners and
as head of their households, and the fact that girls get married,38 and become
housewives. Indeed, as long as the socioeconomic environment does not change
and opportunities for using secondary education in the wage labour market are
scarce or not existent, attitudes about the value of girls' education may remain
low.
1.2.5 Critical appraisal
1.2.5.1 Overall program
Despite the program being internationally perceived as very successful, it has
also been severely criticized. On the one hand, some of the studies that use the
evaluation sample to assess the program have suggested changes in the transfers'
schedule and / or in the targeting to increase eﬃciency.
For instance, Todd and Wolpin (2006) recommend eliminating the scholarship
for grades 3 to 5 and increasing it for grades 6 to 9 by about 50 percent. Such
38 Both phrases are quoted in Adato et al. (2000, 97).
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a change, they argue, would induce a greater impact (of about 0.1 years) on
average school attainment at a similar cost to PROGRESA. Likewise, Attanasio
et al. (2005) suggest eliminating the grant for primary education (grades 3-6),
and increasing it for lower secondary education (grades 7-9). They contend that
such modiﬁcation would allow the program to have substantially larger eﬀects
on enrolment for the latter, while having minor eﬀects for the former and being
revenue neutral for the government.
Similarly, De Janvry and Sadoulet (2006) advice to eliminate school bursaries
for primary education, as attendance at primary school is virtually universal.39
The authors further suggest targeting potential dropouts in the transition from
primary to secondary school, as well as allowing transfers to vary across ben-
eﬁciaries depending on their expected response to the subsidy. For this, only
observable, transparent, and non-manipulable indicators of non-enrolment risk
should be used. The paper estimates that these changes would result in huge
eﬃciency gains over the current poverty-based targeting. In particular, it would
cost only 25 percent of the budget spent in 2000 (one billion US dollars) without
increasing inequality among poor households.
Coady and Parker (2004) however ﬁnd that the program's demand-side subsi-
dies are still a more cost-eﬀective option to improve access to education for poor
households, than alternative supply-side interventions involving an extensive ex-
pansion of the school system. On the other hand, Coady (2006) shows that in
terms of welfare returns, an alternative targeting focusing only on geographic lo-
cation dominates demographic composition targeting, and that the latter in turn
dominates household proxy-means targeting. Nevertheless, the latter's welfare
39Note that despite these suggestions, the grants for primary-school children have not only
been kept, but they have been extended to include grades 1 and 2 in localities with less than
2500 inhabitants (SEDESOL (2013)).
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contribution increases substantially as the program expands into better-oﬀ local-
ities.
Likewise, Rubalcava and Murillo (2006) ﬁnd that locality characteristics such
as population size and marginalization indices inﬂuence poverty and the way in
which households use their cash transfers. Therefore, they suggest that target-
ing take into account municipality-level characteristics, rather than only house-
hold characteristics. Additionally, the paper ﬁnds that even when female headed
households are not always poorer, they have certain peculiarities that turn into
disadvantages, and that the program does not take into account in any way.
Moreover, beneﬁciary women often recognized the existence of `unequal re-
sponsibility' among people involved in the program. They felt, for instance, that
genuine cost-sharing would mean teachers not missing classes so often, and being
penalized if they did so. More generally, they criticized the lack of reliable ac-
countability mechanisms where complaints regarding the behaviour of oﬃcials or
professionals40 could be processed (Molyneux (2006)).
Furthermore, health services have not been able to cope with the increase in
demand generated by the program. In this sense, some evaluations have noticed
deﬁciencies in the quality and availability of healthcare, including lack of person-
nel and medicines (Pastrana (2005); Molyneux (2006)). In any case, only basic
preventive healthcare services are available in clinics in small towns,41 and the
infrastructure itself often consists only of a single room with no windows and no
ventilation (Pastrana (2005)). In order to obtain more serious treatment, peo-
40In this regard, Adato et al. (2000), for instance, report having met non-beneﬁciaries in
PROGRESA localities who described doctors not attending to beneﬁciary women who did not
speak Spanish. The reason being that general practitioners, untouched by a child dying in her
mother's arms, considered it a waste of time to doctor mono-lingual indigenous patients since
the latter would not understand them, nor being able to read the prescriptions.
41There are no clinics whatsoever in small villages; beneﬁciaries residing there have to travel
long hours to the towns where the clinics are located (Pastrana (2005)).
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ple have to travel to bigger towns and pay themselves for the (costly) service
(Molyneux (2006)).
Last but not least, there is evidence that PROGRESA has often been used
for political ends. Speciﬁcally, beneﬁciaries denounce that they are often black-
mailed into participating in political rallies of local candidates from the current,
and former, national incumbent party, the PRI. If they refuse, they are threatened
with being expelled from PROGRESA (Red Nacional de Promotoras y Asesoras
Rurales (2000)). More recently, in April 2013, a set of recordings that second
those, and more serious, claims was made public by the opposition party PAN.42
Nonetheless, the latter was in turn accused by the PRI of conditioning the enrol-
ment in Oportunidades to the prior registration of future beneﬁciaries as members
of the PAN, while the latter held Mexico's presidency between December 2000 and
November 2012.43
Academic research too has found evidence that politics, and not just poverty,
have determined the allocation of PROGRESA among localities. For instance,
Rocha Menocal (2001) ﬁnds that a greater proportion of households became PRO-
GRESA beneﬁciaries in 1999 in states where the national incumbent party, PRI,
had received a larger share of votes than the opposition in 1997, and where state
elections were scheduled to take place in 2000.
Likewise, Takahashi (2007) shows that in 2000, prior to the presidential elec-
tion, the federal government under PRI allocated higher PROGRESA expendi-
42Speciﬁcally, the videos show oﬃcials from all three government levels (municipal, state,
and federal) along with PRI candidates and representatives in possession of electoral rolls
of Oportunidades' beneﬁciaries organizing procedures for the massive use of government
structures and resources to beneﬁt the PRI in the then forthcoming elections in the state
of Veracruz (see http://radioquintanaroo.com/pan-denuncia-uso-de-programas-de-sedesol-para-
beneﬁciar-el-pri-en-eleccionesvideo/; http://aristeguinoticias.com/tag/casoveracruz/). The in-
cumbent PRI then did win the said elections.
43See http://aristeguinoticias.com/2304/mexico/difunden-diputados-del-pri-las-grabaciones-
contra-los-yunes/
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tures to municipalities governed by PRI, and where the degree of party competi-
tion was higher. Finally, Green (2005) ﬁnds that a 10-percentage point increase in
the 1997 PRI vote share in a given municipality increases the probability that that
municipality was enrolled in PROGRESA by the end of 2000 by over 4 percentage
points.
1.2.5.2 Empowerment
Although PROGRESA may empower women through managing the subsidy,
it eﬀectively naturalizes the social divisions through which gender asymmetries
are reproduced and so, it reinforces the existent patriarchal structure. That is, by
strengthening women's responsibilities for their children's welfare, the program
conﬁrms mothering as women's primary social role; any change in women's status
occurs only within the traditional domestic division of labour (Molyneux (2006)).
Molyneux (2006, 439) thus suggests that, in order to move equality issues
from rhetoric into practice, state policies should challenge, rather than deepen,
the "unequally valued forms of social participation for men and women regarding
the organization of care work. Additionally, the author highlights the fact that
women need, above all, a reliable income source and sustainable routes out of
poverty. PROGRESA however does not address these needs; it does not provide,
for instance, job training to help women to enter the wage labour market, nor
nurseries to support working mothers.
Like this, Molyneux (2006) denounces that Oportunidades makes women de-
pendent on a subsidy that, while it may enhance their social status and self-
respect, in doing little to help them secure sustainable livelihoods, puts them
at risk of remaining in poverty for the rest of their lives (p. 440). She goes
on saying that: stipends are no substitute for economic regeneration, and with-
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out attention to the household livelihoods and long-term prospects of the poor,
including women (p. 441), poverty will not be eradicated. Indeed, as a civil
servant at Mexico's Ministry for Social Development recognized, the program is
a `container', it does not alleviate poverty, but it prevents people from starving.44
In sum, if Oportunidades seeks to have a stronger impact on women's empow-
erment, it should probably have a broader developmental approach to poverty
reduction. It may thus include, for instance, alphabetization45 and training pro-
grams for women, productive projects, and gender-sensitive education for men.
1.3 Selﬁsh empowerment and ﬁrst birth sex selec-
tion in Delhi, India
1.3.1 Introduction
The third chapter of this thesis analyses the eﬀect of women's empowerment (pro-
gressivity) on the sex of the ﬁrst child, and on the duration to ﬁrst birth in India's
National Capital Territory, Delhi. Progressivity may be seen as closely related
to the selﬁsh notion of women's empowerment as it highlights only conﬂictual
elements of gender relations, but at the same time it stands on purely humanist
grounds. Subsection 1.3.3.2.1 will detail the rationale for introducing this new
concept.
Chapter 3 thus ﬁrst constructs a women's progressivity / empowerment index
using data from the third round of the Indian National Family Health Survey
44Quoted in Pastrana (2005).
45Note that it is not uncommon to ﬁnd beneﬁciary women who are illiterate. Nonetheless, de-
spite women consistently asking for PROGRESA to oﬀer them educational programs to acquire
basic literacy and numeracy skills, and doctors highlighting the importance of developing these
skills for the program to be successful (Adato et al. (2000)), adult education in PROGRESA
comes only in the form of the health talks.
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(NFHS-3). Speciﬁcally, empowerment is measured in terms of whether women
decide alone on their own healthcare; are free to visit the health facility on their
own; do not justify wife beating under any circumstance; and think that it is
justiﬁed to refuse sex to husbands under certain circumstances.
Four binary variables are ﬁrst created indicating whether or not women are
empowered / progressive regarding each of the above mentioned domains. Next,
a continuous progressivity index is estimated using a latent factor model, which
allows controlling for correlation between observed characteristics that may in-
ﬂuence demographic outcomes, and any unobserved heterogeneity. The chapter
then assesses the eﬀect of women's empowerment / progressivity on the sex of the
ﬁrstborn, and on the duration to ﬁrst birth in Delhi.
The reason for focusing on Delhi is that, unlike other Indian states / territo-
ries, it has a distorted sex ratio (with missing girls) even for ﬁrst order births.
Furthermore, its child sex ratio46 has not improved in the last decade. The results
show that a one-standard deviation increase in the women's progressivity index
increases the likelihood of a ﬁrstborn girl by 5.8 percentage points, compared
to women who have not yet given birth. Additionally, more progressive women
do not experience longer ﬁrst birth intervals. These results are consistent with
empowered women being less inclined to sex-select their ﬁrst child in Delhi.
Lastly, the chapter estimates the ﬁrstborn's sex equation for two other Indian
states: Kerala and Punjab. Progressivity is not found to signiﬁcantly aﬀect the
probability of having (reporting) a ﬁrstborn girl in any of those states. This result
is expected in the case of Kerala, as that state does not suﬀer from an imbalanced
child sex ratio, but it is less expected in the case of Punjab, where a problem
of `missing' women does exist. Subsection 1.3.3.3 argues why individual-level
46That is, the number of boys in the age group 0-6 for every 100 girls in the same age bracket.
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empowerment may be helpful in reducing existent gender inequalities in Delhi,
but not in Punjab.
In a nutshell, that subsection contends that these ﬁndings highlight the rele-
vance of the community gender context, which can be inﬂuential in negating or
enhancing the eﬀects of individual empowerment on well-being outcomes. That
is, as Chapter 3 shows, women in Delhi are collectively more progressive than
women in the rest of India, such that the context may further enhance the eﬀect
of individual progressivity. In contrast, progressive women in Punjab might not
ﬁnd a supportive environment that allows them to turn their progressive thoughts
(e.g. defending the life of their daughters) into action.
This does not mean that there are no women with low progressivity levels in
Delhi. There are (although less than in Punjab), and that may in fact partly
explain why sex-ratios are unbalanced there, but the idea is that women who
happen to be progressive enough as to want to keep a girl child, manage to do so
because they may not be `punished' by the community for not having conformed
with the patriarchal social norms. This might be true, ﬁrstly because perhaps
those rules are less entrenched in people's minds in Delhi; and second, because
women there might not be known by the wider community. Therefore, collective
action that aims at empowering communities of women (and instilling gender
egalitarian thoughts in men) may have more far reaching beneﬁts on reducing
gender inequalities, than the increase in empowerment of isolated agents.
Clearly, community-level empowerment is obtained by the aggregation of em-
powered individuals, such that one may wonder which one came ﬁrst. In the case
of Delhi, being the National Capital Territory, the environment there may have
always been more open-minded and liberal than elsewhere in India. Then, as new
migrants arrive with their less progressive mindsets, they ﬁnd a more progressive
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environment and may thus, little by little, become themselves more progressive.
Next, each generation born in Delhi may itself be more liberal, such that the
overall context becomes each time more progressive. Subsection 1.3.3.3 provides
suggestive evidence that something like this may indeed be at play.
1.3.2 Empowerment indicators in the Demographic and Health
Surveys
Chapter 3 uses data from the third round of the Indian National Family Health
Survey (NFHS-3), which is part of the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS).
The DHS provide information on population, health and nutrition for women,
children, and men, and have been conducted in 90 diﬀerent developing countries
since 1984. Data from the DHS are representative at the national level and are
also comparable across countries, as three near-identical core questionnaires are
usually applied. Those questionnaires are: one for the household, one for women,
and one for men (Kishor (2005)).
The third chapter in this thesis uses data from the women's core questionnaire
of the NFHS-3. That survey was conducted in 2005-2006, it is representative at
the national and state levels, and interviewed a total of 124,385 women aged 15
to 49 years. The chapter does not use previous rounds of the NFHS, conducted
in 1992-3 and 1998-9 respectively, as they do not contain some of the questions
that were used to create the progressivity index. Indeed, it was only in late 1997,
starting from the MEASURE DHS+ phase of the DHS project, when there was
an increased eﬀort to integrate gender into the surveys (Kishor (2005)).
At that point, advisory groups of gender experts were constituted to revise the
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questionnaires. The process resulted in the addition in 1999 of four sets of gender-
related questions into the women's core questionnaire, as well as in the inclusion
of standardized modules on domestic violence, women's status, and female genital
cutting. Nevertheless, the two latter modules have not yet been implemented in
several countries, including India.
Still, the questions included in the post-1999 version of the women's core
questionnaire are often used to develop female empowerment indicators. Those
questions include: women's participation in household decision making; questions
on gender-related hurdles in accessing healthcare; and two sets of questions on
women's acceptance of gender-role norms that justify men's control over women.
More speciﬁcally, the four sets of gender-related questions that were added to the
women's core questionnaire in 1999 are:47
I. Who in your family usually has the ﬁnal say on the following decisions:
 Your own healthcare?
 Making large household purchases?
 Making household purchases for daily needs?
 Visits to family or relatives?
 What food should be cooked each day?
Responses are coded as: Respondent; Husband/partner; Respondent and hus-
band/partner jointly; Someone else; Respondent & someone else jointly; Decision
47Note however that in fact, not every DHS included all of these questions. The NFHS-3,
for instance, lacks one of the household decision making domains (the one regarding what food
to be cooked each day), one of the factors preventing women from getting medical advice or
treatment (the one regarding knowing where to go), and one of the grounds for refusing sex
(the one regarding having recently given birth). On the other hand, it contains two additional
factors preventing women from getting medical advice or treatment (concern that there may not
be a female health provider, and concern that there may be no drugs available); as well as two
grounds for justifying wife beating (being suspected of being unfaithful, and showing disrespect
for the in-laws).
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not made/not applicable.
II. Many diﬀerent factors can prevent women from getting medical advice or
treatment for themselves. When you are sick and want to get medical advice or
treatment, is each of the following a big problem or not?
 Getting money needed for treatment?
 Knowing where to go?
 The distance to a health facility?
 Having to take transport?
 Not wanting to go alone?
 Getting permission to go?
 Concern that there may not be a female health provider?
Responses are coded as: It is a big problem; It is a small problem; It is not a
problem.
III. Sometimes a husband is annoyed or angered by things that his wife does. In
your opinion, is a husband justiﬁed in hitting or beating his wife in the following
situations:
 If she goes out without telling him?
 If she neglects the children?
 If she argues with him?
 If she refuses to have sex with him?
 If she burns the food?
Responses are coded as: Yes; No; Don't know.
IV. Husbands and wives do not always agree on everything. Please tell me if you
think a wife is justiﬁed in refusing to have sex with her husband when:
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 She knows her husband has a sexually transmitted disease?
 She knows her husband has sex with other women?
 She has recently given birth?
 She is tired or not in the mood?
Responses are coded as: Yes; No; Don't know.
Additionally, there are other questions, which have been used in the DHS
literature to create female empowerment / autonomy indicators. Those questions
relate to physical freedom, and to access and control over economic resources.
In the case of mobility, the following questions are asked in the women's core
questionnaire:
Are you usually allowed to go to the following places alone, only with someone
else, or not at all?
 To the market?
 To the health facility?
 To places outside the village?
Responses are coded as: Alone; With someone else; Not at all.
As for economic security, the following is asked:
 Would you say that the money you earn is more than what your husband
earns, less than what he earns, or about the same?
Responses are coded as: More than husband; Less than husband; Husband has
no earnings; Don't know.
 Who decides how the money you earn will be used: mainly you, mainly your
husband, or you and your husband jointly?
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Responses are coded as: Respondent; Husband; Respondent and husband jointly;
Other.
 Who decides how your husband's earnings will be used: mainly you, mainly
your husband, or you and your husband jointly?
Responses are coded as: Respondent; Husband; Respondent and husband jointly;
Husband has no earnings; Other.
 Do you have any money of your own that you alone can decide how to use?
Responses are coded as: Yes; No; Don't know.
A brief, non-exhaustive, review of the literature that has used DHS data to
create measures of female empowerment / autonomy follows. The survey may at
times seem too detailed but that was needed in order to inform the reader about
the diﬀerent well-being achievements that have been investigated in the literature
(e.g. women's versus child outcomes), the diﬀerent empowerment indicators that
have been used, the way in which they have entered the analyses and, lastly, to
highlight the fact that variables such as education have generally not been used
as direct indicators of empowerment. Instead, education has commonly been used
in the literature as a simple socioeconomic characteristic.
Basu and Koolwal (2005) use data from the second round of the NFHS for
the state of West Bengal48 to go beyond the oft-mentioned multidimensionality
of empowerment, and question instead whether those dimensions are indeed all
measuring empowerment. Therefore, they explore the eﬀect of both instrumental
and selﬁsh attributes and behaviours on the part of women on several well-being
outcomes for the latter, as well as on child health indicators. In particular, nine
48Note that no explanation was given for choosing this particular state within India.
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women's welfare outcomes are considered. These relate to their nutrition (whether
or not women usually consume the following four sets of elite foods at least once
per week: milk and curd, fruit, eggs and chicken, and meat or ﬁsh) and health
(body-mass index, whether women sought advice for reproductive health problems
in the last three months,49 and three probabilities for lack of: anaemia, health
problems after the last birth, and reproductive health problems in the last three
months).
Four probabilities related to women's last pregnancy / child health are also
investigated. These are: take-up of antenatal care, institutional delivery, child
was born alive, and newborn does not suﬀer anaemia. Lastly, three probabilities
regarding the newborn's immunization status are analysed. In particular, whether
the child has had all recommended vaccines, none at all, or at least one.
Indicators of women's selﬁsh / self-indulgent empowerment include: age, age
gap between wife and husband, media contact (including newspaper/magazine
and radio), wife does not need permission to visit family and friends, she decides
on her own on her healthcare, she is allowed to have money set aside to use as
she wishes, and she does not justify domestic violence.
Instrumental / responsibility indicators of women's empowerment on the other
hand include: woman's contribution to total family earnings (four dummy vari-
ables), woman's decision making participation regarding what to cook and pur-
chasing jewellery / other household items (two dummy variables per decision
domain, one for deciding on her own and one for deciding jointly with others,
leaving no participation as the reference category), and woman's freedom to go
to the market (two dummy variables, one for being allowed to go with permis-
sion and one for not requiring permission, leaving not been allowed to go at all
49Note that for this outcome, all women were included, regardless of whether or not they
experienced reproductive health problems in the previous three months.
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as the reference category). The paper also controls for women's socioeconomic
characteristics in the form of: location (rural / urban), caste, household stan-
dard of living, household size, sex of the household head, woman's and partner's
educational attainment, and a pregnancy indicator.
The paper ﬁnds that women's selﬁsh behaviours and attributes correlate more
closely with women's improved food consumption and better reproductive health,
than with child health outcomes. Moreover, several of the instrumental behaviour
indicators are uncorrelated or negatively correlated with women's own welfare
indicators, but they are positively correlated with child health outcomes. The
latter in general are also signiﬁcantly and positively associated with instrumental
attributes. The paper thus points out the potential trade-oﬀs between women's
own health versus child health that may result from the presence of the two
diﬀerent notions of empowerment.
Desai and Johnson (2005) in turn use a cross-section of 12 countries to ex-
amine the eﬀect of women's empowerment on child immunization, nutrition, and
mortality. More speciﬁcally, the countries under investigation are: Benin, Egypt,
Malawi, Mali, Uganda, Zimbabwe, India, Nepal, Haiti, Colombia, Nicaragua and
Peru. Two outcome variables are investigated for 1-5 year-olds: the number of
vaccinations received and the height-for-age standardized score. A third depen-
dent variable is the probability of dying as a child (1-5 years old) for children born
5-10 years prior to the interview.
Maternal empowerment is measured through a dummy variable indicating
whether or not women have the ﬁnal say in at least one of the four following
decisions. Making day-to-day household purchases, making large household pur-
chases, obtaining healthcare for themselves, and visits to family and friends. Ad-
ditionally, community-level empowerment is accounted for by including a variable
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measuring the proportion of women in the sampling cluster who have the ﬁnal
say in making at least one of the decisions mentioned above. In particular, all
women in the cluster who have had at least one child are included, regardless
of the current age of their children. Socio-economic controls are: indicators for
mother's and her partner's education, household wealth, child's birth cohort and
urban residence.
The paper ﬁnds a positive eﬀect of individual empowerment on children's
height-for-age in all countries, but the eﬀect on child immunization and mortality
is geographically less consistent. Additionally, the paper shows that community-
level empowerment is often more important on child health outcomes than individual-
level empowerment. These results emphasize the relevance of the gender context
on children's health achievements.
Matthews et al. (2005) in turn examine the role that women's autonomy play
in the timely use of maternal services by women who have recently given birth,
and who reside in the Indian state of Maharashtra. Speciﬁcally, they divide the
sample into four groups: residents in the slums of Mumbai, residents in Mumbai
not in slums, and those outside Mumbai (urban / rural Maharashtra). Three prob-
abilities are investigated as dependent variables. In particular, whether: the ﬁrst
prenatal care visit took place during the ﬁrst pregnancy trimester, women have
had at least three antenatal care visits, and delivery took place in an institution.
Women's autonomy is measured in terms of whether or not women participate
in the decision to: obtain healthcare for themselves, purchase jewellery and other
items, and go and stay with their families; whether or not they need permission to
go to: the market, and visit friends and relatives; and whether they are allowed to
have money set aside to use as they wish. The study also controls for women's em-
ployment and education, their age, religion, media (TV and newspaper) contact,
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their previous place of residence (urban / rural), and who heads the household.
The paper ﬁnds that women in urban Maharashtra have on average higher
autonomy and more timely use of maternal care services than women in rural
Maharashtra, regardless of whether or not they reside in Mumbai. Moreover,
women in Mumbai's slums have higher autonomy and better access to timely
maternal care than women in non-Mumbai urban areas. Similarly, the eﬀect of
the autonomy indicators on maternal care seeking behaviour is stronger and more
consistent in slum areas of Mumbai, than in rural Maharashtra. These results
show that the role that autonomy plays in the use of maternal services varies by
whether or not meaningful healthcare choices are available.
Hindin (2005) explores the role that women's autonomy play in securing women's
adequate nutrition in Zambia, Malawi, and Zimbabwe. These countries were cho-
sen as they increasingly face a dual crisis: HIV/AIDS and acute food insecurity.
Furthermore, women's nutrition is particularly relevant there as women are of-
ten the producers of food. The dependent variable is the probability that women
have chronic energy deﬁciency (CED), which is deﬁned as having body mass index
(BMI) lower than 18.5.
Women's autonomy is measured using three continuous variables counting the
number of decisions (out of a total of four for Zambia, ﬁve for Zimbabwe, and six
for Malawi) in which: women have the ﬁnal say, the partner has the ﬁnal say, and
women and partners have a joint say. Speciﬁcally, the decisions relate to own's
health, large household purchases, and visits to family, friends, or relatives. Due
to being available in their respective surveys, the following additional decision
making domains were included in some cases. The number of children to have
and when in Zambia and Malawi, and daily household purchases and food to be
cooked each day in Zimbabwe and Malawi.
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Furthermore, the gender context / women's status in society is accounted
for by including an index of the number of domains (up to a maximum of ﬁve)
where women see wife beating as justiﬁed. The paper also controls for women's
individual status by including the age, educational, and occupational diﬀerences
between them and their husbands, as well as an indicator of whether or not they
have ever been beaten by their partners.
The paper ﬁnds that women with lower autonomy (i.e., those in households
where partners make more decisions on their own), are at an increased risk of
CED in Zambia and Malawi, but not in Zimbabwe, where female autonomy is
substantially higher. Nonetheless, making more decisions on their own, or having
no participation at all from their partners also marks women in the former coun-
tries as nutritionally disadvantaged. This makes sense if no participation means
that partners are unable, or unwilling, to contribute to the household. These re-
sults highlight the importance of the gender context. They suggest that complete
decision making autonomy in communities where such autonomy is not the norm,
may isolate women and increase their disadvantage rather than decreasing it.
Mumtaz et al. (2005) examine how gendered access to resources and couple
dynamics impact condom use at the most recent sexual encounter among men
and women in Uganda and Zimbabwe. These countries were chosen as they have
relatively high rates of HIV/AIDS. Gendered access to resources is controlled for
through an employment and occupation indicator, a media contact score (rang-
ing from 0 to 6 and accounting for radio, TV and newspapers exposure), and a
HIV/AIDS-speciﬁc knowledge score (ranging 0-9 and based on 9 questions).
Gendered couple dynamics in turn are measured in terms of the relationship
status (married / living together); a level of communication score (ranging from
0-4 and including family planning and desired family size); control of women's
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income; a women's participation in household decision making score (ranging
from 0-4 and including decisions on large household purchases, daily purchases,
visits to family and friends, and the food to be bought); an attitudes towards wife
beating score (ranging from 0-5 and including beating if wife goes out without
informing her husband, if she neglects the children, if she argues with her husband
/ partner, if she refuses to have sex, and if she burns the food); and an attitudes
score regarding the acceptability of women refusing sex to their husbands (ranging
from 0-4 and incorporating the following circumstances: if she is tired, if she has
recently given birth, if she believes that his partner is unfaithful, and if he has an
STI).
The paper does not ﬁnd consistent support for the hypothesis that condom use
is related to greater women's autonomy. However, access to resources, particularly
in the form of HIV/AIDS-speciﬁc knowledge, does positively aﬀect condom use.
The socio-legal status of the relationship is also very important as condoms are
least likely to be used during sexual intercourse within marriage. Furthermore,
condom use is generally motivated by the need to prevent pregnancy rather than
sexually transmitted diseases. In this context, the authors hypothesize that con-
dom use may not necessarily be women's requirement, but instead reﬂect men's
power over women with whom they want to have sex, but do not want to bear
the responsibility for having children.
The main paper's ﬁnding is consistent with Becker (1997), who analyses the
eﬀect of women's empowerment on the use of contraception and the take-up of
prenatal care in Zimbabwe. Women's empowerment is measured in terms of
women's participation in household decision-making. Speciﬁcally, on: the pur-
chase of household items, wife's work outside home, and the number of children
to have. The results show that empowerment signiﬁcantly improves the ﬁt of the
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pre-natal care equation, but has almost no aﬀect on contraceptive use.
Lastly, Alfano et al. (2011) analyse the eﬀect of maternal autonomy on chil-
dren's school enrolment age in three Indian states: Andhra Pradesh (AP), Kerala,
and Uttar Pradesh (UP). These states were chosen as they illustrate diﬀerent ed-
ucational realities in India. In particular, Kerala has very high rates of school
enrolment and adult literacy, and a high average educational attainment. In
contrast, UP has some of the lowest education outcomes in India, and AP is in
between those two extremes.
Autonomy is measured in terms of four diﬀerent spheres for a total of 19 binary
measures. The spheres are: economic (women decide either alone or jointly with
their husbands on what to do with their husbands' money, and women have money
of their own that they alone can decide how to use); physical (women are allowed
to go alone or jointly with someone else to: the market, the health clinic, and
places outside the community); decision-making (women decide either alone or
jointly with their husbands on: their own healthcare, small household purchases,
large household purchases, and visiting family and friends); and emotional (women
do not justify wife beating if wives: argue with their husbands, are disrespectful
with the in-laws, go out without telling their husbands, neglect the house or the
children, refuse to have sex with their husbands, do not cook properly, and if
husbands suspect their wives of being unfaithful. Additionally, women justify
wives refusing sex to husbands if the latter have a sexually transmitted disease or
other women, or if wives are tired).
The paper also controls for child's birth order, mother's caste and religion,
parental educational attainment, and household's wealth quintile. The paper es-
timates a latent factor model where the dependent variable, school enrolment age,
is jointly determined with maternal autonomy. This was done as both variables
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are modelled as being associated with the same parental and household charac-
teristics.
The results show that autonomy is not associated with maternal, nor house-
hold's socio-economic characteristics in Kerala (except for maternal education),
but that it is strongly correlated with those characteristics in the other two states.
Furthermore, autonomy positively aﬀects the school starting age in UP, but it is
less important in AP, and not signiﬁcant at all in Kerala. These results may
highlight the role that the community gender context can play on children's well-
being, and how it interacts with individual autonomy. That is, the latter may
be less important in contexts where the norm is to prioritize children's education
(e.g. Kerala), than in contexts where enrolling children at school at the recom-
mended age (6 years old) is less common (e.g. UP). Note however that in this
case, unlike the dependent variable in Chapter 3, enrolling children at school at
the recommended age, albeit uncommon in some Indian states, may attract little
opposition from others.
1.3.3 Progressivity and sex selection in Delhi
1.3.3.1 The outcome variable: Firstborn's biological sex
The existence of gender disparities in health and wellbeing has been well doc-
umented in the case of India (e.g. Das Gupta (1987)), including disparities in
morbidity and mortality rates (e.g. Dreze and Sen (1995)) that contribute to
skewed sex ratios. The role of women's empowerment / autonomy on those dis-
parities, as well as on ideal family size, contraceptive use, and total fertility, all of
which in a context of strong son preference may inﬂuence sex ratios, has also been
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investigated using Indian data (see, for instance, Dreze and Sen (1995), Mason
and Smith (2000), Schuler et al. (1995) and Mason and Smith (2000); and Dyson
and Moore (1983) and Malhotra et al. (1995), respectively).
Nonetheless, apart from the rare newspaper article (mis)reviewing a book
(Hvistendahl's (2011) one) and concluding that female empowerment often seems
to have led to more sex selection (Douthat (2011)), I am not aware of any paper
analysing the role of direct measures of women's autonomy / empowerment on
the probability of having a boy / girl as an indirect measure of sex selection, or
otherwise. Education, a so called indirect measure of women's autonomy / em-
powerment, is included, for instance, as a covariate in Bhalotra and Cochrane's
(2010) study of sex selective abortions in India. Nevertheless, that paper does not
deal with female empowerment / autonomy in any way.
Other authors use aggregated data at the district-, state-, or country-level to
analyse the sex ratio itself as an indicator of women's empowerment / equity (e.g.
Nangia (2005) and Nayak and Mahanta (2012)); or to assess the impact of sex
ratios on various measures of women's status / roles including, for instance, the
percentage of married women, the divorce rate, female labour-force participation
rates, total fertility, etc. (South and Trent (1988)). Chapter 3 in this thesis is
thus, to the best of my knowledge, the ﬁrst study that investigates the impact
of women's individual-level empowerment on the biological sex of children in a
context of imbalanced sex ratios, and otherwise.
The importance of analysing what types of women are more likely to allow
(report) the birth of a daughter in places with `missing women' lies, on the one
hand, on the negative consequences that such imbalance has on the girls who
happen to be born. In particular, skewed sex ratios have been found to be pos-
itively correlated with increased bride buying (see, for instance, Das Gupta and
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Shuzhuo (1999), Blachet (2005), and Hvistendahl (2011)) and the abduction of
girls (Kaur (2004)) / sex traﬃcking (Hvistendahl (2011)). In order to avoid the
latter, parents try to marry oﬀ their daughters at a younger age (Kaur (2004)).
Child brides are however more vulnerable to domestic violence (Rao (1997),
Mishra, (2000), Hindin (2002), Kaur (2004)), they are not sent to school by their
in-laws, and are put under great pressure to get pregnant as to prove their fer-
tility, all of which helps to perpetuate poverty (Otoo-Oyortey and Pobi (2003)).
Moreover, young girls are at an increased risk of dying from pregnancy and labour
complications (Mayor (2004)), and of giving birth prematurely and / or to low
birthweight babies (Khashan et al. (2010)). The latter in turn contributes to a
higher risk of neonatal and infant mortality and morbidity (McCormick (1985),
Friede et al. (1987)).
Increased male-to-female sex ratios have also been found to be positively corre-
lated with higher crime rates (Edlund et al. (2007)). Furthermore, 'surplus' men
(unmarried, low-status, and young) may be more prone to abuse drugs (Kaur
(2004), Tucker et al. (2005)) and to engage in risky sexual behaviours (Scott
et al. (2012)), both of which would lead to an increase in HIV/AIDS infection
rates (Tucker et al. (2005)). Moreover, 'surplus' males may also pose a threat to
international peace should their governments fail to engage them in productive
activities at home (Hudson and den Boer (2004)).
On the other hand, the topic in Chapter 3 is relevant for the analysis of
women's empowerment given what Kabeer (1999) calls the problem of values
in that literature. Speciﬁcally, she asserts that achievements, as relevant aspects
of empowerment,50 can in general be divided into two: on the one hand basic
50Empirically, one could analyse the impact of women's empowerment on well-being achieve-
ments (or on gender diﬀerentials in those outcomes), or aggregate individual achievements and
use them as empowerment indicators themselves.
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fundamentals of survival and well-being (e.g. nutrition, morbidity, mortality or,
perhaps more generally, life expectancy, etc.), and on the other, other valued
functioning achievements (e.g. political representation).51 The latter however run
the risk of representing external values (the researcher's), rather than women's
own choices.52
In this sense, note that while allowing the birth of a daughter is a basic survival-
related functioning, that outcome may also be seen as representing external values.
That is, someone may argue that if women choose to abort the baby girl that is
their `free' choice, which we (researchers, outsiders) should respect, and even
conclude -as Douthat (2011) does, that female empowerment (free choice) leads
to sex selection.
In this context, it is important to note three things. First, that Chapter 3 does
not implicitly impose a normative restriction on what biological sex is best. That
is, the chapter does not study the probability of giving birth to a baby girl versus
a boy. Instead, it analyses both of those probabilities jointly (versus still being
childless), using a competing risk model. This allows for female empowerment to
potentially aﬀect both probabilities, such that if more progressive women in Delhi
happen, as they do, to be more likely to report a girl as the ﬁrstborn, that does
not imply that they are selectively aborting boys.
Second, the topic in Chapter 3 is relevant because, as Kabeer (1999, 457) as-
serts, the apparently `voluntary' nature of such choices should not detract our
51The United Nations Development Program's Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), for
instance, focuses only on the latter. It includes the proportion of seats held by women in
national parliaments, the percentage of women in economic decision making positions (including
administrative, managerial, professional, and technical occupations), and women's income share
as a proportion of men's income in the same jobs.
52A contemporaneous illustration of this risk could be the declaration of the "International
Topless Jihad Day" on the 4th of April 2013 by activists of the Ukrainian feminist group FEMEN
who, based on their external values, aimed at encouraging their Muslim `sisters' to liberate
themselves from oppression by choosing not to wear headscarves.
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attention from their consequences. And third, as Subsection 1.3.3.3 highlights,
we should not forget the relevance of the gender context in the study of women's
empowerment. That is, even if women seem to `freely' choose to abort a female
foetus that should not, unlike Douthat (2011), automatically be labelled empow-
erment (free choice), without alluding to the context in which such said `free'
choice is taking place.
Instead, as Kabeer (1999) suggests, we should note two things. First, that
that sort of discriminatory behaviour against other females may be the result of
women's own internalization of their status as persons of lesser value in society;
and second, that social values play a crucial role in justifying both the subordinate
status of women, and the latter's own internalization of those values. That is, as
Kabeer (1999) notes, power relations are not only expressed through the exercise of
agency and choice, but also through the kinds of choices people make. Dominance
operates through coercion and conﬂict, but also through consent and complicity.
Because of this, Kabeer (1999) suggests accounting for structural parameters in
the analysis of empowerment by qualifying choice in terms of the conditions in
which it takes place, its contents, and its consequences.
Lastly, note that in the context of `missing' girls, allowing the birth of a daugh-
ter may be seen as a valued achievement that goes against the norm, and that
helps to transform prevailing inequalities (abnormally high male-to-female sex ra-
tios), rather than reinforcing them or leaving them unchallenged. This adds to
the relevance of studying the biological sex of children as an outcome variable for
the women's empowerment literature.
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1.3.3.2 The main independent variable: Progressivity
Once a researcher has decided to (try to) measure women's empowerment / au-
tonomy, there are three main decisions that need to be made. First, decide what
indicators to use; second, decide how to code them; and third, decide whether
each indicator is equally cogent for empowerment and so, whether each of them
should have the same weight in the estimating equation. This subsection seeks
to justify the decisions made in Chapter 3 regarding each of those matters. In
particular, Subsection 1.3.3.2.1 explains the need for introducing the concept of
progressivity based on the ﬁrst two points mentioned above. Subsection 1.3.3.3 in
turn deals with the third issue and outlines the chapter's ﬁndings.
1.3.3.2.1 Conceptualization and measurements
Chapter 3 introduces the notion of progressivity which, in the context of female
empowerment, is deﬁned as favouring the advancement of women towards im-
proved conditions in society. In that deﬁnition, the qualiﬁer improved needs to be
highlighted. This is because the variables used to measure progressivity are only
those behaviours and perceptions that testify of married women's ability to pre-
serve their basic human rights (e.g. the right to a healthy life, free from violence,
AIDS, and in general from sickness) / integrity, without acquiring responsibilities
towards others, except perhaps towards themselves.
As those beliefs and behaviours from the part of women may directly erode
their husbands' power over them, they may be potentially contested by men and
thus, trigger intra-household conﬂict. Because of this, progressivity may be seen
as closely related to the selﬁsh notion of empowerment. Nonetheless, the crucial
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diﬀerence between the two concepts is that the progressivity indicators can be
defended from a pure human rights perspective. Speciﬁcally, the variables used
in Chapter 3 to measure progressivity are:
 Whether women decide on their own healthcare.
 Whether women are free to visit the health facility unaccompanied.
 Whether women do not justify wife beating under any of the following cir-
cumstances. If the wife: goes out without telling her husband; neglects the house
or the children; argues with her husband; refuses sex to her husband; does not
cook properly; shows disrespect for her in-laws; or if her husband suspects her of
being unfaithful.
 Whether women think that it is justiﬁed for a wife to refuse sex to her
husband under each of the following circumstances. If she is tired or not in the
mood; if her husband has a sexually transmitted disease; or if her husband has
other women.
Noticeably, each of those measurements involves gender interactions that may
potentially aﬀect women's health / physical integrity. This is relevant as the ﬁ-
nal goal of Chapter 3 is to assess the inﬂuence of progressivity on the sex of the
ﬁrstborn in a context of `missing' women. That is, in a context where the de-
pendent variable aims to provide some insight about the incidence of sex-selective
abortions which, if present, would undermine women's health / physical integrity,
even if women agreed on undergoing such a procedure. But again, it is impor-
tant to highlight that any humanist, male or female, would defend each of those
progressivity indicators.
The need of introducing the notion of progressivity is also due to the conceptual
diﬀerences between women's empowerment and autonomy, as well as between
the instrumental and the selﬁsh notions of empowerment or, more generally, to
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the current theoretical debates regarding what truly represents empowerment.
In this sense, note that it would not have been correct to claim that by using the
four measurements listed above I was trying to account for women's autonomy,
because in that case, other measurements regarding, for instance, women's ability
to go to the market on their own would have had to be included. This is because
being able to move around freely confers physical autonomy to women, regardless
of where exactly they are going to. Having the ﬁnal say on small household
purchases (e.g. food), would equally have had to be included. However, there are
several critiques regarding the use of such variables as indicators of empowerment.
First, as Kabeer (1999) notices, in traditional patriarchal cultures there is
usually a hierarchy of decision-making responsibilities recognized by the family
and the community, which reserves some areas of decision making for men, as
household heads, and assigns others to women in their capacity as mothers, wives,
etc. Thus for instance in South Asia, deciding what food to purchase and cook
generally falls within women's decision making domain, while decisions related to
the education and marriage of children, and market transactions in major assets
tend to be male (Kabeer (1999, 446)). Indeed, Sathar and Kazi (2000) ﬁnd that
in Pakistan, the only decision-making arena in which women have the major role
is in the purchase of food. Adato et al. (2000) show that the same is true in the
case of women in certain poor (PROGRESA) communities in Mexico.
This socially-based assignment of decision-making responsibilities is clearly
due to the diﬀerent domestic roles that cultures ascribe to people depending on
their biological sex. For instance, cooking and cleaning is generally women's
responsibility. Therefore, they are allowed / expected to make decisions about
food (what to purchase and cook) as well as, probably, to be allowed to go to the
market on their own. Nevertheless, as Kabeer (1999) notes, evidence of women
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playing a role in making decisions which have little consequential signiﬁcance on
their lives (unlike strategic life choices), or that were assigned to them anyway by
the pre-existing gender division of roles and responsibilities, tell us far less about
women's power to choose than evidence on decisions which relate to strategic life
choices, or to choices which had been denied to them in the past. (p. 447).
Moreover, Basu and Koolwal (2005) highlight the fact that decision-making
entails not (only) freedom, but often (only) responsibilities, such that in fact, they
argue, some of the women's empowerment indicators that are often used in the
literature do not really represent empowerment (e.g. women's participation on
deciding what food to purchase / cook or on seeking medical attention for their
children). That is, having a say on does not necessarily mean having full rights
on, but rather being responsible for , such that those decision-making indicators
might not measure the woman's freedom to make her own decisions as much as
her ability to make certain types of decisions and the responsibility to make only
these kinds [of] decisions (Basu and Koolwal (2005, 17)).53
To illustrate this issue, Basu and Koolwal (2005) suggest rephrasing questions
on women's decision making ability as whether women can choose to neglect
making those decisions (and bear no negative consequences). If they can, then
perhaps we can tell that those women are empowered; but the simple fact that
they participate in those decisions does not really measure empowerment. This
aspect is even more salient when completely empowered women are deﬁned as
those who have full rights to decision making. Instead, the authors argue, what
that really means is probably that they have full responsibilities on a matter, with
their husbands abdicating their share of responsibility. Autonomy indicators may
thus have diﬀerent implications for families and for women themselves.
53The emphases in italics are mine.
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This is precisely why Basu and Koolwal (2005) suggest diﬀerentiating between
indicators of selﬁsh versus instrumental empowerment; where, in their view,
the latter does not really represent empowerment, but rather simply gives women
the responsibility and the technical ability to become better wives and mothers,
and thus to improve family welfare. Additionally, as Kabeer (1999) notes, we
should also distinguish between `control' (policy-making) and `management' (de-
cisions regarding policy implementation). The latter provides Chapter 3 with
another ground for including only women's participation in decision-making re-
garding healthcare for themselves, and physical freedom to go to the health clinic
on their own, and excluding other decision-making and mobility indicators.
That is, apart from being of little consequence for women's lives, to have been
assigned to women by the existent gender division of roles and, to be simply mea-
sures of instrumental empowerment, rather than of true (selﬁsh) empowerment,
I would even claim that women's participation in decision-making regarding small
household purchases (e.g. what food to purchase and cook) may indicate some
control from the part of women only up to a point. For instance, suppose that
suddenly, a mother decided to become vegetarian (carnivorous) in a carnivorous
(vegetarian) household. Would she then be able to impose her new nutrition style
upon her whole family? Probably she would not. In fact, there is anecdotal evi-
dence54 involving non-vegetarian women from Southern India who, after marrying
vegetarian men in the North of the country, have to become themselves vegetarian,
rather than the other way around.
On the other hand, the last two progressivity measurements are attitude ques-
tions. They give an indication of the spread of critical consciousness among
women. That is, of the extent to which women question the traditional gender-role
54See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13331808
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norms that give husbands rights over the behaviour and the bodies of their wives.
These measurements are important because, as it was pointed out in the previ-
ous subsection, power also operates through people's preferences and values such
that, as Kabeer (1999, 441) explains, a more critical consciousness only becomes
possible when competing ways of `being and doing' become available as material
and cultural possibilities, so that `common sense' propositions of culture (e.g.
husbands' power over wives, including their right to beat them and to control
their bodies) begin to lose their `naturalized' character, revealing the underlying
arbitrariness of the given social order.
Let us turn now to the second matter listed at the beginning of this subsec-
tion. That is, to the decision on how to code the progressivity measurements.
Such decision is related to the ﬁrst one, i.e. to the decision on how to measure
progressivity, which in turn depends on the progressivity concept itself. In this
context, note that another reason why other decision-making variables were not
included as progressivity indicators is that, even if they were measuring not only
women's responsibility, but also their fee choice, it is not clear that full auton-
omy / empowerment is really beneﬁcial for women.
That is, would not be better to reach an agreement, through interaction and
negotiation, between husband and wife than one of the parties (even if it was the
wife) making all decisions? Even in issues where no responsibility was involved,
but rather simple preferences? Would not such an agreement require a higher level
of maturity from both parties, and the ability to compromise in a responsible way
without the need of ﬁghting, and thus be more aspirational than having the ﬁnal
say on a given subject? This issue is open to debate and the researcher's opinion
about it will be reﬂected in the way empowerment indicators are coded.
This is another reason why Chapter 3 uses only the indicators outlined at the
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beginning of this subsection and not others. That is, while in the case of areas such
as the purchase of small / major household items it is clear that women having
a say entails them having less power / responsability within the household than
if they had the ﬁnal say (and so, those response options would probably need
to be coded diﬀerently), it is not clear that in those particular cases having the
ﬁnal say or deciding alone is necessarily better than having a say or deciding
jointly with husband. Thus if Chapter 3 aimed at measuring women's auton-
omy / (em)power(ment), those variables would not only need to be included,
but the diﬀerent response options would probably need to be included separately
(unlike Alfano et al. (2011)).
Because of this, Chapter 3 includes only variables where it can be claimed
that women deciding on their own is better than just having a say / deciding
jointly with husband and so, they can be coded accordingly. Those variables
include only beliefs and behaviours that give an indication of women's ability to
control their own health and bodies, and thus enjoy a healthy life, such that they
can be defended from a purely humanist perspective. Therefore, a binary variable
was created for each indicator, ωq, q=1,...,4, with values equal to 1 if a woman is
progressive and 0 otherwise. Speciﬁcally:
ωi1 = 1 if woman i decides alone on her own healthcare; 0 otherwise.
ωi2 = 1 if woman i is allowed (by her husband) to go alone to the health facility;
0 otherwise.
ωi3 = 1 if woman i believes that a husband is not justiﬁed in beating his wife under
any of the seven circumstances mentioned at the beginning of this subsection; 0
otherwise.
ωi4 = 1 if woman i thinks that a wife is justiﬁed in refusing sex under each of the
three circumstances mentioned at the start of this subsection; 0 otherwise.
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Given the humanist nature of the progressivity notion, note that in the last
two cases progressive women are only those who do not agree on any ground for
wife beating / potential rape. Additionally, it could also be argued that truly
progressive women would not accept such obvious gender inequalities in power.
Before turning to the empirical estimation, and thus to the point regarding the
weights that each progressivity measurement should have in the ﬁnal equation, the
next subsection defends the decision of not including education as a progressivity
indicator.
1.3.3.2.1.1 The debate on education
Women's education is not included as a measure of empowerment (progressivity)
in the previous subsection. The literature provides both theoretical and empirical
support for this decision. Moreover, given the outcome that is analysed in Chapter
3, and the context in which it takes place, there are additional conceptual and
empirical reasons for not including education as an indicator of progressivity.
Firstly, from a theoretical perspective, Stromquist (2002) argues against an
uncritical acceptance of education's empowerment potential. In her view, empow-
erment consists of four dimensions: cognitive (a critical understanding of one's
reality), psychological (a feeling of self-esteem), political (awareness of power in-
equalities and the ability to organize and mobilize), and economic (the capacity
to generate independent income), which jointly enable women to act on their own
behalf. Given this framework, she contends that although an educational set-
ting has the potential to foster all four dimensions, programs need to be designed
explicitly to achieve each of those goals.
Therefore, whether or not education is empowering depends on the objectives
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particular programs seek, the forms they take, and the instructional modes they
use (Stromquist (2002)). Some educational materials may, for instance, deepen
sexual stereotypes and conceptions of masculinity and femininity that limit the so-
cial potential of women. Speciﬁcally, they may contain gender-stereotyped images
of men's and women's roles in society, and / or present only culturally accept-
able materials that leave patriarchal ideologies and the existing sexual division
of labour unchallenged. Likewise, school teachers may themselves have sexist
attitudes that aﬀect classroom practices and children's performance and career
expectations (Stromquist (2002)).
Empowering girls should thus mean oﬀering them courses with content that
not only attacks current sexual stereotypes, but also provides them with alter-
native visions of a gender-free society. Girls empowered in this way would then
participate more in class, not be intimidated by boys, and speak their own minds
(Stromquist (2002)).
The author also argues that raising consciousness about the need to challenge
asymmetrical gendered power is more important for determining women's agency
than the simple ability to code and decode print. In this context, women-led non-
governmental organizations may have a greater potential to empower women by
oﬀering informal educational programs explicitly aimed at raising such conscious-
ness (Stromquist (2002)).
Likewise, Basu and Koolwal (2005) contend that education may indeed be a
sort of empowerment, but only of instrumental empowerment. That is, education
may empower women for the beneﬁt of others, e.g. their children. It may, for
instance, teach women to recognize the ﬁrst signs of illness, provide them with
information on the medical facilities in their area, and teach them the discipline
to follow instructions from medical practitioners.
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In this sense, they argue, education may be a sort of empowerment if by that
we mean the ability not to be ﬂummoxed by written (or even oral) instructions,
but it is not if we use the term to refer to the freedom to make choices (Basu
and Koolwal (2005, 17)), where freedom means the expansion of choices and
freely made choice. Thus if a woman can (is allowed to) go to the market on
her own, makes decisions about what to cook and about taking her sick children
to the doctor, she might be autonomous / empowered, but only in a technical
(instrumental) sense. That is, in the sense that if she can read, go to the market,
and take a child to the doctor, she is more exposed to information and thus more
likely to get a child medically treated (Basu and Koolwal (2005)).
Nevertheless, will an educated woman be truly empowered? That is, will
she be able to choose freely? To answer this, Basu and Koolwal (2005) suggest
wondering whether women would be penalized for making choices contrary to what
is commonly believed to be a demonstration of freedom. For instance, suppose
that an educated woman did not take charge of her children's health or of the food
to be consumed by her household, could she excuse herself by claiming that she
is exercising her freedom and get away with it? Perhaps not, as she knows that
there are certain expectations of her, as an educated woman, from her family, the
society and increasingly, from the state (Basu and Koolwal (2005)).
Additionally, as it was already mentioned in Subsection 1.2.3.1, empirical stud-
ies too provide support for not including education as an empowerment / auton-
omy indicator. Those studies (e.g. Jejeebhoy (2000), Frankenberg and Thomas
(2001), Matthews et al. (2005) and Alfano et al. (2011)) may include and refer
to education as a setting variable (along with co-residence with in-laws, age at
marriage, etc.), which can then be a determinant of direct measures of empow-
erment (e.g. women's participation in intra-household decision-making, mobility,
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incidence of domestic violence, etc.). In other studies, education is referred to as
an indicator of women's (socio-economic) status (e.g. Kishor and Nietzel (1996)
and Sathar and Kazi (2000)); enabling factor / indirect measure of empower-
ment (e.g. Kishor (2000)); or as a simple socio-demographic characteristic (e.g.
Hindin (2005)).
Furthermore, in the case of progressivity, education cannot be used as an
unambiguous indicator of it because there are people, men and women, with no
formal education, who nonetheless have very progressive, egalitarian (as opposed
to retrograde / backward) views on gender. Similarly, sexist ideas survive among
highly educated people. Additionally, given the notion of progressivity and the
outcome variable that is analysed in Chapter 3, only measurements involving
gender interactions that may potentially aﬀect women's health are used. Women's
educational attainment does not fall in that category.
Lastly, some studies have found that education positively correlates with sex-
selective abortions in India. This may be because more educated women have
more information, access to sex determination and abortion facilities, and are
more likely to plan their families (Retherford and Roy (2003)). In this context,
including education as an empowerment indicator runs the risk of the researcher
ﬁnding precisely what Douthat (2011) concluded, that female empowerment leads
to sex selection. But again, such inclusion may not be correct as it overlooks
the importance of the context where education is taking place. Thus, following
Stromquist (2002) one may inquire: is such education raising women's critical
consciousness? Or is it, on the contrary, simply domesticating women, as Sudha
and Rajan (1999) suggest?
In sum, it is not evident that education should be included, nor how it should
be coded, as an empowerment / progressivity indicator. Whilst in the case of the
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four progressivity measurements in this subsection it is clear how a progressive
woman should look like (a value of 0 if non-progressive, and a value of 1 if pro-
gressive), what values should be given in the case of education? What level of
formal education will grant a woman the adjective of progressive (versus retro-
grade)? Or should we code as 0 (non-progressive / backward) both extremes and
leave women with some education (e.g. primary completed) as progressive? It
is not clear.
1.3.3.3 Estimation and results
After creating a binary variable for each progressivity indicator as explained in
the previous subsection, Chapter 3 estimates a progressivity index using a la-
tent factor model. The latter allows controlling for correlation between observed
characteristics that may inﬂuence demographic outcomes, and any unobserved
heterogeneity. The index is then used to assess the eﬀect of women's progressivity
on the sex of the ﬁrstborn and on the duration to ﬁrst birth in Delhi.
The latent model can be summarized by the following system of equations.
ω∗iq = λ0q+λ1qαi+ϑiq, q = 1, ..., 4, with ωiq =

1 ifω∗iq > 0
0 otherwise
(1.1)
αi = z
′
iγ+ui (1.2)
Where:
ωiq, q = 1, ..., 4 are the four binary progressivity indicators, as outlined in the
previous subsection.
αi is woman's i true, latent, level of progressivity (i.e. an unobserved het-
erogeneity term) which depends on some observed characteristics, z′i (e.g. age at
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marriage, current age, age diﬀerence between spouses, education, caste, religion,
etc.)
Under certain credible assumptions, as detailed in Subsection 3.3.2, these equa-
tions are jointly estimated through maximum likelihood to obtain the Bayesian
shrinkage estimator (Goldstein (2003)). That is, the estimated posterior condi-
tional mean of the latent variable, ˆ¯αi ≡ E(αi|zi, ωiq), q = 1, ..., 4. That estimator
is standardized in Chapter 3 and used as the main independent variable in the
ﬁrstborn's sex and ﬁrst birth interval equations.
This procedure to estimate an index is not very common in the women's em-
powerment literature. What is more common is to obtain an index as the sum
of the values of the individual empowerment indicators,55 or as their arithmetic
mean. Such index can either be an overall one (e.g. Kritz et al. (2000)), or sepa-
rate indeces can be created by empowerment / autonomy domains (e.g. physical,
economic, decision-making, etc.) (see, for instance, Sathar and Kazi (2000), Je-
jeebhoy (2000) and Mumtaz et al. (2005)). Alternatively, a set of dummy variables
for each empowerment / autonomy indicator can be entered as independent vari-
ables in the ﬁnal equation (e.g. Basu and Koolwal (2005), Desai and Johnson
(2005) and Matthews et al. (2005)).
The estimation methodology used in Chapter 3 is however similar to the one
found in Alfano et al. (2011)). That paper uses a latent factor model for women's
autonomy, but equations equivalent to the two shown above are estimated jointly
with a third equation for the outcome variable (age at ﬁrst school enrolment).
55The measurements can either be dummy variables like in this thesis (i.e. 0=not empowered
/ autonomous / progressive; 1=empowered / autonomous / progressive), or take higher values
depending on how progressive / autonomous / empowered the woman is. For instance, one
could assign a value of 2 if the woman makes the ﬁnal decision on a given matter on her own /
does not need permission to go to a certain place; 1 if she usually participates in the decision
but does not have the ﬁnal say / requires permission to go to a certain place; and 0 if she does
not participate at all / is not allowed to go at all. This latter methodology is used, for instance,
by Jejeebhoy (2000).
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In contrast, Chapter 3 estimates the progressivity index separately, which allows
comparing the results in a more straightforward way with other speciﬁcations that
account for empowerment in alternative ways. Those speciﬁcations use either a
simpler index (ranging from 0 to 1 and giving the same weight to each indicator),
or a set of four dummy variables, one for each progressivity measurement, in the
ﬁrstborn's biological sex equation.
The reason why Chapter 3 focuses on the sex of the ﬁrstborn is due to the
existent disagreement on whether sex selection is used for ﬁrst order births in India
(see, for instance, Retherford and Roy (2003), Jha et al. (2006) and Poertner
(2010)). Furthermore, the chapter focuses on Delhi after showing that, unlike
other states / territories in India, it has an unnaturally high sex ratio even among
ﬁrst order births. Furthermore, unlike Punjab and Haryana for instance, its child
sex ratio did not improve during the last decade. This is very important as
India's male-to-female child sex ratio has experienced a sustained increase since
the Independence in 1947 (Registrar General (2011)).
Using the estimation procedure described in this subsection, Chapter 3 ﬁnds
that a one-standard deviation increase in the women's progressivity index is as-
sociated with a 5.8-percentage point increase in the likelihood of a ﬁrstborn girl
relative to women who have not yet given birth. Additionally, more progressive
women do not experience longer ﬁrst birth intervals. These results are consis-
tent with more progressive women being less inclined to sex-select their ﬁrst child
in Delhi. This is the preferred estimation methodology as it accounts for any
potential correlation that may exist between women's unobserved heterogeneity
(progressivity) and their observed characteristics. Moreover, it does not impose
any weight a priori on the individual progressivity indicators.
In any case, Chapter 3 also provides estimates of the ﬁrstborn's sex equation
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using a simpler progressivity index on the one hand, and progressivity dummy
variables on the other. The simpler index is the arithmetic mean of the four
progressivity binary indicators. In that case, the results show that a fully em-
powered woman (i.e. one who decides by herself on her own healthcare, is free to
go on her own to the health clinic, does not justify wife beating under any cir-
cumstance, and thinks that refusing sex to husbands under certain circumstances
is justiﬁed) is 8.3 percentage points more likely to report a girl as the ﬁrstborn
compared to women who have not yet given birth, and who are not progressive
at all as measured by the four progressivity indicators previously described.
On the other hand, if each progressivity indicator is entered directly into the
ﬁrstborn's sex equation, only the ﬁrst measurement, whether women decide by
themselves on their own healthcare, signiﬁcantly aﬀects the (reported) ﬁrstborn's
sex. In particular, women who have the ﬁnal say regarding their own healthcare
are 4.9 percentage points more likely to report a ﬁrstborn daughter compared to
women who are still childless, and who let others decide on the use of healthcare
for them.
Lastly, Chapter 3 estimates the ﬁrstborn's sex equation for two other Indian
states, Kerala and Punjab, using the latent factor model described in this sub-
section. Kerala does not suﬀer from an imbalanced child sex ratio and thus,
progressivity is not expected to aﬀect the biological sex of ﬁrstborns there. Pun-
jab in contrast does have a problem of `missing' girls. The results show that
individual progressivity does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the ﬁrstborn's sex in any of
those states. This result is expected in Kerala given its egalitarian gender context.
Moreover, the reason why individual empowerment may help to reduce existent
gender inequalities in Delhi, but not in Punjab, may also be due to structural
considerations.
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The latter result is very important as previous literature has underlined the
importance of the gender context while seeking to explain, either diﬀerences in
the spread of gender inequalities between the Southern and the Northern/Western
regions in India (e.g. Dreze and Sen (1995)), or diﬀerences in women's autonomy
itself between states in those two regions (e.g. Dyson and Moore (1983), Jejeebhoy
(2000)). Nevertheless, the results in Chapter 3 suggest that the gender context
may be important in enhancing or negating the inﬂuence of individual-level em-
powerment on well-being outcomes (e.g. the probability of being born for boys /
girls), even among Northern Indian states / territories, that display similar gender
inequalities.
Kabeer (1999) refers to the gender context as the rules, social norms and
practices that make up gender relations including, among others, those regarding
marriage, mobility, and inheritance. Thus in Punjab, that structure might be
far more important in determining the extent to which families value the girl
child, than the individual characteristics of her parents and so, it may negate
the eﬀects of individual empowerment on the likelihood of allowing a girl to be
born. This is because, in cultures of son-preference, women will secure greater
respect, social status and family approval by giving birth to a certain number of
sons, and in general by favouring them over daughters. In those cultural settings,
female foeticide and infanticide might thus be `rational' responses to social norms
(Kabeer (1999)).
In this sense, looking at the estimated progressivity distribution in Delhi com-
pared to that in Punjab (see Figure A3.1), one notes that in the latter there are
many more women with very high progressivity, such that that variable is on av-
erage higher there than in Delhi (0.53 versus 0.47). Nevertheless, progressivity 's
standard deviation is larger, and its median lower, in Punjab than in Delhi (0.33
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versus 0.2, and 0.38 versus 0.44, respectively). This is because there are many
less women in Delhi with very low progressivity, and many more with medium
progressivity, compared to Punjab. Thus for instance, given a progressivity level
of 0.4, 58 percent of women in Delhi are above that level, compared to just 47
percent of women in Punjab. Furthermore, the percentage of progressive women
in Delhi is 35, 73, 62, and 77, compared to 48, 56, 39, and 73 percent in Punjab,
as measured by each of the four progressivity indicators, respectively.
Given this setting, suppose that there is a progressivity threshold (e.g. 0.4)
after which women are not ready to kill a daughter. In contrast, women with
progressivity levels lower than that, in both states / territories, have already
internalized their own subordinate status as persons of lesser value in society,
such that they have a strong son preference and are ready to commit foeticide /
infanticide; that is in part why there are `missing' girls in both states / territories.
Additionally, suppose that women above that cut-oﬀ progressivity level are
ready to defend their daughters, but only women in Delhi manage to transform
their progressive thoughts into action due to living in a more open-minded envi-
ronment. Indeed, note for instance that only 7 percent of women in Delhi live
in rural areas, compared to 38 percent of women in Punjab. In any case, urban
areas in Punjab might not be comparable to those in Delhi as Matthews et al.'s
(2005) research in the context of Maharashtra suggests.
Living in Delhi may thus provide anonymity, such that even when patriarchal
social norms do exist, they might not be that deeply-entrenched in the wider
community anymore. Thus if a woman happens to be progressive enough as to
wish to keep her daughter, the community will support her in the sense that, at
least, it will not raise against her, perhaps in part because they do not even know
her and so, it will not penalize her for not conforming to its norms. Therefore, we
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are more likely to see those women having (reporting the birth of) a daughter.56
Larger structural change may thus be crucial as Kabeer (1999, 457) points out.
That is, in a context where cultural values constrain women's ability to make
strategic life choices, structural inequalities cannot be addressed by individuals
alone. She thus highlights the importance of women's organizations and social
movements in creating the conditions for change, and in reducing the costs of
not conforming to the social norms for individual women. The mass anti-rape
protests that have taken place in New Delhi in the last months, and in which
large numbers of men have also taken part, suggest that these conditions may, to
some extent, already exist in Delhi, but perhaps not elsewhere in India.
Because of this, Chapter 3 estimates the ﬁrstborn's sex equation using the in-
dex obtained through maximum likelihood, but constraining the sample to women
whose husband was interviewed. This was done in order to test the hypothesis
that those women enjoy a more progressive and supporting environment at home,
which may enhance the eﬀect of women's progressivity on the girl equation.
That is, although couples who were interviewed are representative of all cou-
ples at the state and national level, that is only in terms of observable charac-
teristics. Nonetheless, husbands must have made themselves available to answer
the questionnaire, which may signal that they conferred importance to a demo-
graphic and health survey. They might thus be more progressive, supportive, and
understanding than other husbands, ceteris paribus.
The results provide support for this hypothesis as the eﬀect of progressivity on
the probability of reporting a daughter as the ﬁrst child is almost twice as large
as in the baseline speciﬁcation. Speciﬁcally, a one-standard deviation increase in
the women's progressivity index is now associated with an 11.4-percentage point
56There might also be more tangible support available in the form of, for instance, refuges for
women who suﬀer domestic violence, etc. But I do not have evidence of this at the moment.
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increase in the likelihood of a ﬁrstborn girl, relative to women who have not yet
given birth.
Therefore, collective action that aims at empowering communities of women, as
well as instilling progressive thoughts in men, may have far more reaching beneﬁts
on reducing gender inequalities than the increase in empowerment of isolated
agents. Clearly, community-level progressivity / open-mindedness, is obtained by
the aggregation of progressive (men and) women, such that one may wonder which
one came ﬁrst. In this case, given that Delhi is the National Capital Territory of
India, the median level of progressivity might have always been higher there than
elsewhere in the country. Then, new migrant women who arrive from other states
ﬁnd a more progressive context, and little by little they themselves become more
open-minded. Next, each generation of girls that are born in Delhi is each time
more progressive, such that the context becomes each time more progressive.
In a sense, the data supports these hypotheses. Speciﬁcally, there is a variable
in the dataset that gives us some information about who is a migrant. This is the
answer to the question how many years have you lived in the current place of
residence. Under that deﬁnition, only 20 percent of women in the Delhi sample
are non-migrants, as only those many answer that they have been living there
always. Next, looking at the variable that reports women's native language,
we have that 99.6 percent of women in the sample speak Hindi as their mother
tongue.
Therefore, it would be safe to conclude that the 80 percent of the sample
who are migrants do not come from the gender egalitarian states of Tamil Nadu
and Kerala in Southern India.57 Instead, they may come from Uttar Pradesh and
57The oﬃcial language in Tamil Nadu is Tamil (see
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tamil_Nadu); and the two oﬃcial languages in
Kerala are Malayalam and English, the former being the main language (see
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kerala).
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Bihar.58 Indeed, while Keralites migrate to countries in the Arabic Peninsula (e.g.
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) in search of work,59 a report recently released by the
Indian Institute of Human Settlement (IIHS) found that most migrants in Delhi
come from Uttar Pradesh (47 percent) and Bihar (31 percent).60 This is true not
only for men, but also for women.61 Those two states are associated with some
of the starkest indicators of gender discrimination62 in the Indian subcontinent
(Dyson and Moore (1983), Kabeer (1999)).
Unfortunately, the NFHS-3 does not allow diﬀerentiating between inter-, and
intra-state migrants (i.e. people who have not always been residing in the
current place of residence). However, since 1994 Delhi's annual population growth
has increased more due to newly arrived migrants than to natural population
increase (Government of NCT of Delhi (2011)). Therefore, a large proportion of
migrants may certainly come from other Indian states rather than from within
Delhi. The hypothesis is thus that women with low progressivity levels might be
recent migrants from states where the gender context is in general more retrograde
than in the National Capital Territory (e.g. Uttar Pradesh and Bihar); but as
they spend longer in Delhi they become more progressive.
The NFHS-3 provides suggestive evidence to support this hypothesis. Specif-
58The Encyclopaedia Britannica informs us that in Uttar Pradesh (UP), Hindi
is an oﬃcial language of the state and the mother tongue of most of the peo-
ple. Urdu, additionally an oﬃcial language, is primarily spoken by Muslims. (See
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/620898/Uttar-Pradesh#toc281407); the same is
true in Bihar (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bihar#Language_and_literature).
59http://articles.timesoﬁndia.indiatimes.com/2013-06-21/middle-east-
news/40118402_1_migrants-oommen-chandy-saudi-arabia
60The report used information from the 2001 census, the 2007-08 National Sample Survey,
and preliminary data from the 2011 census; as of 1 September 2013, migration data for cen-
sus 2011 had not yet been released (see http://articles.timesoﬁndia.indiatimes.com/2013-09-
01/delhi/41661826_1_services-sector-bihar-migrants-delhi-government)
61Speciﬁcally, it is estimated that around 70 percent of female migrants in Delhi come from
Uttar Pradesh and Bihar (see http://www.acralive.org/2010/12/most-migrant-women-in-delhi-
work-in.html).
62This includes, for instance, infant and child mortality, prevalence of child marriage, literacy
rates and incidence of domestic violence.
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ically, women in the Delhi sample who have been living in their current place of
residence for less than one year have an average progressivity level of 0.36. This
rises to 0.43 for women who have been living in the same place for 1-5 years;
0.48 for those with 6-19 years of continuous residence; and 0.51 for women who
have been living there for 20 years or longer.63 This results in an overall average
progressivity level of 0.47 in Delhi.
Nevertheless, although the results in Chapter 3 show that women's empow-
erment may help to reduce the extent of an existent gender inequality in Delhi,
New Delhi is also known as the rape capital of India. This is according to the
National Crime Records Bureau, which compares reported cases of crime from
major Indian cities (e.g. New Delhi, Mumbai, etc.)64 However, it might be that
rape is more likely to be reported in New Delhi than in other cities due to stigma
or because reporting might seem useless in smaller cities.65
In any case, if occurrence is in fact higher in Delhi / New Delhi than in
other Indian states / cities, it may be due, partly, precisely to the clash between
modernity and tradition that takes place there. That is, women in (New) Delhi
may be more emancipated as they may move around more freely due perhaps to
having a higher economic participation in the service sector compared to women
elsewhere in India. Migrant men from other Indian states however may have a
more retrograde mindset and be unhappy with women's emancipation, as they
63Women who have been living there always also have an average progressivity level of 0.51
on their own.
64See http://www.huﬃngtonpost.com/2013/01/04/india-rape-capital-delhi-self-
defense_n_2406866.html
65This is known to be true at least in the country side of some Northern states like Uttar
Pradesh and Rajasthan. Speciﬁcally, Burke (2013) reports that: As in rural Rajasthan...women
in the countryside of Uttar Pradesh suﬀer systematic sexual harassment and often violence.
Rape is common and gang rape frequent. Victims are habitually blamed for supposedly enticing
their attackers. Many are forced to marry their assailants; others kill themselves rather than
live with the social stigma of being "dishonoured". Police rarely register a complaint, let alone
investigate.
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may see their masculinity threatened. This shock of mindsets may explain the
high levels of violent crime against women in Delhi.66 Indeed, note for instance
that all of the six men involved in the shocking gang rape of a 23-year-old student
in New Delhi last year are `surplus' (unmarried, low-status, and young) migrant
workers from remote parts of India in the states of Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and
Bihar (Burke (2013)).67 In that case, backward mindsets may have collided with
women's progressivity.
1.4 Understanding the divide between instrumen-
tal and selﬁsh empowerment
In this section I claim that the reason why there exist two so diﬀerent, even
conﬂicting, notions of women's empowerment is due to the fact that major aid
agencies' (e.g. the World Bank, some UN agencies, etc.) foremost concern has
always been, even nowadays, to reduce fertility rates.68 This means that, at least
at the institutional level,69 they might not be truly concerned about women's
welfare / happiness, which in this section should be understood as a lack of suﬀer-
ing. Therefore, any goals that those organizations seek to achieve, including those
66In this regard, Aljazeera's documentary Unintended conse-
quences: India's rape crisis is very telling; it can be watched at:
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/101east/2012/04/201242482823627221.html.
67See http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/10/delhi-gang-rape-india-women
68Hvistendahl (2011) provides evidence not only of this interest among powerful international
and American organizations such as the World Bank, the United Nations Population Fund, the
Population Council, the Ford Foundation, and the Rockefeller Foundation in the 1970s, but
also of how these organizations funded research aimed at developing foetal sex determination
techniques, such as amniocentesis, which eventually bore fruit, in India.
69Surely there are individuals within those organizations, e.g. Monica Das Gupta at the World
Bank, who truly care about women as individuals rather than as instruments to reach other
goals; but at the institutional level the foremost concern is not to help women, but to reduce
population growth.
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aimed at empowering women (e.g. raising female education), might in reality be
due to attain their ﬁnal goal of reducing population growth. Such objective has
historically made them advocate for, and support (i.e. fund), population policies
in developing countries that, along with a strong son preference, have given rise
to sex-selective abortions in countries like India (Hvistendahl (2011)).70
Although the current rate of population growth may not be sustainable en-
vironmentally speaking, it is unacceptable, from a humanist point of view, that
the price for lower fertility be the suﬀering of women. Lower population growth
should not come at the expense of women (literally), nor at the expense of the
welfare / happiness of those girls who are allowed to be born and survive. That is,
as it was pointed out in Subsection 1.3.3.1, part of the problem is that imbalanced
sex ratios appear to have increased prostitution and human traﬃcking for sexual
exploitation (Hvistendahl (2011)).
Despite these phenomena being widespread and causing huge suﬀering to the
women involved, mainstream aid agencies have so far failed to put addressing those
problems at the top of their priorities. This makes one wonder whether they really
care about women's well-being. The extent of the problem is as follows.
1) There are around 163 million `missing' women in Asia alone71 (Guilmoto
(2007)), 23 years after Amartya Sen (1991) published his More Than 100 Million
Women Are Missing essay.
2) There are around 27 million people who have been traﬃcked for sexual or
labour exploitation, i.e., living in slavery (Bales et al. (2009)), 150 years after
slavery was abolished.
In this section I identify some ideas that may contribute to solve these problems
70Details are given in footnote 68.
71There is evidence that sex-selective abortions also take place among Asian populations in
the UK (Dubuc and Coleman (2007)) and in the USA (Almond and Edlund (2008)).
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if they were inculcated in society. As spreading these thoughts would presumably
give rise to lower fertility rates, mainstream development organizations might
be willing to embrace them. Furthermore, as they may also increase people's
happiness, they hope to be supported by human activists. Additionally, in order
to face the problem in a more immediate term, some policy recommendations are
made. The ideas are as follows.
1) We need a redeﬁnition of masculinity. In particular, we need to ﬁght the idea
of masculinity being deﬁned based on the number of sexual conquests. Instead, we
may promote the idea that sex should only take place between two people who can
communicate with and understand each other. This would, by deﬁnition, make
prostitution, child marriage, child grooming, and domestic violence unacceptable.
In contrast, inter-racial, inter-religious, and sex-same relationships would be
acceptable, as long as the parties understand each other. Moreover, given that
violent husbands have often risen up themselves in a home where domestic violence
was prevalent (e.g. Maldonado et al. (2006)), the more men can ﬁnd the right
woman (i.e. the one they can communicate with and are understood by), the
happier and less violent they will be. This will beneﬁt women and children. In
order to support the ﬁrst point, we also need to promote the following ideas.
2) Money is not important, communication is.
3) Humanism/Dignity: All human beings (regardless of their sex and cultural
background) are equal (thus equally valuable and equally likely to be the right
partner).
These ideas come from the realization that, although poverty often plays a role
in the human traﬃcking for sexual exploitation phenomenon, the real problem is
the demand (i.e. men). So unless the demand is reduced, which means involving
men in the solution, there will be no real solution. The (unorthodox) idea is thus
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to change men's preferences, such that even if they have the money to buy a girl,
they choose not to do it.
It is true that there is a purely biological problem (the fact that men can obtain
sexual satisfaction from any woman), but if we managed to spread the idea that
mistreating women is coward rather than masculine, men who use women only for
sexual satisfaction purposes should be a minority. But of course, in many places
it is precisely the fact that there are 'missing' girls that causes 'surplus' men to
demand prostitutes, so the two problems are connected.
On the other hand, married men also use the services of enslaved / groomed
for sex girls.72 This makes one wonder whether those men are happy in their
marriages, and otherwise to guess why they got married in the ﬁrst place. One
possible reason to marry strangers might be that they belong to one's same re-
ligious group and/or community, and that marriage outside such circle is not
supported by families.73
This underlines the importance of the structure, i.e., of the gender and cultural
context as it exempliﬁes that males, and not only women, are expected to abide
by the social norms of their communities. Because of this, we need to teach men
and women in all cohorts and countries that culture is not as important as the
happiness of their sons and daughters. Thus if the latter want to marry outside
their communities, that should be supported as long as they can communicate
with their partners and understand each other without ﬁghting. On the other
hand, parents might threaten to disinherit their children if the latter married
72This is true, for instance, for some of the UK nationals who were part
of grooming gangs that have recently been brought to justice in the UK (see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rochdale_sex_traﬃcking_gang).
73This has been suggested by some interviewees in the BBC documentary Exposed - Groomed
For Sex (available from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KkaPlDOE7X0), which investi-
gates about child grooming gangs in the UK.
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outside their community.74 Therefore, element number 2 is crucial; but in order
to achieve it, a change to a more humane, less materialistic, economic model is
also needed.
This idea can already be seen in calls for the introduction of measures of
happiness in indicators of countries' prosperity.75 That is, instead of trying to
maximize (per capita) GDP, if we cared about happiness, rather than money, we
would, in my view, have to look at reducing domestic violence, human traﬃcking,
and balancing sex ratios. I do not see any of those among the UN Millennium
Development Goals.76 After the next two paragraphs I will argue that this might
74This has been the experience of one of the interviewees in the BBC
documentary Welcome to India 2012 - Episode 1 of 3 (available from
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IpdoRUMeshw)
75For instance, in 2012 the United Nations decided that wellbeing would be at the centre of new
sustainable development goals, which are expected to replace the Millennium Development Goals
when they expire in 2015 (see http://www.huﬃngtonpost.com/2012/06/11/united-nations-calls-
for-_n_1582289.html). This decision was made at the High Level Meeting titled Happiness
and Well-being: Deﬁning a New Economic Paradigm, which took place on the 2nd of April 2012
at the UN headquarters in New York, and that was hosted by the Royal Government of the
Kingdom of Bhutan. That country has been promoting the adoption of a new, more sustainable,
world economic system and introduced the concept of Gross National Happiness (GNH) in 1972
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_national_happiness). At that point, it proclaimed that
GNH was more important than Gross National Product; and in 2008 it developed a GNH
Index that consists of nine domains: living standards, health, education, culture, community
vitality, time use, good governance, and psychological wellbeing. To the best of its capacity, the
country has been trying to put GNH in practice at home. Bhutan then initiated the UN General
Assembly Resolution 65/309 titled Happiness: Towards a Holistic Approach to Development,
which was passed by consensus on 19th July 2011, and which gave rise to the 2nd of April 2012
meeting (see http://www.gnhc.gov.bt/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Brochure-ﬁnal-ﬁnal.pdf).
76Likewise, policy recommendations from the 2nd of April 2012 UN High Level Meeting in-
clude, for instance, prioritizing investment in renewable energy, public transport and green
spaces; introducing work sharing schemes that increase leisure time and prevent unemploy-
ment; discouraging materialism by banning advertising to children; and creating accounting
systems that factor in the value of `services' provided by the ecosystem. Although eﬀorts to
incorporate traditional and indigenous knowledge; empower women; and ensure equality of
opportunity are also included (Royal Government of Bhutan (2012)), the main concern seems
to be environmental. Like this, nothing is mentioned about the need to bring the world's
sex ratio at birth down to its natural level (it is currently 107 boys per 100 girls), and even
less about ending human traﬃcking. This might be because Bhutan, the country promoting
the adoption of a new world economic system, does not have a problem of skewed sex ra-
tios at birth. In particular, according to data published in 2012, that ratio was between 104
and 105 boys born for every 100 girls born depending on the data source (either from the
Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) World Factbook 2012, or from the World Bank's World
Development Report 2012 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_sex_ratio)).
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be because aid organizations' foremost aim is to reduce fertility rates.
First, let me make clear that in my view, female education should be supported
as it allows girls to gain skills to, in theory, compete on par with men in the
labour market. This would then contribute to weaken the belief that daughters
are a liability for parents. However, in reality women are often discriminated
against in the labour market, even in advanced economies, and/or after having
gained valuable skills, they sometimes have to choose between having a career
or a family. Therefore, I suggest that the new, more humane, economic system
support families by oﬀering, for instance:
4) Some paid maternity and paternity leave and free nurseries.77
If these four points were followed, we may expect to see an increase in the median
age at marriage, a fall in fertility rates, and perhaps increases in educational
attainment.
Nevertheless, the sort of support suggested in point 4 is not always available,
not even in some industrialized countries.78 This is partly because we, as a soci-
This is relevant as the non-binding policy recommendations that were made after the
2nd of April Meeting are largely derived from a list suggested by the government of
Bhutan, and which was included in the meeting's ﬁnal brochure (http://www.gnhc.gov.bt/wp-
content/uploads/2012/03/Brochure-ﬁnal-ﬁnal.pdf). Nevertheless, note that even in Bhutan fe-
males seem to be disadvantaged compared to males, as the sex ratio for working age peo-
ple (ages 15-65) is 113, and that for people aged 65 and over, is 112 (CIA World Fact-
book 2012, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_sex_ratio). This im-
plies that, in contrast to what is observed in most countries, Bhutanese women have
much higher mortality rates than males. Furthermore, there are also criticisms regarding
Bhutan's suppression of its largest minority, the Hindu Lhotshampa, who were expelled in
mass after new citizenship laws were passed in 1985; the few who remained in the country
are allegedly discriminated against (http://www.dol.govt.nz/publications/research/bhutanese-
refugee-resettlement/bhutanese-report3-2.asp).
77This may be ensured, for instance, perhaps for up to two children (the total fertility rate
needed for ensuring population replacement) per family. In any case, this may not bankrupt
the state given that it is so diﬃcult to ﬁnd the right partner.
78In the United States, for instance, there is no federal legislation re-
quiring ﬁrms to oﬀer paid holidays, and even less parental leave (see
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parental_leave#America).
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ety, praise money, but also because we do not look at children as our children,
but rather as their mothers' children. That is precisely why the instrumental
version of empowerment exists. Development agencies know that mothers are al-
truistic and that they are children's main care givers. Therefore, instead of trying
to change men's mentality, masculinity deﬁnitions, and involving men in chil-
dren's care, they support interventions that leave the unequal gender structure
untouched.
It might thus be that major aid organisations want to promote female educa-
tion just in order to reduce fertility,79 but they do not seem to be interested in
women's well-being in its own right. Otherwise, why are not bringing sex ratios
down to their natural level of 104-106 boys born for every 100 girls born, and
ending sex slavery at the top of their priorities?80 The answer may lie in that
setting balanced sex ratios and lowering gender diﬀerentials in mortality among
the MDGs may compromise low fertility rates in India and China. It thus seems
that, as long as fertility rates are kept low,81 the instrument is irrelevant, even
if that means that an increasing number of girls are sold as prostitutes in India
(Hvistendahl (2011)).
Likewise, development agencies may argue that any education is empowering
precisely because they see it as a means to reduce fertility rather than to prepare
girls to assess their worth and envisage new possibilities (Stromquist (2002,
24)). Such preparation may be irrelevant given than any education keeps girls
busy, thus (presumably) preventing them from starting a family at a young
79The link between higher female education and lower fertility has been exposed, for instance,
by Jejeebhoy (1995) and Osili and Long (2008).
80Note that although the UN's Global Initiative to Fight Human Traﬃcking (UN.GIFT) (see
http://www.ungift.org) exists, the phenomenon it is trying to ﬁght against is not at the top of
the UN's priorities.
81Hvistendahl (2011) argues that population growth has been slowed in India, in part, by
reducing the number of daughters.
101
age.82 Nonetheless, education does not equate with empowerment; take for
instance women in Saudi Arabia or Iran, who can be highly educated but still be,
legally, seen as subordinate to men.
Similarly, note that PROGRESA, that aims at empowering women and is
supported by the World Bank, which argues that any education is empowering,
has thus chosen not to empower adult women. That is, I think that there would
be no debate regarding the empowering eﬀects of becoming literate. However, note
that PROGRESA is not making a diﬀerence at that crucial stage as enrolment
rates at primary school among girls were already close to 100 percent prior to the
program (De Janvry and Sadoulet (2006)). This is precisely why several studies
suggest suspending the scholarships at that school level, and saving the money
for higher grades (Attanasio et al. (2005), De Janvry and Sadoulet (2006), Todd
and Wolpin (2006)).
Moreover, the program has chosen not to oﬀer basic education for illiterate
adult women, even when the latter have repeatedly requested it (Adato et al.
(2000)). This supports the hypothesis that the ﬁnal goal of mainstream develop-
ment agencies is, simply, to reduce fertility, and that they see female education
just as an instrument to reach that goal. That is, as adult women have already
started a family -that is why they are PROGRESA beneﬁciaries-, aid agencies /
the state may ﬁnd it useless for their ﬁnal goal to teach them basic reading, writing
and numeracy skills, even when that would give women better economic oppor-
82Some literature has shown the existance of a negative correlation between age at ﬁrst
birth and completed fertility (e.g. Kohler et al. (2001)). Nevertheless, note that the
reason why some parents do not want their daughters to continue their education is often
precisely because they fear, just as aid donors, that their daughters may start a family
at a young age, after having found a boyfriend at school and getting pregnant (Adato
et al. (2000)). Furthermore, there are reports of school teachers in sub-Saharan Africa
using their status to sexually abuse girls (http://allafrica.com/stories/201307140017.html;
http://www.soschildrensvillages.org.uk/about-our-charity/archive/2010/10/sex-crimes-against-
children-in-uganda) which, anecdotal evidence shows, makes parents less willing to send their
daughters to school.
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tunities, and beneﬁt their children in the long run. In contrast, Oportunidades
provides education for young girls, starts paying higher bursaries for them pre-
cisely when they become biologically able to have children (i.e. at the onset of
secondary education (normally age 12)), and aims at improving the health and
nutrition of young children, all of which may help to reduce fertility.83
Nonetheless, the link between girls education and lower fertility sometimes
fails, as teenagers often ﬁnd a partner at school and become pregnant.84 Is edu-
cation thus 'truly' empowering girls? That is, is becoming pregnant their (free)
choice? Otherwise, were not they aware of the risks of having unprotected sex?
Did not they know that contraceptives exist? Did not they know where from to
obtain them? Were not they empowered enough as to resist men's pressures
or to insist on / impose the use of a prophylactic upon their partners? Or were
they forced to have sex?85 Could not we say that education has failed to empower
these girls in the sense of preparing them to assess their worth and envisage new
possibilities (Stromquist (2002, 24))?
Lastly, given that changing socially constructed deﬁnitions of masculinity takes
time, applying / debating the application of the following policies may help to face
human traﬃking.
1. Punish the purchase of sex, just as it is done in Sweden.
2. Publicly expose users of child prostitution regardless of where the oﬀence
83The positive association between child mortality and fertility (Chowdhury (1988), Palloni
and Rafalimanana (1999)) may be due to people choosing to have more children than their ideal
family size in contexts of high infant / child mortality, as to ensure that they end up with their
ideal family size in the long-run.
84For instance, in a single upper secondary school (usually ages 15-18) in a Mexican munici-
pality in the State of Mexico, 45 students became pregnant during the ﬁrst two months of the
academic year 2012-2013 (see http://www.zocalo.com.mx/seccion/articulo/son-embarazadas-
45-alumnas-en-dos-meses)
85Again, note the reports of school teachers in sub-Saharan Africa using their
status to sexually abuse girls (http://allafrica.com/stories/201307140017.html;
http://www.soschildrensvillages.org.uk/about-our-charity/archive/2010/10/sex-crimes-against-
children-in-uganda).
103
takes place. There could be, for instance, a dedicated webpage where any one
could check the list of convicted paodophiles.
3. Oﬀer support to paedophiles who request to be treated (they might come
forward if they are certain that if they are catched they will be publicly exposed).
Psychological and psychiatric support could, for instance, be made available; and
groups of Paedophiles Anonymous, similar to the existent Alcoholics Anony-
mous, could be created.
4. Help to ﬁght corruption in developing countries. Corruption makes human
traﬃcking for sexual exploitation possible.86
1.5 Conclusions
This chapter has provided a background on women's empowerment. In particular,
it has highlighted the existence of two notions of empowerment, each of them
involving diﬀerent underlying capacities and freedoms for women. One of them is
the instrumentalist notion, which emphasizes women's altruism and dedication
to the collective family welfare, and is thus not likely to be resisted within the
household. The other one is the selﬁsh / self-interest notion, which focuses much
more on the conﬂictual element of gender relations. In this case, empowerment is
put to the service of meeting women's own physical, emotional, and / or mental
well-being.
This thesis contributes to the literature by providing empirical examples of how
the two types of empowerment can aﬀect children's welfare. The second chapter
relates to the instrumentalist notion of empowerment, and the third chapter to the
selﬁsh one. Speciﬁcally, the second chapter evaluates a conditional cash transfer
(CCT) program, which empowers poor women in Mexico by giving them tools
86See Cacho (2010).
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to be better mothers, in terms of its impact on birthweight. The third chapter
analyses whether empowered women, deﬁned as those who have better control
of their own healthcare and bodies, as well as more progressive gender attitudes,
are more likely to have a ﬁrstborn girl in Delhi, India. This probability itself
constitutes a women's empowerment achievement because, although it is a child
outcome, it aﬀects women's health and, in a context of `missing' girls, it aﬀects
and is a by-product of gender power relations in society.
Given this setting, the ﬁrst chapter provides a literature review on the evalua-
tion of PROGRESA-Oportunidades, the CCT program, drawing attention to the
importance of exploring its impact beyond simple mean eﬀects. Such emphasis
is due to the fact that Chapter 2 assesses the program's impact on the whole
birthweight distribution rather than just at the mean. Additionally, Chapter 1
gives an overview of how women's empowerment/autonomy has been measured
in the literature. The Chapter then questions the apparent success for which
Oportunidades is internationally recognized by including critical appraisals of the
program in general, as well as on its eﬀect on women's status and empowerment
/ autonomy.
On the other hand, Chapter 1 reviews the indicators and methodology that
has been used to measure women's empowerment in research that uses the same
type of datasets employed in Chapter 3. This was necessary as the latter chapter
ﬁrst constructs an index of selﬁsh empowerment, referred as progressivity, and
then assesses its eﬀect on the sex of the ﬁrstborn and on the duration to ﬁrst
birth in Delhi, India. Chapter 1 thus explains the importance of studying the ﬁrst
outcome in the context of women's empowerment, and the reasons for introducing
the notion of progressivity ; it also highlights the fact that the latter is analysed
ﬁrst as a dependent variable in Chapter 3, and describes the indicators and the
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estimation methodology used to measure it.
Additionally, Chapter 1 presents a hypothesis to explain why there exist two
so diﬀerent, and even conﬂicting, notions of female empowerment. Finally, the
chapter outlines some ideas that, if put into practice, may help to increase women's
well-being (i.e. reduce their suﬀering).
In sum, this thesis contributes to the women's empowerment literature by
providing an example where a seemingly empowering intervention leaves the un-
equal gender context unchallenged, or even reinforces it, even while apparently
bringing about beneﬁts for children. In this sense, the thesis exempliﬁes the po-
tential trade-oﬀs that may exist between women's own welfare and their children's
well-being. On the other hand, the thesis presents an instance in which women's
empowerment helps to reduce prevailing gender inequalities. In that case, the
thesis highlights the importance of the gender context in enhancing or negating
the eﬀects of individual-level empowerment on well-being outcomes, and draws
attention to the need of instilling progressive thoughts in communities of women,
as well as in men.
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Tables
Table 1.1: Monthly scholarships in US dollars
School Grade Cash Transfer (US$)
Primary School Males & Females
3rd 13
4th 15
5th 19
6th 25
Lower Secondary School Males Females
7th 37 39
8th 39 43
9th 41 47
Upper Secondary School Males Females
10th 62 71
11th 67 76
12th 71 81
Source: SEDESOL (2009). Scholarships for July-December 2012 paid in Mexican
pesos; Mexico's Central Bank's oﬃcial average exchange rate (13.06 pesos per US$)
(www.banxico.org.mx) for that period was used to obtain the ﬁgures in dollars.
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Table 1.2: Required health centre visits for program beneﬁciaries
Who? How many? When?
Check-ups
Children
< 4 months 3 At 7 and 28 days, and at 2 months
4-24 months 20 One per month
2-4 years old 3 per year One every 4 months
5-9 years old 2 per year One every 6 months
10-19 years old 2 per year One every 6 months
Women
Pregnant 5 First one in ﬁrst trimester
Lactating 2 -
Adults (both genders)
20-49 years old 2 per year One every 6 months
50+ years old 1 per year -
Health, hygiene, nutrition and best practices talks
Mother of the family 6 per year One every 2 months
Other adults 1 per year One every 12 months
Source: SEDESOL (2009). Requirements in bold are some of the channels through which Oportu-
nidades might aﬀect birthweight.
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Table 1.3: Timetable for the evaluation of Oportunidades
Date Survey
Nov-1997 1st interview (ENCASEH )
_
Mar-1998 2nd interview (1st ENCEL)
_
May-1998 Treatment localities start receiving beneﬁts
_
Oct-1998 2nd ENCEL
_
Jun-1999 3rd ENCEL
_
Sep-1999 Control localities start enrolling &
Transfers start to be recorded
_
Nov-1999 4th ENCEL
_
Autumn-2003 5th ENCEL & Fertility survey
_
2004 New control localities start enrolling
Source: INSP (2006). Surveys in bold were used in Chapter 2.
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2 Chapter 2: A Poverty Alleviation
Program and Birthweight
2.1 Introduction
Each year 15 percent of all newborns in developing countries -a total of 19
million babies- are born with low birthweight (<2.5 kg) (UNICEF(2010)). Com-
pared to babies who were born with normal weight, low-birthweight babies face
several disadvantages throughout their life. They have a much higher risk of dy-
ing within the ﬁrst 28 days after birth (McIntire et al. (1999)), experience higher
mortality and morbidity rates during childhood (Boardman et al. (2002)), have
an increased risk of attention problems (e.g. Breslau and Bohnert (2008)), and
lower adult productivity (see Behrman and Rosenzweig (2004)). The latter study
also ﬁnds that increased birthweight increases adult height and adult educational
attainment.
In developing countries, poor maternal nutrition during pregnancy (e.g. Fall
et al. (2003)), anaemia (see Mavalankar et al. (1992) and Feresu et al. (2004)),
infectious diseases such as malaria (see, for example, Verhoeﬀ et al. (2001) and
Feresu et al. (2004)), maternal smoking during pregnancy (e.g. Ferraz et al.
(1990)), and inadequate or lack of prenatal care (see, for instance, Mavalankar et
al. (1992), Coria-Soto et al. (1996) and Goldani et al. (2004)) have been found
to directly or indirectly contribute to lower birthweight.
This chapter evaluates the Mexican conditional cash transfer program Opor-
tunidades (opportunities) in terms of its impact on birthweight. Poor households
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under the program receive cash upon their investment in their members' human
capital. This means: children must regularly attend school; all household mem-
bers must regularly visit health clinics to receive preventive healthcare; and adults
have to attend talks on health, hygiene, nutrition, and in general best practices
(SEDESOL (2009)).
Oportunidades may aﬀect birthweight as it seeks to improve the nutrition of
pregnant women, provide them with access to adequate prenatal care, and increase
maternal awareness. Speciﬁcally, pregnant women in beneﬁciary households have
to attend at least ﬁve prenatal care consultations, the ﬁrst of which has to take
place during the ﬁrst trimester of pregnancy. They also receive nutritional sup-
plements that provide them with 20 percent of their daily calorie requirements
and 100 percent of all necessary micro-nutrients (Hoddinott and Skouﬁas (2004)).
Moreover, the household's female head must attend bi-monthly talks on health,
hygiene and nutrition, and it is she who receives the cash transfers.
Barber and Gertler (2008, 2010) analyse the eﬀect of Oportunidades on mean
birthweight and ﬁnd that the latter is 127 grams higher for babies born into
households that had already received its ﬁrst cash transfer. Mean eﬀects may
however not be representative of the impact of covariates at the extreme tails
of the conditional birthweight distribution (see, for instance, Abrevaya (2001),
Koenker and Hallock (2001) and Abrevaya and Dahl (2008)), and in this case, we
may be particularly interested in what happens at lower quantiles. Furthermore,
conditional quantile regression estimates do not tell us what will happen to a
particular baby when we change a covariate by a small amount, since the baby will
not necessarily be on the same quantile after the change. For this, unconditional
quantile regressions (Firpo et al. (2009)) are needed.
This chapter uses conditional and unconditional quantile regressions to assess
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the eﬀect of Oportunidades on the birthweight of babies born into enrolled house-
holds in rural Mexico. The results show that the program did have a positive
impact on birthweight but that babies at the upper tail of the distribution have
beneﬁted the most in terms of weight gain. While Oportunidades is associated
with a 206-gram increase on birthweights at the 80th percentile of the conditional
distribution, the eﬀect at the median is 155 grams, and 135 grams at the 20th
percentile. Unconditional quantile regression estimates corroborate this pattern
of the eﬀect of the transfer at the diﬀerent points of the distribution.
This heterogeneous program eﬀect on birthweight may be due to heavier babies
belonging to households with healthier members even in the absence of Oportu-
nidades, such that when the program is introduced and the cash received it can
be spent mostly on the pregnant woman, generating a higher positive impact on
babies who would have been better oﬀ anyway.87 The ﬁxed (i.e. independent of
household characteristics) component of the transfer, which is intended to buy
food, should thus probably be higher for larger households, and for those whose
members have on average a poor health status.
A second ﬁnding is that maternal smoking during pregnancy is associated with
a 460-gram decrease in birthweights at the 20th percentile of the conditional dis-
tribution. This eﬀect, which is not picked up by least squares regression estimates,
more than completely wipes out any program beneﬁts. Therefore, reminders about
the dangers of smoking during pregnancy should be given repeatedly during pre-
natal care consultations and at the health and nutrition talks, both of which are
compulsory for beneﬁciaries.
The remainder of the chapter is divided as follows. Section 2.2 describes the
conditional cash transfer program. Section 2.3 presents the data, sample, and
87Note that unfortunately, there is no data available on objective measures of health, such as
body mass index, that would allow controlling for the health status of all household members.
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descriptive statistics. Section 2.4 outlines the model, and Section 2.5 presents
the results. Section 2.6 undertakes robustness checks, and Section 2.7 deals with
unconditional quantile estimation. Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 The conditional cash transfer program
2.2.1 Conditionality
Oportunidades was introduced in 1997 under the name Programa de Edu-
cacion, Salud y Alimentacion (PROGRESA  Education, Health and Nutrition
Program) to beneﬁt more than 140,000 households in rural Mexico. It has ex-
panded since its inception such that beneﬁciary families reached 5.8 million in
2012 (20 percent of all households in Mexico). Under the program, beneﬁciary
households receive cash upon their investment in their household´s human capi-
tal. The total transfer consists of two parts, a ﬁxed amount (i.e., common to all
enrolled households), and an amount that varies across households depending on
their demographic composition.
The ﬁxed amount is conditional on all household members fulﬁlling their health
centre-related obligations. This means that all members must attend their re-
quired check-ups and adults must regularly attend talks on health, hygiene and
nutrition (see Table 1.2). What is relevant for birthweight is that pregnant women
have to attend at least ﬁve prenatal care consultations, the ﬁrst of which has to
take place within the ﬁrst trimester of pregnancy, and that the female household
head must attend talks on best practices regarding hygiene, health, and nutrition
every two months. Moreover, pregnant and lactating women, as well as newborns
and malnourished children, are given nutritional supplements which contain 20
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percent of their daily calorie requirements, and 100 percent of all necessary micro
nutrients (Hoddinott and Skouﬁas (2004)).
If all household members fulﬁll their health centre-related obligations, the
mother of the family receives a cash transfer in Mexican pesos which in the second
semester of 2012 was equivalent to $34 per month (SEDESOL (2013)).88 This
grant is intended to buy food and, in December 2012, it was around 53 (38)
percent of the cost of the basic food basket for a single person residing in a rural
(urban) area.89 The second part of the subsidy is conditioned on the regular
attendance at school of all children in the household between the grades 3 to 12
(usually ages 8 to 18).90 The grant increases as children progress through school
and from the 7th grade onwards is higher for girls than for boys, but there is an
upper limit for this scholarship component (SEDESOL (2013))91.
The total transfer may thus diﬀer across households and to receive it, all house-
hold members must fulﬁll their obligations over a two-month period. Schools and
health centres are then given about one month deadline to submit attendance
records to the program administrators. The latter then calculate the total pay-
ment that each household is entitled to, and transfer it to the female household
head on a bi-monthly basis for initially three years, after that a reassessment takes
88Mexico's Central Bank's oﬃcial average exchange rate for that period (13.06 pesos per
dollar) was used to obtain the ﬁgures in US dollars (see http://www.banxico.org.mx/).
89The per capita value of such basket is provided every month by Mexico's National Council for
the Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL) (see http://www.coneval.gob.mx/),
which is the institution that provides oﬃcial poverty statistics in the country. The oﬃcial average
exchange rate for December 2012 (12.87 pesos per dollar), was used to obtain the value of both
baskets, rural and urban, in US dollars (see http://www.banxico.org.mx/) and so, calculate the
proportion that the ﬁxed part of the household cash transfer may represent for a single person.
90Grants for children enrolled in school grades 1 and 2 are also available in villages with less
than 2500 inhabitants.
91For the second semester of 2012, such cap was set at about 97 USD per month for families
with children enrolled in primary and lower secondary school; and at 178 USD for families with
children enrolled in upper secondary school (SEDESOL (2013)). Mexico's Central Bank's oﬃcial
average exchange rate for that period (13.06 pesos per dollar) was used to obtain the ﬁgures in
US dollars (see http://www.banxico.org.mx/).
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place (SEDESOL (2009)).
2.2.2 Selection of beneﬁciaries
In rural areas, the selection of beneﬁciaries into the program consists of three
steps: 1) Identifying the localities to be targeted; 2) selecting households in those
localities; and 3) having a community assembly approve the list of beneﬁciaries
(INSP (2006)).
Localities are identiﬁed using a marginalization index that was previously con-
structed for each locality in Mexico for which socioeconomic and demographic
census data existed. Localities with the highest marginalization indeces are given
priority for inclusion in the program provided that they have access to educational
and health centre infrastructure, and a minimum of 50 inhabitants. Given these
conditions are met, a socioeconomic and demographic survey is administered to
each household in the locality and a poverty index score generated for each of them
(INSP (2006)). Eligible households are then identiﬁed using linear discriminant
analysis but in general, households with poverty index scores above the median
are deemed to be eligible. Nevertheless, the fact that the community has the ﬁnal
say on the list of beneﬁciaries has meant that some households which were deemed
ineligible end up being enrolled.
2.2.3 Evaluation sample
Due to logistical and ﬁnancial constraints the program was introduced in
phases. At the program's inception, the Mexican government took advantage
of this feature by randomly selecting 506 poor localities in seven states to partic-
ipate in an evaluation sample. Out of them, 320 were randomly selected to start
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receiving beneﬁts from May 1998 (having started to enrol from March 1998). Res-
idents of the remaining 186 localities then started to enrol in September 1999 and
to receive beneﬁts soon afterwards, but initially they did not know about this and
thus constitute the original control group. While the randomization was successful
at the locality level, the two groups of localities (i.e. early and delayed enrollers)
were signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in terms of several household and individual variables
(INSP (2006)).
The program evaluation consisted of periodically interviewing all households
in the 506 localities between November 1997 and November 1999, and then again
in 2003 (see Table 1.3). The ﬁrst survey, the Encuesta de Caracteristicas So-
cioeconomicas de los Hogares (ENCASEH - Survey of Household Socioeconomic
Characteristics), was used to select households into the program. Eligible house-
holds had to enrol by a deadline, after which no enrolment was permitted until
three years later when the next selection process took place. This prevented mi-
gration into the original treatment (early-enrolled) localities to receive beneﬁts.
The program take-up rate among eligible households in the evaluation sample was
97 percent. Initial enrolment was for three years conditional on fulﬁlling the pro-
gram's obligations; only about 1 percent of the households were denied program
beneﬁts due to non-compliance (Boyce and Gertler (2001)).
After enrolment, four rounds of an evaluation survey, the Encuesta de Eval-
uacion de Hogares (ENCEL - Household Evaluation Survey), were carried out
between March 1998 and November 1999. A ﬁfth ENCEL was administered in
the autumn 2003 to assess the program's medium-term eﬀects. As by then all 506
localities in the evaluation sample had already been incorporated into the pro-
gram, a new control group was created by using socioeconomic and demographic
data to match each of the 506 localities to a locality that had not yet been incor-
116
porated. However, as replacement was allowed, only 152 localities constitute the
new control group (Todd (2004)).
Before 2003 each ENCEL consisted only of a socioeconomic survey. In 2003
however, a Fertility Survey was also administered to 14,861 women aged 15 to
49. The sample included a representative group from each of the three types of
localities (original treatment, original control, and new control) in each of the
seven states under evaluation (CONAPO (2004)). This database is my main
source of data. It contains basic information such as the date of birth and gender
of all children born alive during the intervention period (1997-2003), and detailed
information on each woman's last pregnancy, including outcome and birthweight
of the newborn.
2.3 Data, sample & descriptive statistics
2.3.1 Data & sample
This chapter uses data from ﬁve diﬀerent sources. The Fertility Survey was used
to obtain data on the outcome variable birthweight, on the date when each house-
hold enrolled in Oportunidades, and on infant, maternal, and pregnancy related
variables. The ENCASEH was in turn used to obtain data on household char-
acteristics prior to the intervention, and 92locality level data was taken from the
2005 Population Count (short census). Lastly, the Transfers Database, which con-
tains information on all transfers made to beneﬁciaries since September 1999, and
the (socioeconomic) ENCEL 2003 were used to identify households that withdrew
92Note that no maternal controls at baseline (i.e., before the program's inception) were used.
This is because apparently, the household member identiﬁer was not always respected across
diﬀerent survey's rounds. I concluded this after merging the Fertility Survey with the ENCASEH
and ﬁnding out that in some cases the month and year of birth, and sometimes even the gender,
allegedly referring to the same person did not coincide.
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from the program before 2004. All these datasets are publicly available at the
program's website (www.oportunidades.gob.mx).
The sample includes 744 singleton live births which weighed less than seven
kilograms, and took place in households where only one member gave birth (per-
haps more than once) between 1997 and 2003. These households were designated
as poor, enrolled in the program before 2000, have fully completed interviews,
and included full information on all covariates. That is, the program eﬀect will
be captured using an indicator for whether or not the baby was born under the
program (and thus, was a beneﬁciary birth).
As there is no publicly available data regarding the amount of cash transfers
received by beneﬁciary households before September 1999, the sample was ob-
tained assuming that no household withdrew from the program before that date.
This assumption is supported by a mean exposure time before withdrawal for
dropouts in the ﬁnal sample (a total of 49 observations) of three and a half years.
In any case, Section 2.6 shows that the results are robust to six beneﬁciary births,
whose households may have withdrawn before September 1999 (they have mostly
missing values in the Transfers Database but are not recorded as dropouts), being
treated as non-beneﬁciaries instead.
Furthermore, note that 23 households that enrolled in Oportunidades before
2000 were excluded from the analysis as it was not possible to determine whether
or not they dropped out from it; and if so, whether it was before or after the baby's
birth. None of those households is included in the Transfers Database, 16 of them
identiﬁed themselves as not receiving program cash beneﬁts in the ENCEL 2003,
and the remaining seven did not have information on this last question (three
of them because of not being included in that ENCEL at all). Still, Section 2.6
shows that the results are robust to the inclusion of these 23 observations, which
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results in a sample size of 767.
2.3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 2.1 shows descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) of all vari-
ables used in the analysis separately by beneﬁciary status. Beneﬁciary babies
have been deﬁned as those being born at least 2 months after their household
enrolled in Oportunidades. This ensures expectant mothers in beneﬁciary house-
holds to have had some program exposure in terms of prenatal care, nutritional
suplements, and health and hygiene talks. Furthermore, the household might also
have already received its ﬁrst cash transfer two months after enrolment.
The results show that beneﬁciary births are 125 grams heavier than their non-
beneﬁciary counterparts. In terms of maternal, infant, and pregnancy related
characteristics, we see that the baby whose birthweight is being analysed is of
higher order parity (higher than the third birth) in both subsamples. The pro-
portion of girls among beneﬁciary births is higher than among non-beneﬁciary
ones (47 versus 42 percent). This is probably due to the diﬀerence in sample
sizes. Babies born at least two months after their household enrolled in Opor-
tunidades were weighed on average 3 days after birth, compared to 4.2 days for
non-beneﬁciary births. This may be due to babies in beneﬁciary households be-
ing born in health facilities rather than at home. Mothers were on average 30
years old in both subsamples, and the same proportion of women reported having
smoked during preganancy (4 percent of them). Lastly, a prenatal care quality
index was constructed based on three indicators: whether or not the prenatal
check-ups were undertaken by a physician or a nurse, and whether or not they
included weighing the expectant mother, and measuring her uterus. The results
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show that the index is on average very similar for both birth groups, being 0.91
for non-beneﬁciary births and 0.94 for beneﬁciary ones.
Turning to household socioeconomic and demographic characteristics prior to
the introduction of Oportunidades we see that, among beneﬁciary births, a larger
proportion of household heads speak an indigenous language (34 versus 28 percent
among non-beneﬁciary births). That variable will be included as a covariate as
a proxy for ethnicity. Household heads among non-beneﬁciary births were on
average slightly more educated than heads of households where beneﬁciary births
took place (3.84 versus 3.5 years of formal education). The former were also
slightly older than the latter in November 1997, when the ﬁrst interview took
place (34.8 versus 34.3 years old). On average, both groups were made of six
members, one third of which were children younger than 6 years, and another third
were children aged 6 to 17 years. Lastly, an economic index capturing dwelling
characteristics and assets possession was created based on whether the dwelling
has water and electricity, a fridge and a stove, its ﬂoor is covered, and whether
the household owns agricultural land. The index could take values between 0 and
1, and its average was 0.3 for both beneﬁciary and non-beneﬁciary births.
Finally, the locality's altitude will be included as a covariate following previ-
ous research (see Giussani et al. (2001)) which has found that it is negatively
associated with bithweight. The results in Table 2.1 show that localities where
beneﬁciary births took place have on average very similar altitude than those
where non-beneﬁciary births ocurred (1293 versus 1307 meters).
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2.4 Model
This chapter uses linear conditional quantile functions (Koenker and Bassett
(1978), Koenker (2005)) to investigate the impact of Oportunidades at diﬀerent
points of the birthweight distribution. Speciﬁcally, consider:
F−1BWi() ≡ QBWi(θ|xi) = x
′
iβθ, i = 1, . . . , N; 0<θ<1; βθ Rρ
where:
BWi = birthweight in grams, where the i's are independent of each other.
FBW () =BW 's cumulative distribution function.
xi= Vector of independent variables
In this context, the θth regression quantile is deﬁned as any solution β∗θ R
ρthat
solves:
minβθRρ
∑N
i(i:BWi≥x′iβθ) θ|BWi − x
′
iβθ|+
∑N
i(i:BWi<x
′
iβθ)
(1− θ)|BWi − x′iβθ|
That is, just as classical least squares seeks to minimize the sum of the squared
residuals, conditional quantile functions are estimated by minimizing an asym-
metrically weighted sum of absolute residuals. A special case is the symmetric
sum, which yields the median regression.
The baseline speciﬁcation captures the program impact through a binary vari-
able, b (beneﬁciary), indicating whether the recorded birthweight refers to a ben-
eﬁciary (b=1 ) or a non-beneﬁciary birth (b=0 ). Furthermore, the vector of inde-
pendent variables x is split into maternal, infant, and pregnancy related variables
m, household characteristics at baseline, z, and locality characteristics, y (see
Table A2.1 in the Appendix for details) as follows:
QBWi(θ|mi,zi,yi) = αθ+γθbi,k+β ′θ1mi+β ′θ2zi+β ′θ3yi+εi, θ = 0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.9 (2.1)
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where:
bi,k =

1 if born at least k months after the household enrolled in Oportunida-
des and before the former withdrew from the latter
0 otherwise
m = Maternal, infant, and pregnancy related variables: Birth order, gender, and
the number of days after birth when the baby was weighed, maternal age at birth,
maternal smoking during pregnancy, and a prenatal care quality index.
z = Household characteristics at baseline: Household head characteristics: age,
education, and whether he speaks an indigenous language. Family structure:
household size, proportion of members younger than 6 years, and proportion of
members aged 6 to 17 years. Dwelling infrastructure and assets possession index:
the dwelling has water and electricity, a fridge and a stove, its ﬂoor is covered,
and the household owns agricultural land.
y = Locality characteristics: Altitude.
In equation (2.1), k had to be chosen so as to generate groups of beneﬁciary
and non-beneﬁciary births statistically indistinguishable from each other in terms
of their observable characteristics prior to the intervention. Therefore, mean-
comparison tests for each pre-birth covariate in equation (2.1) were carried out
between the beneﬁciary and the non-beneﬁciary births generated by a minimum
program exposure ranging from two to nine months (k = 2,...,9). That is, only
values of k≥2 were considered as k=0, the enrolment date, generally means a
zero program exposure; and k=1 might be a too short period for households to
digest the program.
The results in Table 2.2 show that only a minimum program exposure of
two months (k=2) generate groups of beneﬁciary (560 observations) and non-
beneﬁciary births (184 observations) statistically indistinguishable from each other
prior to the intervention at the 5 percent signiﬁcance level. From here onwards,
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k in equation (2.1) is thus ﬁxed at two (k=2). Note that after two months of
enrolment households may not yet have received their ﬁrst cash transfer, as the
program administrators may not yet have veriﬁed the fulﬁlment of obligations.
However, as the 560 households where beneﬁciary births occurred have on average
been enrolled in Oportunidades for 33 months, the beneﬁciary indicator will be
capturing, among others, the program's monetary eﬀect.
2.5 Estimation results
Figure 2.1 plots birthweight density functions separately for beneﬁciary and non-
beneﬁciary births along with their respective means and the normal distribution.
We see that some beneﬁciary babies were born weighing less than 1.8 kilograms,
whereas there are no such babies among the non-beneﬁciary births. It might
thus be that Oportunidades enabled such low-birthweight babies to be born. Fur-
thermore, compared to the distribution for beneﬁciary births, the distribution for
non-beneﬁciaries has a larger mass at lower quantiles until about 2.8 kilograms,
where both distributions coincide. The opposite happens from that point until
about 3.17 kilograms. Oportunidades may have enabled babies who would other-
wise have weighed less than 2.8 kilograms to be born with higher weight. Given
that the birthweight mean for the beneﬁciary and the non-beneﬁciary births is
very similar, 3279.3 and 3154.2 respectively, these hypotheses cannot be tested
using OLS. In contrast, quantile regressions are very suitable in this context.
Figure 2.2 plots the eﬀects of Oportunidades (ﬁrst panel) and maternal smok-
ing (second panel) on birthweight obtained from estimating equation (2.1) us-
ing both conditional quantile regressions (at θ = 0.1, ..., 0.9), and ordinary least
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squares. The respective 95 percent conﬁdence intervals are also shown.93 From
the ﬁrst panel, it is apparent that the program eﬀect (beneﬁciary) does vary along
the conditional birthweight distribution, although the associated standard errors
are very large. The second panel illustrates that maternal smoking during preg-
nancy (smoked) has a large and negative eﬀect on birthweights at the lower end
of the conditional distribution. For birthweights below or at the 0.3 quantile, this
eﬀect lies outside the 95 percent conﬁdence interval of the mean regression.
Table 2.3 reports full regression results for the baseline speciﬁcation (k=2) for
three conditional quantile functions (at θ = 0.2, 0.5, 0.8) and the respective mean
(OLS) eﬀects. As Figure 2.2 illustrates, the program eﬀect at median birthweights
is very similar to the mean eﬀect, at about 155 grams ceteris paribus and signiﬁ-
cant at the one percent level. In contrast, the program is associated with a 135-
and a 207-gram increase on birthweights at the 20th and 80th percentile of the
conditional distribution, respectively.
One possible explanation why babies at the top end of the conditional birth-
weight distribution may beneﬁt more from the program is as follows. If in the
absence of Oportunidades a newborn's weight is, all things equal, a proxy for the
general wellbeing of her household, then heavier babies belong to households with
better oﬀ, healthier members, such that when Oportunidades is introduced and
the cash transfer received, it can be spent mostly on the pregnant woman, gener-
ating a higher positive impact on already better oﬀ babies; that is, on those at the
upper tail of the conditional birthweight distribution. This result has economic
signiﬁcance even though the estimated program impacts at various quantiles may
not be statistically diﬀerent from each other due to their large standard errors.
93The conﬁdence intervals for the quantile regression coeﬃcients were estimated using boot-
strapped standard errors (SEs) as Stata calculates the default SEs based on iid error assump-
tions. This is done using the method suggested by Koenker and Bassett (1978, 1982) and Rogers
(1992) has found that those SEs are understated in cases of heteroskedastic errors.
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The analysis in Section 2.6.3 will thus seek to decrease those standard errors by
increasing the number of non-beneﬁciary births, as well as using heteroskedasticity
consistent standard errors.
Table 2.3 also shows that babies at the 20th percentile of the conditional
birthweight distribution born to women who smoked during pregnancy weigh 459
grams less than similar babies born to non-smoking mothers. This eﬀect is not
picked up by least-squares regression estimates.
Other results from the conditional quantile regressions that are not reﬂected
in the mean estimates are as follows. Babies at the 20th percentile of the condi-
tional birthweight distribution born to women who received high-quality prenatal
care (i.e. the check-ups were undertaken by a physician or a nurse and included
weighing the mother and measuring her uterus) are 308 grams heavier than babies
born to women who received prenatal care, but lacked all of the above mentioned
characteristics.
Likewise, a one-standard deviation (0.214) increase in the proportion of house-
hold members aged 6 to 17 years is associated with a 147-gram increase on birth-
weights at the 80th percentile of the conditional distribution. This eﬀect may be
due to the social customs in rural Mexico, where children -especially girls- are
expected to take care of their younger siblings and help with the housework from
an early age. In such a set-up more children aged 6 to 17 in a household would
thus mean that, ceteris paribus, a pregnant woman has more time to rest and
is less stressed, and therefore gives birth to healthier, heavier babies. The eﬀect
may be signiﬁcant only at upper quantiles because, if a newborn's weight is a
proxy for her household's general wellbeing, households that -even in the absence
of Oportunidades- produce heavier babies, may also have older children who are
healthy enough to actually take care of the youngest, help with the housework,
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or at least do not demand too much attention.
2.6 Robustness checks
2.6.1 Baseline model
Figure 2.3 and Table 2.4 report robustness checks for the baseline model. Fig-
ure 2.3 plots the program eﬀects obtained from estimating equation (2.1) after
increasing the minimum number of months of program exposure; that is, using
k=3,...,9. This was done as it may be interesting to know what happens if the
beneﬁciary births were deﬁned as only those that spent the whole pregnancy under
the program (k=8, 9).
On the other hand, the results in Table 2.4 were obtained by re-estimating
equation (2.1) after altering the baseline sample (reported under Sample (1)) as
follows: (2) including 16 births out of the 23 that had been excluded from the
analysis due to not appearing in the Transfers Database, and either not being
beneﬁciaries in 2003, or not having information on their beneﬁciary status in that
year (see Section 2.3), as non-beneﬁciaries; (3) same as (2), but switching the six
births believed to be dropouts (see Section 2.3) into the non-beneﬁciary group;
(4) deﬁning the beneﬁciary status at birth exclusively on the basis of enrolment94;
(5) adding to the baseline sample 61 births from households in which more than
one member gave birth between 1997 and 2003.
Figure 2.3 plots the program eﬀect obtained from estimating equation (2.1) by
94Note that in this case the mean-comparison-test yielded that three months (k=3) was the
minimum program exposure that generated the most statistically similar beneﬁciary and non-
beneﬁciary births at the 5 percent signiﬁcance level. Therefore, equation (2.1) was estimated
using k=3 in this case.
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OLS (solid curve) and conditional quantile regressions at θ = .2, .5, and .8 (curves
with squares, triangles, and crosses, respectively), using k=3,...,9. The pattern of
the baseline results holds along the whole range of k. The largest program eﬀect
is found at the 80th percentile of the conditional birthweight distribution, the
smallest at the 20th percentile, and note that the eﬀect at the latter percentile is
not statistically signiﬁcant for k > 5. Also, recall that the groups of beneﬁciary and
non-beneﬁciary births generated by values of k>2 were found to be statistically
diﬀerent from each other already before treatment (see Table 2.2).
Table 2.4 shows that the baseline results are robust to the inclusion of most of
the 23 births which had been left out of the analysis because of being missing in
the Transfers Database, and either not being beneﬁciaries in 2003 or not having
information on their beneﬁciary status in that year (see Section 2.3). I ignore why
those and other households (a total of 135 in the 767 sample) are not included in
that dataset. It could be that they left the program before September 1999, when
the transfers began to be systematically recorded. If so, there would be no reason
for concern if withdrawal was random. This may be the case if they dropped out
because [the program] administrators failed to turn in paper work or instructions
to beneﬁciaries in a timely manner  (Alvarez et al. (2008, 646)), or any other
administrative reason that made them unable to prove that they had fulﬁlled their
program obligations. Nonetheless, it might also be that the withdrawal was due
to some households' characteristics that also aﬀect birthweight.
Because of this, sample (2) in Table 2.4 includes as non-beneﬁciaries 16 births,
out of the relevant 23, that occurred after May 2000. This cutoﬀ date was cho-
sen such that even if the household withdrew from Oportunidades short before
September 1999, there would be no program exposure whatsoever during preg-
nancy. Likewise, sample (3) diﬀers from sample (2) in that it switches the six
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births believed to be dropouts, due to having mostly missing values in the Trans-
fers Database (see Section 2.3.1), into the non-beneﬁciary group.
The results obtained using samples (2) and (3) are in line with the baseline
results in that the largest eﬀect is found at the upper tail of the conditional
birthweight distribution. Still, these samples are relevant only if omission from
the Transfers Database means having dropped out of Oportunidades. However,
the latter may not be the case as 109 households out of the 135 that are missing
in the Transfers Database, identiﬁed themselves as beneﬁciaries in the ENCEL
2003.95 Moreover, note that in those samples the resulting groups of beneﬁciary
and non-beneﬁciary births are already statistically diﬀerent from each other prior
to the intervention. Speciﬁcally, the null hypothesis of equality of means for the
indigenous variable is rejected with a p-value of 0.03 and 0.02 in samples (2) and
(3), respectively. This is because most of the added observations in (2) and most
of the switching observations in (3) are non-indigenous.
In sample (4) the beneﬁciary status at birth is deﬁned exclusively on the basis
of enrolment. This means that all the 23 observations that had been left out
of the analysis in the baseline sample are now included as beneﬁciaries, yielding
a total sample of 767. In this case, Table 2.4 shows that the pattern of the
estimated coeﬃcients is in line with those obtained using the baseline sample
95That is, starting with the larger sample of 767 observations, all of which enrolled in Opor-
tunidades before 2000, there were 135 births with no information in the Transfers Database.
Out of them, 111 occurred at least two months after enrolling in the program, so they should in
principle be treated as beneﬁciary births; and the rest, 24, were non-beneﬁciary births. Never-
theless, out of the 111, 23 either identiﬁed themselves as non-beneﬁciaries in the ENCEL 2003,
or did not have information regarding their beneﬁciary status in that year. As it was not pos-
sible to know when exactly they withdraw, they were excluded from the analysis. The baseline
sample is thus 744 (767-23). On the other hand, out of the 109 that identiﬁed themselves as
beneﬁciaries in 2003, 88 were beneﬁciary births (the ones that were left after dropping out the
23 as explained above, i.e., 111-23=88), and the rest, 21, were non-beneﬁciary births. Lastly, the
remaining 3 out of the 24 non-beneﬁciary births that were missing in the Transfers Database,
identiﬁed themselves as non-beneneﬁciaries in 2003; but this is not important (i.e. there is no
reason to exclude them from the analysis) as they were already non-beneﬁciary births.
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of 744 observations (sample (1)), although the point estimates are much lower.
This may be due precisely to treating as beneﬁciaries births which may not have
occurred under the program.
Lastly, sample (5) adds to the baseline sample 61 births (46 beneﬁciaries and
15 non-beneﬁciary ones) from households in which more than one member gave
birth between 1997 and 2003. The general patterns still hold, although the pro-
gram point estimate (beneﬁciary) is in general lower than in the baseline sample.
This may be due to the fact that a new birth translates itself into scarcer mon-
etary resources within a household, as no extra cash transfer is received due to
it. Moreover, given the structure of the Fertility Database, having birthweight
information on more than one infant per household necessarily means that they
are not siblings, so that the conﬂict over scarcer monetary resources may be ex-
acerbated. The fact that the interaction between the beneﬁciary indicator and
the indicator of households with more than one birthweight is always negative is
consistent with these hypotheses. The rest of the analysis thus uses the baseline
sample of 744 observations.
2.6.2 An alternative measure for the program's impact
The beneﬁciary indicator (bi) in equation (2.1) does not control for the length of
program exposure before birth. However, a longer exposure to Oportunidades may
yield a larger positive eﬀect on birthweight as mothers will presumably have been
fed more nutritiously for longer before giving birth. On the other hand, women
who were already pregnant when their household enrolled in Oportunidades may
not have had ﬁve prenatal care visits as required and/or the ﬁrst visit may not
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have taken place within the ﬁrst pregnancy trimester. Lastly, the more health
talks a woman attends, the more likely she is to internalize the recommendations
she receives there.
To test the hypothesis that a longer program exposure yields a larger positive
eﬀect on birthweight, bi in equation (2.1) was replaced by the number of months
between program enrolment and the date of birth for beneﬁciary births. Table 2.5
summarizes the eﬀects of Oportunidades (ﬁrst panel, second row) and maternal
smoking (second panel, second row) for this speciﬁcation (for full results see Table
A2.6 in the Appendix). The program eﬀects and their respective standard errors
were obtained by multiplying the marginal (per month) eﬀects by the average
number of program months for beneﬁciary births (33 months).
The results show that babies at the 80th percentile of the conditional birth-
weight distribution born into households that had been enrolled in Oportunidades
for 33 months weigh, ceteris paribus, 121.2 grams more than similar babies born
into households that had not yet enrolled. In contrast, the program does not sig-
niﬁcantly aﬀect median birthweights and its eﬀect at the lower quantile continues
to be modest. Moreover, the standard errors associated with the program eﬀects
are still very large. On the other hand, maternal smoking during pregnancy is
now associated with a 465-gram decrease on birthweights at the 20th percentile
of the conditional distribution.
A sensitivity analysis for this speciﬁcation using k=3,...,9 (not included) yields
that the overall results hold along the whole range of k. There is no signiﬁcant
program eﬀect at median birthweights and the eﬀect at the 80th percentile of the
conditional distribution is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. Moreover, the eﬀect
at the 20th percentile is not signiﬁcant for k > 8.
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2.6.3 Decreasing the variance
In order to improve the precision of the estimated program impacts the sample
size was increased by matching each of the 506 beneﬁciary births to its nearest-
neighbour from a pool of 406 potential matches with complete data from the new
control localities. As the number of potential matches was less than the total
number of beneﬁciary births, replacement was allowed. The matches were then
added as non-beneﬁciary births.
More speciﬁcally, propensity score matching was performed using all variables
in vectors z and y in equation (2.1) and a logistic model. This procedure yielded
only 184 matches due to the individuals from the new control localities having on
average lower propensity scores. Moreover, it was not possible to use all matches,
as doing so produced a zero probability of incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis
of equality of means between the resulting beneﬁciary and non-beneﬁciary births
for several variables. Therefore, only 41 matches, the ones with predicted prob-
abilities larger than 0.7, were included in the sample as non-beneﬁciary births.
Mean-comparison tests between the beneﬁciary and the non-beneﬁciary births af-
ter matching yielded that the two groups are not statistically diﬀerent in terms
of all exogenous variables in equation (2.1) at the 5 percent signiﬁcance level.
Table 2.5 summarizes the main post-matching results under Model / sample
(3) (see full results in Table A2.7 in the Appendix). Oportunidades (ﬁrst panel,
third row) is now associated with a 120-gram increase in birthweights at the
median of the conditional distribution at the 5 percent signiﬁcance level. There
is no signiﬁcant program eﬀect at the lower tail of the conditional birthweight
distribution and, similar to the pre-matching situation, the largest eﬀect (184
grams) is found on birthweights at the 80th percentile. Nevertheless, although
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the standard errors of the estimated beneﬁciary coeﬃcients after matching (ﬁrst
panel, third row) have decreased slightly compared to the baseline model (ﬁrst
panel, ﬁrst row), they continue to be quite large such that the program eﬀect
might not be statistically diﬀerent across quantiles. On the other hand, maternal
smoking during pregnancy (second panel, third row) is associated with a 543-gram
decrease in birthweights at the 20th percentile of the conditional distribution.
As a last attempt to reduce the standard errors of the program impacts, the
baseline speciﬁcation was estimated using conditional quantile treatment eﬀects
(CQTE) (Frölich and Melly (2010)). The main results from this model are shown
in Table 2.5 under Model / sample (4) (for full results see Table A2.8 in the
Appendix). As the treatment (being a beneﬁciary birth) is exogenous conditional
on the control variables in vectors m, z and y in equation (2.1), the point esti-
mates were calculated using the Koenker and Bassett Jr. (1978) estimator, which
is the one used in the classical linear conditional quantile regression. The stan-
dard erors however were obtained using the kernel estimator proposed by Powell
(1986). This estimator is consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity, unlike
the estimator of the variance in the baseline model (ﬁrst panel, ﬁrst row). We see
that the heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors of the estimated program
impacts are smaller than the baseline ones at the extreme tails of the conditional
birthweight distribution, but larger at the median. However, they continue to be
extremely large such that the estimated program eﬀects are again not statistically
diﬀerent across quantiles. On the other hand, the eﬀect of maternal smoking dur-
ing pregnancy (second panel, fourth row) on birthweights at the 20th percentile of
the conditional distribution is now statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
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2.7 Unconditional quantile estimation
This chapter has used quantile regressions to uncover the heterogenous eﬀect
of Oportunidades and maternal smoking at diﬀerent points of the conditional
birthweight distribution. Conditional quantile regression estimates however can-
not tell what will happen to a particular baby when a covariate changes by
a small amount as the baby will not necessarily be on the same quantile af-
ter the change. One may thus be interested in changes in the quantiles, qθ,
of the marginal (unconditional) birthweight distribution FBW (bw). That is, we
may want to estimate the direct eﬀect dqθ(p)/dp of increasing the proportion of
beneﬁciary births, p = Pr[b = 1], on the θth quantile of the birthweight dis-
tribution, where b = 1 if the birth is a beneﬁciary one, and b = 0 otherwise.
Nevertheless, the coeﬃcient βθ = F
−1
BWi
(θ|b = 1) − F−1BWi(θ|b = 0) from a single
conditional quantile regression is generally diﬀerent (the exception is the mean)
from dqθ(p)/dp = (Pr[BW > qθ|b = 1] − Pr[BW > qθ|b = 0])/fBW (qθ), the ef-
fect of increasing the proportion of beneﬁciary births on the θth quantile of the
unconditional birthweight distribution;96 where fBW (.) is the density function of
the unconditional birthweight distribution.
Because of this, Firpo et. al (2009) developed the unconditional quantile re-
gression (UQR) approach to estimate the impact of changing the distribution of
explanatory variables, x, on the quantiles of the marginal (unconditional) birth-
weight distribution. The method, also known as recentered inﬂuence function
(RIF ) regressions, consists of running a regression of a transformation of BW on
the explanatory variables. The transformation is the (recentered) inﬂuence func-
tion, which in this case represents the inﬂuence of an individual observation on a
96The expression for dqθ(p)/dp is obtained by implicit diﬀerentiation of FBW (qθ) = p ∗
(Pr[BW ≤ qθ|b = 1]− Pr[BW ≤ qθ|b = 0]) + Pr[BW ≤ qθ|b = 0] (Firpo et. al (2009)).
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given quantile.
Speciﬁcally, given the outcome variable birthweight, BW, and a population θ-
quantile, qθ, of the unconditional birthweight distribution, the inﬂuence function,
IF (), is given by:
IF (BW ; qθ) = θ − 1 {BW ≤ qθ} /fBW (qθ)
where:
1 {.} =Indicator function specifying whether the birthweight value is below qθ.
Adding back the distributional statistic of interest, qθ, yields the recentered
inﬂuence function:
RIF (BW ; qθ) = qθ + θ − 1 {BW ≤ qθ} /fBW (qθ)
The RIF-regression model (Firpo et al. (2009)) is then deﬁned as the conditional
expectation:
E[RIF (BW ; qθ)|x]
where: x = All variables in vectors m, z and y in equation (2.1).
The estimated coeﬃcients, E
{
dE[RIF (BW,qθ)|X=x]
dx
}
, are the average marginal
eﬀects or unconditional quantile partial eﬀects (Firpo et al. (2009)).
Figure 2.4 plots the estimated coeﬃcients for the beneﬁciary indicator ob-
tained from estimating equation (2.1) using the baseline sample and ordinary least
squares (horizontal line with triangles), conditional quantile regressions (curve
with squares), and OLS-RIF -regressions (curve with diamonds) for θ = 0.1, ..., 0.9.
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The latter used an Epanechnikov kernel function and the default optimal band-
width calculated by Stata.97 The main estimated coeﬃcients are also shown in
Table 2.5 (ﬁrst panel, ﬁfth row); full results are shown in Table A2.9 in the Ap-
pendix. The results are robust to alternative bandwidths and kernel functions.
Both Figure 2.4 and Table 2.5 (ﬁrst panel, ﬁfth row) show that the program
eﬀect on the unconditional quantiles of the birthweight distribution is similar to
the eﬀect on the respective conditional quantiles (ﬁrst panel, ﬁrst row in Table 2.5).
This is due to the large standard errors that the estimated beneﬁciary coeﬃcient
displays and reﬂects the fact that a large amount of the birthweight variation
remains unexplained. Oportunidades is thus associated with approximately a
140-gram increase on birthweights at the 20th percentile of the conditional and
unconditional distributions. The respective program eﬀects on birthweights at
the other quantiles under investigation diﬀer more across both distributions. Like
this, although the eﬀect of Oportunidades is increasing along the unconditional
birthweight distribution, the program point estimates are less spread out than the
ones on the conditional birthweight distribution.
2.8 Conclusions
Using quantile regressions this chapter has shown that the eﬀect of Oportunidades
on birthweight varies across the conditional distribution. While the point estimate
on median birthweights is 155 grams, a lower, 135 grams, and statistically less
97Such optimal bandwidth (115 in this case) is not optimal in any global sense. It is simply
the width that would minimize the mean integrated squared error if the data were Gaussian and
a Gaussian kernel were used. For multimodal or highly skewed densities, this width is usually
too wide and over smooths the density. Because of this, alternative bandwidths and kernel
functions were used to check for robustness of the results.
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signiﬁcant program eﬀect has been found on birthweights at the 20th percentile of
the conditional distribution. In contrast, Oportunidades is associated with a 206-
gram increase in birthweights at the 80th percentile of the conditional distribution.
This result has economic signiﬁcance even though the above mentioned eﬀects may
not be statistically diﬀerent from each other as their associated standard errors
are very large.
The use of conditional quantile regressions has also uncovered the fact that
maternal smoking during pregnancy has a large and deleterious eﬀect on birth-
weights at lower quantiles. Speciﬁcally, maternal smoking is associated with a
459-gram decrease in birthweights at the 20th percentile of the conditional distri-
bution. This eﬀect is not picked up by least square regression estimates.
Finally, this chapter used recentered inﬂuence function regressions (Firpo et
al. (2009)) to estimate the eﬀect of Oportunidades on various quantiles of the
unconditional birthweight distribution. Those estimates are similar to the ones
obtained through conditional quantile regressions and imply that already better
oﬀ babies (those at the top of the birthweight distribution) have beneﬁted the
most from Oportunidades.
Empowering women by giving them access to adecuate prenatal care and im-
proving their nutrition while pregnant, as well as by giving them greater control
over resources and providing them with information on better practices thus seem
to have a positive impact on babies' birthweight. Nevertheless, in order for new-
borns to fully reap the program's beneﬁts, the latter may need to be modiﬁed to
further empower women as follows: (i) Reminders about the dangers of smoking
and the importance of healthy eating during pregnancy should be given repeat-
edly during prenatal consultations and at the health and nutrition talks, both of
which are compulsory for beneﬁciaries. (ii) Awareness about the dangers of smok-
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ing among non-beneﬁciaries could be raised using media campaigns, especially
through posters, billboards and radio. (iii) The heterogeneous program eﬀect on
birthweight may be due to heavier babies belonging to households with healthier
members even in the absence of Oportunidades. Therefore, the ﬁxed (i.e. indepen-
dent of household characteristics) component of the transfer, which is intended to
buy food, should probably depend on household size and on the average health
status of all household members.
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Tables & Figures
Table 2.1: Sample means (standard deviation) by beneﬁciary status
Non-beneﬁciaries Beneﬁciaries
Dependent variable
Birthweight 3154 3279
(573) (641)
Maternal, infant, and pregnancy related characteristics
Birth order 3.41 3.43
(0.95) (0.91)
Female 0.42 0.47
Days after birth when baby weighted 4.15 2.94
(10.00) (8.21)
Maternal age 29.79 30.20
(6.10) (6.23)
Mother smoked during pregnancy 0.04 0.04
Prenatal care's quality index (0-1) 0.91 0.94
(0.24) (0.17)
Household (hh) socieconomic & demographic characteristics at baseline
Head of hh speaks indigenous language 0.28 0.34
Head of hh's education (years) 3.84 3.51
(2.73) (2.56)
Head of household's age 34.76 34.29
(9.71) (11.01)
Household size 6.05 5.89
(2.08) (2.28)
Children aged 0-5 in hh (proportion) 0.31 0.30
Children aged 6-17 in hh (proportion) 0.29 0.27
Economic index (0-1) 0.30 0.29
(0.22) (0.22)
Locality Characteristics
Altitude (meters) 1307 1293
(838) (814)
N 184 560
Beneﬁciary births are those which took place in households at least 2 months after the latter
enrolled in Oportunidades , as by then the household might already have received their ﬁrst
cash transfer.
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Table 2.2: P-values for the diﬀerences of means between beneﬁciary and non-
beneﬁciary births given diﬀerent minimum durations of program exposure (k)
Min. exposure (months) = k 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Birth order 0.42 0.50 0.66 0.81 0.58 0.36 0.57
Maternal age at birth 0.43 0.47 0.58 0.69 0.98 0.94 1.00
Mother smoked while pregnant 0.89 0.97 0.93 0.76 0.63 0.53 0.42
Prenatal care quality index (0-1) 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.25 0.17 0.13 0.21
HoHH speaks indigenous lang. 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01
Head of HH's education (years) 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.39 0.44 0.28 0.29
Head of HH's age 0.58 0.51 0.53 0.23 0.14 0.20 0.17
Household size 0.39 0.27 0.22 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.06
Children aged 0-5 in HH (0-1) 0.45 0.71 0.88 0.95 0.83 0.93 0.74
Children aged 6-17 in HH (0-1) 0.22 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03
Economic index (0-1) 0.65 0.31 0.28 0.26 0.21 0.42 0.49
Altitude (meters) 0.84 0.75 0.75 0.70 0.67 0.64 0.53
Total sample size 744 744 745 745 745 745 747
Non-beneﬁciary births 184 190 197 210 220 229 240
Beneﬁciary births 560 554 548 535 525 516 507
P- values are for the test: H0 : µ0 − µ1 = 0 v H1 : µ0 − µ1 6= 0, where the subindex of
µtakes the value of 0 if it is a non-beneﬁciary birth, and 1 if it is a beneﬁciary birth. Unequal
variances were assumed. P-values in bold are for the 5 percent signiﬁcance level. HoHH stands
for the head of the household. Source: Own computation using data from ENCASEH , Fertility
Survey, ENCEL 2003, and Transfers Database. The sample size increases with k because, as
the number of beneﬁciary births decreases with k , fewer people are prone to be excluded from
the analysis due to being missing in the Transfers Database, and either identifying themselves
as non-beneﬁciaries in the ENCEL 2003 or not appearing in that dataset.
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Table 2.3: Baseline results for birthweight (equation (2.1), with k=2)
Quantiles: 20% 50% 80% OLS
beneﬁciary 135.2* 155.0*** 206.5** 157.2***
(77.00) (54.52) (83.01) (50.61)
ﬁrstbir -8.616 -142.3 -204.2 -157.4
(146.7) (126.0) (129.4) (103.8)
second -125.9 -142 0.552 -114
(114.0) (115.1) (138.0) (87.25)
third -81.69 -56.38 77.7 -44.33
(101.3) (80.51) (110.5) (74.87)
female -182.4*** -191.3*** -190.9*** -168.3***
(62.83) (53.35) (72.04) (45.40)
daysafwe 5.886 5.358** 5.787 6.114**
(3.660) (2.315) (3.916) (2.674)
young -88.65 -198.6* -355.2** -250.1**
(218.1) (111.8) (139.6) (115.6)
old -34.65 11.13 -16.00 44.31
(83.36) (69.03) (98.45) (59.93)
smoked -458.7* 69.35 77.59 -9.786
(276.4) (181.2) (191.2) (149.5)
qualindex 308.3** 124.9 36.96 80.98
(154.8) (146.2) (221.5) (133.5)
indig -123.7 -149.7** -113.3 -144.2**
(94.95) (67.16) (83.83) (62.19)
edu6head -179.1* -48.45 -51.44 -110.0*
(92.19) (62.88) (91.43) (60.53)
edplushead -12.91 61.49 110.3 1.338
(82.19) (73.98) (112.6) (68.65)
agehead 2.898 3.438 3.467 3.551
(4.142) (3.712) (3.844) (2.668)
famsize -6.507 -13.73 -36.90** -23.29*
(23.11) (15.39) (18.23) (12.84)
propage5 209.4 22.31 156.3 109.1
(351.8) (329.2) (400.0) (293.9)
prage6_17 186.5 402.1 688.8* 326.3
(317.4) (287.7) (351.6) (247.6)
econindex -58.61 -132.3 -263.6 -125.3
(173.1) (152.6) (172.2) (112.4)
altitude 0.000779 -0.0582 -0.0297 -0.0248
(0.0453) (0.0405) (0.0435) (0.0354)
Constant 2510*** 3129*** 3581*** 3207***
(295.8) (269.2) (413.5) (258.3)
N=744 in each case. SEs in parentheses (robust for OLS, bootstrapped (1000 replica-
tions) for quantile regressions). Signiﬁcance level: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 2.4: Robustness checks for the baseline sample
Variable Quantile Regressions OLS N Bene Non-
(Sample) 20% 50% 80% All ﬁciary benef
Beneﬁciary
(1) 135.2* 155.0*** 206.5** 157.2*** 744 560 184
(77.00) (54.52) (83.01) (50.61)
(2) 144.3** 137.4*** 201.0*** 153.3*** 760 560 200
(73.44) (51.41) (72.16) (48.27)
(3) 141.0** 136.2** 201.1*** 155.6*** 760 554 206
(70.19) (54.23) (71.68) (48.00)
(4) 79.49 114.1** 151.3* 109.0** 767 597 170
(76.80) (51.71) (83.21) (51.16)
(5) 102.6 163.7*** 184.0** 161.9*** 805 606 199
(73.26) (50.00) (81.07) (50.41)
Smoked
(1) -458.7* 69.35 77.59 -9.786
(276.4) (181.2) (191.2) (149.5)
(2) -484.4* 67.06 78.47 -11.56
(278.8) (163.8) (191.6) (144.6)
(3) -477.1* 101.7 79.97 -13.25
(286.0) (161.0) (167.9) (144.6)
(4) -555.8* 22.19 70.77 -13.19
(297.3) (156.8) (181.7) (144.9)
(5) -556.4** 140.1 34.31 -46.35
(277.5) (168.3) (148.3) (143.3)
Constant
(1) 2510*** 3129*** 3581*** 3207***
(295.8) (269.2) (413.5) (258.3)
(2) 2620*** 3031*** 3582*** 3190***
(284.2) (262.1) (394.1) (249.6)
(3) 2627*** 3031*** 3597*** 3191***
(301.9) (262.3) (385.7) (249.6)
(4) 2438*** 3016*** 3658*** 3207***
(300.7) (251.1) (410.3) (248.7)
(5) 2406*** 3076*** 3564*** 3154***
(306.0) (258.0) (368.3) (246.0)
Extra constant for households (hh2 ) with more than one birthweight
(5) -107.4 -107.5 -166.8 -189.6
(1) baseline; (2) adds as non-beneﬁciaries 16 births that occurred after May 2000 & are missing in
the Transfers Database (TD); (3) as (2) plus switches the status of 6 observations that have mostly
missing values in the TD; (4) the beneﬁciary status is deﬁned on the basis of enrolment; (5) inclu-
des households with birthweight information on more than one member. The extra constant is for
the sum of the coeﬃcients on beneﬁciary*hh2+hh2 . Standard errors in parentheses (robust for
OLS, bootstrapped (1000 reps.) for quantile regressions). * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 2.5: Main results for diﬀerent models/samples (k=2)
Model / Quantile Regressions OLS
Variable Sample 20% 50% 80%
I. Program impact
(1) 135.2* 155.0*** 206.5** 157.2***
(77.00) (54.52) (83.01) (50.61)
(2) 81.99* 57.04 121.19** 85.56**
(45.81) (42.90) (51.19) (33.81)
(3) 109.8 120.2** 184.3** 120.4**
(71.38) (47.92) (71.97) (46.85)
(4) 135.2** 155.0** 206.5*** 157.2***
(66.52) (63.22) (68.27) (50.61)
(5) 141.5* 141.6** 174.4** 157.2***
(74.26) (67.38) (75.80) (50.61)
II. Smoked
(1) -458.7* 69.35 77.59 -9.786
(276.4) (181.2) (191.2) (149.5)
(2) -464.7* 74.33 -15.18 -12.88
(281.3) (174.4) (188.7) (149.4)
(3) -543.4* 95.56 124.4 -6.182
(289.7) (164.1) (164.9) (144.5)
(4) -458.7** 69.35 77.59 -9.786
(261.6) (164.5) (159.2) (149.5)
(5) -275.5 49.93 183.9 -9.786
(175.5) (137.2) (185.9) (149.5)
III. Constant
(1) 2510*** 3129*** 3581*** 3207***
(295.8) (269.2) (413.5) (258.3)
(2) 2466*** 3269*** 3728*** 3257***
(300.7) (299.3) (392.3) (264.8)
(3) 2610*** 3096*** 3847*** 3326***
(297.8) (224.4) (402) (229.1)
(4) 2510*** 3129*** 3581*** 3207***
(315.9) (302.3) (337.9) (258.3)
(5) 2365*** 3090*** 3827*** 3207***
(316.5) (256.4) (342.7) (258.3)
k is the minimum program exposure in months. Sample size=744, except in (3) where it is 785.
(1) baseline; (2) the beneﬁciary indicator in eq. (2.1) is replaced by the no. of months under
the program before birth. The results hold for a baby born into a household with 34 months
of program exposure (sample mean); (3) as (1) but adds matches from non-control localities
as non-beneﬁciaries. (4) as (1) but uses cond. quantile treatment eﬀects. (5) as (1) but uses
unconditional quantile regressions. SEs in parentheses (robust for OLS, bootstrapped for
quantile regressions (1000 (800) reps. for (un)conditional quantiles), except in (4) which
uses the Powell (1986) estimator). * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Figure 2.1: Birthweight distributions for beneficiary and non-beneficiary births† 
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†All densities use an Epanechnikov kernel function and the respective default “optimal” width calculated by Stata.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Estimated effect of Oportunidades and maternal smoking on 
birthweight at different quantiles (minimum program exposure is two months)†  
 
†Plots obtained from estimating equation (2.1) (k=2) using conditional quantiles (continued curve) and ordinary 
least squares (horizontal dashed line). The respective 95% confidence intervals were obtained using robust 
standard errors (OLS), and bootstrapped standard errors (800 replications) for the quantile regressions. 
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Figure 2.3: Estimated program effect as k (minimum program exposure) varies† 
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†Plots obtained from estimating equation (2.1) by ordinary least squares (OLS), and conditional quantile 
regressions (θ=0.2, 0.5, 0.8) using k=2,3,...,9.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Estimated program effect on birthweight at different quantiles 
(minimum program exposure is two months)† 
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†Plots obtained from estimating equation (2.1) (k=2) by ordinary least squares (OLS) and conditional (CQR) and 
unconditional quantile regressions (UQR). The latter were estimated using an Epanechnikov kernel function and 
the default “optimal” bandwidth calculated in Stata.  
3 Chapter 3: First Birth Sex
Selection in Delhi, India: The Role
of Progressive Gender Attitudes
3.1 Introduction
While India is expected to be the world's most populous country by 2020 (UN
(2011)), millions of baby girls may have been selectively aborted (Jha et al. (2011)
Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010)) or killed after birth, either actively (Sudha and
Rajan (1999)), or passively through neglect over the last decades (Chaudhuri
(2012), Miller (1997), Fathalla (1998)). In the absence of any interventions 5
percent more boys than girls are born (Ben-Porath and Welsh (1976), Jacobsen et
al. (1999)). This is possibly mother nature's response to the fact that females are
more resilient to disease (Teitelbaum (1970)), such that under the same healthcare
and nutritional conditions they have lower mortality rates than males across all age
groups (Sen (1992)). The population sex ratio, the number of males for every 100
females, is thus normally between 98 and 100 (Coale (1991)). In India however,
the most recent census reported a sex ratio of 106 (Registrar General (2011)), and
a child sex ratio, which includes only the population in the age group 0-6 years,
of 109 (Registrar General (2011)). The sex ratio at birth, the number of males
born per 100 females born, was in turn 112 in 2004-2006, and 110 in 2008-2010
(Registrar General (2012)).98Those ﬁgures are much higher than the biologically
98The Registrar General of India, through the Sample Registration System (SRS), provides
three-year moving averages of estimates of the sex ratio at birth for India and its bigger states
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normal sex ratio of 105 male births per 100 female births,99 or approximately 48.8
percent females.
The necessity of slowing down population growth was recognized in India since
the early years after the independence in 1947 (Haub 2009). In the last decades
however, the lower demand for children along with the strong preference for sons
and the availability of prenatal sex determination scans has given rise to the
phenomenon of female foeticide. Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010) estimate that 0.48
million girls were selectively aborted every year between 1995 and 2005. Likewise,
Jha et al. (2011) conclude that 12 million females went 'missing' between 1980
and 2010 due to selective abortions. Even after birth girls may be actively killed
(Sudha and Rajan (1999)), or passively by denying them food and / or healthcare
(Miller (1997), Fathalla (1998)). Chaudhuri (2012) estimates that 58.29 million
girls went missing between 1950 and 2010; out of them, 16.3 million were due
to sex selective abortion and the rest, 42 million, to postnatal excess mortality
within their ﬁrst year of life.
India is however not homogeneous and girls are valued diﬀerently in diﬀerent
regions, such that sex ratios vary widely across states and union territories (see
Table 3.1).100 According to the Census 2011, the child sex ratio101 was 118 and
120 in the northern states of Punjab and Haryana respectively, down from 125 and
122 in 2001. At 115, the respective ratio in Delhi was less biased towards boys,102
based on data that it periodically collects. Annual data is not released as sampling errors might
be large.
99China also has very skewed sex ratios. In 2010 the sex ratio was 118 boys per 100 girls at
birth, and 105.2 for the overall population (National Bureau of Statistics (2011)).
100The ﬁrst two columns of Table 3.1 present state-level child sex ratios based on census data.
Overall male-to-female sex ratios in India also vary a lot across states, ranging from 92 in Kerala
to 115 males for every 100 females in Delhi (Registrar General (2011)).
101The child sex ratio is considered to be a better measure of sex-selective abortions and
infanticide than the sex ratio at birth, as the latter might be inaccurate due to underreporting
of home births and unwanted children (Hesketh and Xing (2006)).
102In 2008-2010, sex ratios at birth in Punjab, Haryana, and Delhi were respectively, 120, 118,
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but unlike the former states it did not experience any improvement between 2001
and 2011, contributing to the highest child sex ratio that India has ever had since
1947, and which was 109 in 2011 (Table 3.1; Registrar General (2011)).
Sex-selective abortions and female infanticide are the most serious examples
of the gender based violence that is widespread in India. The recent horriﬁc case
of a student who was gang raped in New Delhi, and later died from her injuries,
is another example of how vulnerable women are in India (Daniel (2013)). A
2012 survey, polling 370 gender specialists by the Thomson Reuters Foundation,
ranked India as the worst place to be a woman among the top 19 economies of
the world103 (Trustlaw (2012)). Violence against women is due in part to the
acceptance of society towards it, in particular when the aggressor is the husband.
In 2012, UNICEF's Global Report Card on Adolescents found that 53 percent of
girls and 57 percent of boys in India think that wife beating is justiﬁed (UNICEF
2012); adults hold similar views (Jejeebhoy (1998)). These attitudes that justify
and condone violence are due to an existing retrograde, deep-rooted mindset that
women are inferior (Bhalla 2012) and / or that they should be submissive, and
ultimately have their root in patriarchy (Travers (1997)).
This chapter uses a latent factor model to create an index to measure how
progressive women's attitudes towards gender are in India. Being progressive is
deﬁned as having attitudes and perceptions favouring the advancement of women
towards better conditions in society. Speciﬁcally, progressive women decide on
their own healthcare, are free to visit the health facility on their own, do not
justify wife beating, and think that it is justiﬁed to refuse sex to husbands under
and 113, down from 129, 124 and 120 in 2001-2003 (Registrar General (2012)).
103This was based on parameters such as quality of health services, threat of physical and
sexual violence, level of political voice, and access to property and land rights; even Saudi
Arabia, where women are legally discriminated against, ranked higher than India (Trustlaw
(2012)).
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certain circumstances. The chapter then assesses the eﬀect of progressivity on the
sex of the ﬁrst child and on the duration from marriage to ﬁrst birth in Delhi.
Whilst a longer ﬁrst birth interval will negatively aﬀect total fertility (Trussell
and Menken (1978)), and could therefore be seen as a progressive attitude, it
might be that some of the women who have not yet given birth have relied on
abortions to limit their fertility and achieve a desired oﬀspring sex composition.
The chapter ﬁnds that a one-standard deviation increase in the progressivity index
is associated with a 5.8-percentage point increase in the likelihood of a ﬁrstborn
girl relative to women who have not yet given birth. Likewise, more progressive
women do not experience longer ﬁrst birth intervals which, consistent with the
ﬁrst result, may indicate that they are less inclined to sex-select their ﬁrst child.
Finding out what types of women are more likely to give birth to / allow
the birth of, and ultimately report the birth of a daughter in India104 is relevant
given the consequences of having a deﬁcit of women, especially in the marriage
market. Indian states that have been facing such a deﬁcit for some time now
have met the situation by across-region marriages -the importing of brides from
states with less skewed sex ratios (Kaur (2004)), buying wives in neighbouring
countries (Das Gupta and Shuzhuo (1999), Blachet (2005)), and the abduction
of girls (Kaur (2004)). These practices harm women further as the risk of being
kidnapped encourages parents to marry oﬀ their daughters at a younger age (Kaur
(2004)). Usually, across-region and foreign wives are also much younger than
their husbands, underage, and more vulnerable to domestic violence (Kaur (2004),
Hindin (2002), Rao (1997), Mishra, (2000)). Child brides are not sent to school by
104Reporting of daughters is relevant for this chapter as it uses survey data; that is, it relies
on the reported sex of the child from mothers. In India, births of girls often go unreported as
they are unwanted ((Hesketh and Xing (2006)) and may later be directly or indirecly murdered.
Nevertheless, this chapter assumes that more progressive women do report the sex of their
children accurately.
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their in-laws, tend to have low autonomy levels, and are put under great pressure
to become mothers so as to prove their fertility, all of which helps to perpetuate
poverty (Otoo-Oyortey and Pobi (2003)). Young girls have a higher risk of dying
from pregnancy complications or during childbirth (Mayor (2004)), and to give
birth prematurely and / or to low birthweight babies (Khashan et al. (2010)),
which in turn contributes to a higher risk of neonatal and infant mortality and
morbidity (Friede et al. (1987), McCormick, (1985)). In this context, it will
be very diﬃcult for India to meet the United Nation's Millennium Development
Goals by 2015.
Increased male-to-female sex ratios have also been found to increase crime
rates (Edlund et al. (2007)). Moreover, unmarried, low-status, young males may
be more prone to abusing drugs (Kaur (2004), Tucker et al. (2005)) and engaging
in risky sexual behaviours (Scott et al. (2012)), which would lead to an increase in
HIV/AIDS infection rates (Tucker et al. (2005)). These 'surplus' men may even
pose a threat to international peace should their governments fail to engage them
in productive activities at home (Hudson and den Boer (2004)).105 This brings
the issue of 'missing' women to the international security agenda.
Previous literature on demographic behaviour in India have generally assumed
that women did not try to constrain their fertility prior to ﬁrst birth (Nath et
al. (1999)). This assumption was supported by data from the ﬁrst round of
the National Family Health Survey (NFHS-1 (1992-3)), where only 3 percent of
ever-married women initiated the use of contraception before their ﬁrst birth.
Nonetheless, there is disagreement on whether sex selection is used for ﬁrst order
105For China, Xing et al. (2009) have estimated that in 2005 there were 32 million 'surplus'
men; that is, young (ages 15-34), low status, unmarried men, which will be unable to ﬁnd a
partner due to the scarcity of women. Similarly, Hudson and den Boer (2004) estimate that
the number of 'surplus' males may reach 50 million in China, and between 30 and 35 million in
India by 2020.
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births. While Jha et al. (2006) using the Special Fertility and Mortality Survey
conclude that the largest number of missing girls is for ﬁrst order births, Rether-
ford and Roy (2003), using the ﬁrst two rounds of the NFHS (1992-3 and 1998-9),
ﬁnd little evidence of sex selection on ﬁrst births. More recently, Poertner (2010),
using all three available rounds of the NFHS, concludes that sex ratios for ﬁrst
births lie within the normal range. The use of pooled data for the whole of India
and several rounds of the NFHS allows the latter studies to analyse time-series
variation. Nevertheless, aggregate national data on ﬁrst births may be hiding
signiﬁcant variation at the state level, similar to the one discussed earlier for child
(see Table 3.1) and population sex ratios (Registrar General (2011)). Moreover,
the conclusion that most women do not use contraception prior to their ﬁrst birth
does not rule out the possibility of them aborting after getting pregnant and
ﬁnding out the baby's gender.
Using data from the third round of the NFHS (NFHS-3), this chapter con-
structs an index to measure how progressive (liberal, non-patriarchal) are women's
attitudes towards gender in India by estimating a multilevel latent factor model.
Such a model allows controlling for correlation between observed characteristics
that may inﬂuence demographic outcomes and any unobserved heterogeneity. The
chapter then assesses the eﬀect of progressivity on the ﬁrstborn's gender and on
the duration from marriage to ﬁrst birth in India's National Capital Territory
(NCT), Delhi. The reason for focusing on Delhi is that, in contrast to what pre-
vious literature have found by pooling data for the whole of India, it has a deﬁcit
of females even among ﬁrst order births. Moreover, unlike other Indian states,
Delhi's skewed child sex ratio did not experience any improvement over the 2001-
2011 decade (see Table 3.1; Registrar General (2011)). Furthermore, Delhi had
access to sex determination scans as early as 1975; that is, earlier than any other
150
Indian state or union territory (Sudha and Rajan (1999)). Lastly,106 over the
years Delhi has received millions of economic migrants,107 including females, from
the rest of India which may be particularly willing to postpone ﬁrst birth.
The chapter ﬁnds that more progressive women are more likely to have a ﬁrst-
born girl. Speciﬁcally, a one-standard deviation increase in the progressivity 's
level is associated with a 5.8-percentage point increase in the likelihood of a ﬁrst-
born girl relative to women who have not yet given birth. The eﬀect is robust
to the set of covariates used to create the progressivity index and increases if the
analysis is restricted to women who married after the introduction of ultrasound
diagnostic facilities. The estimated progressivity impact implies that an extra
3,809 girls would have been born in the NCT of Delhi in 2009. This is 68 percent
of the number of missing girls among ﬁrst births that there might be based on
the estimated total number of missing girls in Delhi (UNFPA (2011)).108 Ad-
106Amniocentesis techniques that, apart from detecting foetal abnormalities, reveal the sex of
the foetus were developed at the All India Institute of Medical Sciences in New Delhi in 1975
(Sudha and Rajan (1999)). Chhachhi and Sathyamala (1983) report that 88 percent of couples
who volunteered for the test in that year, having already two or more daughters, had an abortion
after learning that their expected child was female.
107In fact, since 1994, Delhi's annual population growth has increased more due to newly
arrived migrants than to the natural population growth (Government of NCT of Delhi (2011)).
108The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) - India (2011) estimated that there were
11,243 girls 'missing' each year between 2004-2008 in Delhi due to prenatal sex selection. Given
that the proportion of ﬁrst order births among live births in Delhi in 2010 is 0.502 (Registrar
General (2012)), there would be 5,643 missing girls among ﬁrst order births each year. 3,809 is
68 percent of that amount. Although this estimation is of course not exact as it assumes that
the birth order distribution for abortions is the same as the one for live births, it is indicative
of the strenght of the progressivity eﬀect. On the other hand, the number of extra girls was
calculated based on a sex ratio at birth of 113 girls per 100 boys in 2008-2010 (Registrar General
(2012)), an estimated 279,000 total live births in Delhi (Johnston (2012)) in 2009 (the mid-year
of 2008-2010), and the afore mentioned proportion of ﬁrst order births among live births in
Delhi in 2010. The estimated number of ﬁrstborn girls in Delhi in 2009 is thus 65,687, and 5.8
percent of that amount is 3,809. Using the same methodology, the number of ﬁrstborn girls in
Delhi in 2007 would be 63,563. 5.8 percent of that amount is 3,686, which is 65 percent of the
number of missing girls among ﬁrst births that there may be based on a total of 11,243 missing
girls (UNFPA (2011)). The last ﬁgures are based on a male to female sex ratio at birth of 114 in
2006-2008 (UNFPA (2011)), 271,000 total live births in 2007 (Johnston (2012)), and assuming
that the proportion of ﬁrst order births in Delhi among live births in 2007 was the same as in
2010. Note that I was unable to access information on the percentage distribution of newborns
by birth order for years prior to 2010, as older Statistical Reports of the Sample Registration
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ditionally, more progressive women do not experience longer ﬁrst birth intervals
which, together with them being more likely to have a ﬁrstborn girl, may indi-
cate that they are less inclined to sex-select their ﬁrstborn. These results imply
that women should be taught about their human rights and gender equality, both
in school and through media campaigns. More generally, regional governments
should introduce and expand interventions aimed at subsidising and empowering
women. Crucially, massive media campaings promoting the idea that dowries and
son-preference are old-fashioned should be considered.
The rest of the chapter is divided as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data,
sample, and descriptive statistics. Sections 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 deal with the pre-
ogressivity index, the ﬁrstborn's gender, and the duration from marriage to ﬁrst
birth, respectively. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Data, sample & descriptive statistics
3.2.1 Data & sample
The data come from the third round of the NFHS (NFHS-3) only, as previous
rounds do not contain some of the questions that were used to construct the
progressivity index. The NFHS-3 was conducted in 2005-2006, it is representative
at the state level and interviewed a total of 124,385 women aged 15 to 49 years.
In order to have a nationally representative progressivity index, the latter was
estimated for a total of 83,556 women (36,795 residing in cities and 46,761 in the
country side) who are currently married and are usual residents in the state where
System are not accessible free of charge.
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they were interviewed.
Nevertheless, the models on the ﬁrstborn's gender and on the duration to
ﬁrst birth should focus on Indian states with skewed sex ratios. Table 3.1 shows
the proportion of females among ﬁrst order births by state (column 8), and the
p-value (column 9) for the null hypothesis H0; P = 0.488 v H1 : P 6= 0.488,
where 0.488 is the biologically normal proportion of females at birth. The sample
includes 80,674 currently or formerly married women who are usual residents in
the state where they were interviewed, and whose ﬁrst birth was a singleton.
Although in some states, including Haryana, the sex ratio seems to be female
biased, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected in any of those cases at conventional
signiﬁcance levels. In contrast, at the 10 percent signiﬁcance level, Punjab, Delhi,
Rajasthan, Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, and India as a whole exhibit
a deﬁcit of females compared to the natural sex ratio.109 In 2001, each of these
states had a higher than normal male to female sex ratio (see Table 3.1, column
1). Nevertheless, in the case of Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh, and Mizoram, their
respective child sex ratios (column 3 and 5) could be considered normal.110
This chapter focuses on India's National Capital Territory, Delhi, as in that
case the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1 percent signiﬁcance level. Moreover,
Delhi is widely recognized as one of the Indian states / union territories having
an unnaturally low female to male sex ratio (at birth, in the 0-6 age bracket, and
in the overall population), and between 2001 and 2011, it did not experience any
109The fact that Haryana does not appear in this list may be surprising but is consistent with
Visaria (2005), who in focus group discussions with families in that state (and in Gujarat) was
told that they do not attempt sex selection for ﬁrst births. Furthermore, Haryana's high total
fertility rate (2.7 compared to 2 in Punjab, 2.13 in Delhi, and 2.68 in India as a whole (NFHS-3))
may allow families not to sex select their ﬁrst child, but start doing so at higher parities. In
contrast, families in Punjab and Delhi may start sex-selecting their oﬀspring already from their
ﬁrst child, as they aim at having smaller families.
110Although there is no biologially 'normal' sex ratio for the population aged 0-6, we know that
the sex ratio at birth should be 105, and that for the overall population it should be 98-100, so
a child sex ratio of 104, which is what those three states have, could be considered to be normal.
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improvement in its child sex ratio (see Table 3.1; Registrar General (2011)).
The models on the ﬁrstborn's gender and on the duration to ﬁrst birth were
thus estimated on a sample of 2032 currently married women who are usual resi-
dents in Delhi. Moreover, in case they have not yet given birth, these women have
been married for at least 9 months or, if they have already given birth, their ﬁrst
child was a singleton and was born at least nine months after marriage. Finally,
these women have married only once. This last restriction was needed in order to
assure that relevant partners' characteristics, such as age and education, belonged
to ﬁrst husbands, who have presumably fathered the ﬁrstborns.
3.2.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.2 reports descriptive statistics for all the variables that will be used as
covariates in the regression analyses. They are shown separately for the whole of
India (including Delhi) by place of residence (urban / rural) on the one hand, and
for Delhi on the other hand. On average, women residing in cities marry at 18.8,
those in Delhi at 18.5, and those in the country side at 17.3 years old, respectively.
Urban and Delhi women are also one year older than their rural counterparts (33
versus 31.8 years). As for age diﬀerence between spouses, urban and rural women
are very similar in that regard. Speciﬁcally, around 55 percent of women (56
in the country side) are between 2 years older and ﬁve years younger than their
husbands, compared to 72 percent of women in Delhi. Similarly, 44 percent of
women in cities (43 in the country side) are at least six years younger than their
husbands, compared to only 28 percent of women in Delhi.
On the other hand, urban women and those in Delhi are on average much
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more educated than rural women. Whilst slightly more than a third of women in
cities and in Delhi have incomplete primary or no formal education, 61 percent of
rural women are in such circumstance. Furthermore, 38 percent of women in cities
have some secondary education and 24 percent of them have completed secondary
education or more. The respective proportions for women in Delhi are 28 and 32
percent. In contrast, the respective proportions for rural women are only 26 and
5 percent.
Regarding caste, 47 and 64 percent of women in cities and in Delhi respec-
tively, belong to the 'normal' caste or did not provide information on this variable,
compared to only 32 percent of women in the country side. In contrast, 17 per-
cent of rural women belong to a scheduled caste, and only 7 percent of women in
cities do so. The respective number for Delhi is merely 1 percent. As for religion,
Hindus account for more than 70 percent of women in each of the places under
investigation. Speciﬁcally, they account for 72, 76, and 86 percent of women in
cities, the country side, and Delhi, respectively. The percentage of Christians in
cities and the rural side is about the same (7 and 8 percent respectively), but it
is signiﬁcantly lower in Delhi, being only 1 percent.
Turning to wealth quintile, which is an index measuring household assets rather
than income itself,111 we see that 81 and 85 percent of women in cities and in Delhi,
respectively, belong to either the fourth or ﬁfth quintile. Interestingly, there is no
one in the poorest quintile in Delhi. In contrast, there are 12, 23, 24, 20, and 21
percent of rural women in each wealth quintile from bottom to top respectively.
As for family structure, we see that a larger proportion of women live in extended
families in the rural side, 49 percent, compared to 44 percent of urban women,
and 42 percent of women in Delhi.
111The index was constructed through factor analysis and is ready available in the NFHS-3.
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Finally, regarding media contact, a similar proportion of urban and rural
women, 46 and 43 percent respectively, listen to the radio at least once in a
while. In contrast, 59 percent of women in Delhi do so. Furthermore, large dif-
ferences exist regarding newspaper reading and TV watching between urban and
Delhi women on one hand, and rural women on the other. Whilst only one in
four rural women read the newspaper at least once in a while, 54 and 55 percent
of Delhi and urban women respectively, do so. This is understandable given the
educational attainment ﬁgures described earlier. Similarly, 90 and 91 percent of
women in cities and in Delhi, respectively, watch TV at least once in a while,
compared to 57 percent of women in the country side. This large diﬀerence might
be explained by the lack of electricity in rural areas.
3.3 Progressivity index
In India, sons are preferred over daughters due to religious, cultural, and economic
reasons. Many Hindu sects call for a son to light a parent's funeral pyre in order for
them to reach Nirvana, the release from the cycle of reincarnation. In traditional
patriarchal societies, girls move to live with their in-laws at marriage, and thereby
stop providing economic support to their parents, whilst sons remain at home and
provide for them. Furthermore, although outlawed in 1961, the custom of dowry,
by which the bride's family transfers gifts and wealth to the groom's family upon
marriage, has, in the last decades, spread to communities and castes where it had
never existed (Sudha and Rajan (1999)). Consequently, a daughter is often seen
as a burden and a son as an investment. Additionally, there are some ancient
scriptures, which may still have some inﬂuence on at least some parts of Indian
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society, that describe women as being inferior and subordinate to men.112 In this
context, passively or actively killing a daughter, before or after birth, may be seen
as an aﬃrmation of the patriarchal social order which, from a human rights point
of view, may be seen as retrograde.
There is thus some unobserved heterogeneity which will make some women go
from preferring sons to killing or allowing others to kill a daughter, passively or
actively, before or after birth. This chapter hypothesizes that more progressive
women, those who favour the advancement of society towards improved condi-
tions, are less likely to sex-select their oﬀspring and to neglect their daughters
after birth, such that they are more likely to report having had a female ﬁrst-
born.113 Furthermore, whilst a longer ﬁrst birth interval will negatively aﬀect
112For instance, the Ramcharitamanas of Tulsidas, a 16th century epic poem reads "drums,
uncivilized illiterates, lower castes, animals and women are all ﬁt to be beaten". In spite of this,
it is considered to be one of the masterpieces of medieval Hindu literature (Britannica Online
Encyclopædia (2013)). Other examples come from the Dharma-shastras, the ancient law books
or laws of righteous conduct that formed the basis for the social and religious code of conduct
in areas where the Hindu dharma (religion) was implemented. Although it is diﬃcult to know
how seriously these laws were enforced by the ruling classes, one can trace back to them several
social and religious practices of some groups in India (see http://www.hinduwebsite.com/). The
Vashistha, for instance, reads: Out of fear of the appearance of the menses, let the father marry
his daughter while she still runs about naked. For if she stays (in the home) after the age of
puberty, sin falls on the father [Vashistha (17.70)]. Similarly, the Manu-smriti or Laws of
Manu, which were compiled over the years between 200-400 AD, prescribe the subservience of
women to men (see, for instance, the English translation by G. Buhler (1886)). Some passages
read: In childhood a female must be subject to her father, in youth to her husband, and when
her lord is dead, to her sons; a woman must never be independent [Manu V, 148]; Though
destitute of virtue, or seeking pleasure (elsewhere), or devoid of good qualities, (yet) a husband
must be constantly worshipped as a God by a faithful wife [Manu V, 154]; Women do not care
for beauty, nor is their attention ﬁxed on age; (thinking) '(It is enough that) he is a man', they
give themselves to the handsome and to the ugly [Manu IX, 14]; A man, aged thirty years,
shall marry a maiden of twelve who pleases him, or a man of twenty-four a girl eight years of
age [Manu IX, 94]; etc. These moral prescriptions may explain in part why child marriage
is widespread in India, and why young girls are sometimes married oﬀ to men who are much
older than them. According to the NFHS-3, 51 percent of women got married before their 18
birthday, and 27 percent are married to men who are at least 8 years older than them.
113This addresses the concern that sex ratios at birth might not be as skewed as reported
because of recall problems. That is, it might be that some women had a ﬁrstborn girl, whom
they neglected and therefore passed away soon after birth; then they had a second child who
was a boy and reported him as the ﬁrstborn due to not remembering their ﬁrstborn girl. If
such recall problem exists then the reported sex ratios are not at birth but rather child sex
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total fertility (Trussell and Menken (1978)), and could therefore be seen as a pro-
gressive attitude, it might be that some of the women who have not yet given birth
have relied on abortions to limit their fertility and achieve a desired oﬀspring sex
composition. Women's level of progressivity may thus potentially inﬂuence the
duration to ﬁrst birth, total fertility and, through sex-selective abortions and
strategic negligence, the actual sex composition of the oﬀspring.
3.3.1 Measurements
Women's true level of progressivity is a relative and multidimensional latent vari-
able which may potentially inﬂuence demographic outcomes. This chapter con-
structs an index to measure women's level of progressivity using answers to survey
questions on wife's attitudes and perceptions regarding gender interactions that
aﬀect women's health, both physical and emotional, and including reproductive
health. The index will then be included as an additional covariate in a baby's
sex equation and in a duration to ﬁrst birth model to control for unobserved
heterogeneity.
Speciﬁcally, the questions used to construct the index involve the following
four spheres:
1. Decision making regarding own healthcare.
2. Freedom of movement to visit the health facility.
3. Perceptions towards wife beating due to a number of speciﬁc reasons.
4. Perceptions towards women's right to refuse sex within marriage due to a
number of speciﬁc reasons.
ratios. This however does not aﬀect the analysis as we, humans, should care about girls being
killed, regardless of whether it is before or after birth, such that it does not matter whether the
reported sex ratios are at birth or child sex ratios.
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From each question, whose exact wording is given in Appendix A, a fallible
measurement of women's latent level of progressivity was created in the form of
an indicator (1=progressive; 0=otherwise) variable ωq, q=1,...,4, as follows:
ωi1 = 1 if woman i decides alone on her own healthcare; 0 otherwise.
ωi2 = 1 if woman i is allowed (by husband) to go alone to the health facility; 0
otherwise.
ωi3 = 1 if woman i believes that a husband is not justiﬁed in beating his wife
under any of the following seven circumstances. If she: goes out without telling
him, neglects the house or the children, argues with him, refuses sex, does not
cook properly, shows disrespect for in-laws, or if his husband suspects her of being
unfaithful; 0 otherwise
ωi4 = 1 if woman i thinks that a wife is justiﬁed in refusing sex under each of the
following three circumstances: if she is tired or not in the mood, her husband has
a sexually transmitted disease, or her husband has other women; 0 otherwise.
As the progressivity distribution may depend on place of residence, Table 3.3
reports mean values for each of the four progressivity measurements for the whole
of India (including Delhi) by urban / rural residence, and for Delhi on its own.
Women in Delhi are on average more emancipated than those residing in cities,
and the latter in turn are more liberal than rural women. The sphere with the
lowest proportion of women answering in a progressive way is ω1, decision making
regarding own healthcare, where only about a third of women usually make deci-
sions on this matter. The exact proportions are 27, 31, and 35 percent of women
in the country side, cities, and Delhi, respectively. These proportions are very
low and are consistent with anecdotal evidence showing that women abort female
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foetuses, often because they are pressed to do so by their husbands or in-laws.114
The measurement having the second lowest proportion of women answering
in a progressive way is ω3, perceptions about wife beating. In that case, only 37,
53, and 62 percent of women in the country side, cities, and Delhi, respectively,
believe wife beating is not justiﬁed under any circumstance. This ﬁnding makes it
clear that patriarchal values are very entrenched in the psyche of Indian women,
such that in some circumstances wife beating is considered a husband's 'right'.
As for ω2, freedom to visit the health facility unaccompanied, only 50, 67, and
73 percent of women in the rural side, cities and Delhi, respectively, enjoy this
freedom.
Finally, 68, 76, and 77 percent of women in the country side, cities, and Delhi
respectively, think a wife is justiﬁed to refuse sex with her husband if she is tired
or not in the mood, if her husband has a sexually transmitted disease, or if he
has sex with other women. Overall, women in Delhi thus seem to be more liberal
compared to women in the rest of India, yet that territory has one of the highest
sex ratios in the country. The reported ﬁgures however are mean values and so,
it might still be that variation in progressivity within Delhi helps to explain the
sex of the ﬁrst child and the duration to ﬁrst birth. These hypotheses will be
analysed in Sections 3.4 and 3.5, respectively.
3.3.2 Model and estimation
Deﬁne αi as woman i 's unobserved heterogeneity term, which is the true, latent,
level of progressivity. αi is a culturally determined trait that is inﬂuenced by some
114See for instance a BBC report on female foeticide in south-west Delhi
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13264301)
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of woman i 's observed characteristics, zi, and it in turn aﬀects her answers to ques-
tions regarding issues that aﬀect women's physical, emotional, and reproductive
health. That is, αi aﬀects the value of each of the four binary, fallible progres-
sivity measurements ωq, q=1,...,4. Assuming that at each progressivity level the
probability that a woman with that level of progressivity will answer 'yes' to one
of the measurements ωiq is of the logit form, the relationships between α, z, and
ωq can be summarized by a two-equation system as follows.
ω∗iq = λ0q+λ1qαi+ϑiq, q = 1, ..., 4, with ωiq =

1 ifω∗iq > 0
0 otherwise
(3.1)
αi = z
′
iγ+ui (3.2)
Where:
ωiq, q = 1, ..., 4 =Observed, fallible, measures of αi as outlined in Section 3.3.1.
z = Woman i's observed characteristics: age at marriage, current age, age dif-
ference between spouses, education, caste, religion, husband's polygamy indicator,
wealth quintile, family structure, frequency of media contact, and state indicators.
λ0q and λ1q, q = 1, ..., 4 are the intercepts and factor loadings respectively. For
identiﬁcation, the ﬁrst loading, λ11 = 1, so the other loadings are estimated with
respect to it, and the variance of the progressivity trait can be estimated freely.
Equations (3.1) and (3.2) were estimated jointly by maximum likelihood us-
ing the gllamm routine in Stata under the assumption that the uis are normally
distributed. As women in rural and urban areas may be drawn from diﬀerent
distributions, and therefore behave diﬀerently, the joint model was estimated sep-
arately by place of residence. In each case, the Bayesian posterior, the estimated
posterior conditional mean of the latent variable, ˆ¯αi ≡ E(αi|zi, ωiq), q = 1, ..., 4,
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was obtained115 and standardized with respect to each subsample (rural / urban).
The latter is called progress and informs us about the underlying level of progres-
sivity conditional on the observed behaviour. In the next sections, the subsample
of women in Delhi will be extracted, and progress will be incorporated as an addi-
tional covariate in models to estimate the demographic outcome yi. Path diagram
3.1 illustrates the relationship among equations (3.1), (3.2) and the estimation
equation for yi.
3.3.3 Results
Figure 3.1 plots the estimated progressivity index, progress, for the whole of India
(including Delhi) and for Delhi on its own. We see that the index is somehow
shifted to the right in the subsample, implying that women in Delhi are on average
more progressive than in the rest of India. This is consistent with Table 3.3, where
we saw that in general, a higher proportion of women in Delhi had progressive
views compared to women in the whole of India.
The results from estimating the progressivity model are reported in Tables 3.4
(equation (3.1)) and 3.5 (equation (3.2)). The estimated intercepts and factor
loadings reported in Table 3.4 were then used to plot Item Characteristic Curves
(ICCs) for each measurement, separately by place or residence, in Figures 3.2
(rural) and 3.3 (urban). ICCs plot the probability of a measurement taking the
value of one against the progressivity index. The higher the factor loading the
steeper the curve will be, such that small changes in progressivity will yield large
changes in the probability and so, the better a measurement will be at discrim-
115This is known as the Bayesian shrinkage estimator, see Goldstein (2003).
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inating between very progressive and less progressive women. The intercept in
turn informs us about the probability of women answering 'yes' to a progressivity
question given an average progressivity index value of 0.
The slope coeﬃcients in Table 3.4 show that diﬀerent measurements have dif-
ferent relative importance depending on women's place of residence, and this is
reﬂected in the ICCs. For the rural sample (Figure 3.2), the most important pro-
gressivity measurement, the one with the largest factor loading, is ω2, whether a
woman has the freedom to go to the health facility on her own. Consequently, the
respective ICC in Figure 3.2 shows that this measurement allows discrimination
between very progressive and less progressive women: small changes in progressiv-
ity bring about large changes in the probability of answering 'yes' to the question.
The large negative intercept in turns implies that women with a below average
progressivity index (lower than 0) have an almost zero probability of having the
freedom to go to the health facility on their own. Women with a progressivity
index which is one standard deviation away (i.e. equal to 1) have a very high
probability of having the freedom to go to the health facility unaccompanied.
The ﬁrst measurement, whether the respondent usually makes decisions on her
own healthcare, also allows us to diﬀerentiate across progressivity levels among
rural women in India to a certain extend. For instance, women with a value of
zero in the progressivity index have a 16 percent likelihood of deciding on their
own healthcare, whilst women with a progressivity index of four have a 50 percent
chance of usually making such a decision. In contrast, ω3 and ω4, whether the
respondent does not justify wife beating and whether she justiﬁes refusing sex
within marriage, have a very low factor loading. Consequently, their respective
ICCs have a low slope and therefore, do not discriminate between very progressive
and less progressive women.
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As for the urban sample, it is ω3, whether the respondent does not justify
wife beating, the one that best discriminates between very progressive and less
progressive women due to its high factor loading. Speciﬁcally, Figure 3.3 shows
that women with very low progressivity levels have a close to zero probability of
agreeing that a husband is not justiﬁed in beating his wife, whilst women with
a very high progressivity index have an estimated probability of 0.85 of agreeing
with that view. On the other hand, and unlike ω1, the ICCs corresponding to ω2
and ω4, whether the respondent has the freedom to go to the health clinic on her
own, and whether she thinks that refusing sex to husbands is justiﬁed, are also
steep enough as to being able to discriminate between very progressive and less
progressive women.
Table 3.5 reports the results from estimating equation (3.2). Note that, as the
latent trait does not have a well-deﬁned measurement scale, it is only possible
to talk about correlations between covariates and the level of progressivity, but
not about precise point estimates. The table shows that most regressors are
statistically signiﬁcant and have the expected sign. Speciﬁcally, the correlation
between age at marriage and progressivity is positive in cities but negative in
the rural side. This makes sense as women in urban settings may have more
decision making autonomy as to be able to choose to marry at an older age. In
contrast, in rural areas it may be more diﬃcult to contradict the family, who often
press for an early marriage, such that marrying at an older age may be due to not
ﬁnding a suitable partner because of some individual characteristics which are not
controlled for here (e.g. physical appearance or the number of elder sisters116),
and which also make women less conﬁdent and more submissive in all aspects of
116Taking the wealth quintile constant, a family with more daughters will ﬁnd it more diﬃcult
to meet the dowry requirement necessary to marry oﬀ their girls, especially the young ones
(Kaur (2004)) as they may have already ran out of savings or acquired too much debt in order
to marry oﬀ the elder daughters.
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their life.
Similarly, there is a positive correlation between age and progressivity. This
makes sense as women in the sample are aged 15 to 49 years such that older women
may have gained people's respect and may thus be more mature, experienced and
conﬁdent as to know their rights better, and step out of the house on their own.
On the other hand, women who are older than their husbands were found to be
less progressive.
Turning to education and caste indicators, we see that there is a positive and
monotonic relation between education and progressivity. Lower caste status (the
scheduled castes, tribal communities and other backward castes) is associated
with lower progressivity in urban settings but rural women from schedule castes
are more progressive. This makes sense as traditionally, people from schedule
castes / tribes are characterized by more gender-egalitarian cultures (Sudha and
Rajan (1999)). Nevertheless, people from lower castes in cities may become less
progressive by trying to emulate the customs of upper castes, including female
seclusion, in order to achieve class mobility. This process is known as 'Sanskriti-
zation' ((Sudha and Rajan (1999)).
As for religion, compared to Hindu women, Muslim religious status is associ-
ated with lower progressivity ; whilst Christian, other (Jainism, Judaism, Zoroas-
trianism, Donyi-Poloism, or other), as well as not practicing and not having given
information about religious status, is associated with higher progressivity. Lastly,
compared to Hindu women, Sikh religous status in cities and Buddhism in rural
areas are associated with higher progressivity.
There is also a positive and monotonic relation between the household assets
index and progressivity. Likewise, belonging to a nuclear family and having some
media contact are both associated with higher levels of progressivity regardless of
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place of residence. The latter makes sense as the media may make women more
aware of their human rights. Similarly, women in nuclear families may have less
pressure from their in-laws, such that their way of thinking and behaving may be
less patriarchal and more progressive. Lastly, the state indicators show that urban
women in Himachal Pradesh, Delhi, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal,
Jharkhand, Chhatisgarh and Madhya Pradesh are more progressive than similar
women in Maharashtra. On the other hand, rural women in Bihar, Nagaland,
Orissa, Chhatisgarh and Karnataka are less progressive than similar women in
Uttar Pradesh.
3.4 Firstborn's gender
3.4.1 Model and estimation
Assume all women have access to prenatal sex determination technology and abor-
tion services such that they can choose whether or not to have a child and the sex
of the oﬀspring. Assume further that each woman i has preferences deﬁned over
the set of alternatives Ci= {no child yet, ﬁrst child is a boy, ﬁrst child is a girl}
and that she derives utility from her choice. That is,
Ui(alternative j) = x
′
iβj+φjprogressi+εij, j = 0, 1, 2 (3.3)
where:
x=Woman i 's observed characteristics: age at marriage, age diﬀerence be-
tween spouses, own and husband's educational attainment, caste, religion, wealth
quintile, family structure and rural residence.
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progressi= Woman i 's estimated progressivity index.
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Assuming that the error term εij is orthogonal to x, a multinomial logit model
can be used to describe each woman's decision making process as follows (McFad-
den (1974)). Assume that the stochastic individual speciﬁc terms εij are indepen-
dently distributed, each with an extreme value cumulative distribution function
F (εj) = exp(−exp(−εj)). Therefore, the probability that woman i chooses alter-
native j is:
Pr(yi = j) = Pr(Uij > Uiq)∀q 6= j
For independent extreme value distributions this probability is given by:
Pr(yi = j) = Pr(j|xi) = exp(x
′
iβj+φjprogressi)∑2
g=0 exp(x
′
iβg+φjprogressi)
, j = 0, 1, 2 (3.4)
3.4.2 Baseline results
Given the sample of 2032 women in Delhi, the mean of the categorical outcome
variable is 1.37, and its standard deviation 0.6082. In that sample, 6.84 percent
of women had not yet given birth by the time of the interview, 49.41 percent of
them had had a ﬁrstborn son, and 43.75 of them a ﬁrstborn daughter.
Table 3.6 presents the results from estimating equation (3.4). Although several
estimated coeﬃcients in each of the two gender equations are statistically signif-
117One could think of the original set up of the model as being: Ui(alternative j) = x
′
iβj +
υij , j = 0, 1, 2,where υij = αi + εij . Nevertheless, as αi = z
′
iγ + ui (by equation (3.2)), there is
correlation between the error term, υij , and the observed characteristics x through progressivity,
αi. In order to disentangle the correlation, an estimator (progress) for αi was obtained separately
from Ui(), and plugged back into the latter equation, to obtain equation (3.3). Alternatively,
the correlation between the observed characteristics, x, and the error term, υij , could in general
be accounted for by exploiting within variation in a panel. Unfortunately this solution could not
be used as the NFHS-3 is a cross-section. Likewise, one could capture the correlation by using
time averages of the observed characteristics as suggested by Mundlak (1978). Nonetheless, this
solution could not be used neither as the explanatory variables are time invariant.
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icant, the respective marginal eﬀects are not signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level,
except in the case of the progressivity index in the girl equation. Speciﬁcally, a
one-standard deviation increase in the level of progressivity is associated with a
5.8 percentage point increase in the probability of having a ﬁrstborn girl compared
to women who have not yet given birth ceteris paribus.
3.4.3 Robustness checks
Table 3.7 presents the results from several robustness checks. Model [2] re-
estimates equation (3.4) using only the subsample of observations who are either
censored or whose ﬁrstborn is still alive.118 The results are very robust. The
estimated progressivity eﬀect is now 5.9 percentage points and is signiﬁcant at the
5 percent level, ceteris paribus.
Model [3] re-estimates equation (3.4) using the full sample of 2032 women and
a progressivity index that was constructed using only hard covariates. That
is, those which one can expect to have remained constant throughout the years.
These are: age at marriage, current age, age diﬀerence between spouses, education,
religion, caste, and the state indicators. This was done as the original index may
not be accurately measuring women's progressive thinking at the time of marriage,
as women's observed characteristics may have changed between that date and the
time of the interview. The results show that a one-standard deviation increase in
the 'hard' progressivity index is associated with a 5.4 percentage-point increase in
the likelihood of having a ﬁrstborn girl, and is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level
ceteris paribus.
118In this case, the gender distribution would be 7.27, 48.48, and 44.25 percent censored ob-
servations, boys, and girls respectively. That is, in this sample, boys do seem to have higher
reported mortality. Still, Table 3.7 shows that the results are robust to dropping out mothers
whose ﬁrstborn past away.
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Model [4] re-estimates equation (3.4) using only the post-ultrasound sample.
That is, women who married in or after 1985 (as suggested by Bhalotra and
Cochrane (2010)),119 and the baseline index. In that case, a one-standard devia-
tion increase in the progressivity index is associated with a 7.6 percentage-point
increase in the likelihood of having a ﬁrstborn girl at the 5 percent signiﬁcance
level, ceteris paribus.
Model [5] re-estimates equation (3.4) using the baseline index and the subsam-
ple of women who married at most 12 years before the interview. That is, in or
after 1994. This was done as it is unlikely that women's level of progressivity re-
mained constant throughout the years. Things in India have changed and women
may now think in a less traditional way, such that their perceptions regarding wife
and husband rights may be diﬀerent now than when they ﬁrst married. 1994 is
also the date when the ultrasound started to be widely available (as suggested by
Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010)). In this case, a one-standard deviation increase in
the progressivity index is now associated with a 7.7 percentage-point increase in
the likelihood of having a ﬁrstborn girl at the 10 percent signiﬁcance level, ceteris
paribus.
Table A3.5 in the Appendix presents the results from testing for reverse causal-
ity, that is, from regressing progress on the sex of the ﬁrst child. This was done as
literature on voting behaviour show that children of diﬀerent sex inﬂuence parental
behaviour diﬀerently. In particular, Washington (2008) ﬁnds that daughters in-
crease a congressperson's propensity to vote liberally, specially on reproductive
119Using nonparametric plots and ﬂexible parametric speciﬁcations of the average sex ratio at
birth for the whole of India, Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010) identify 1985 as a break point in the
sex ratio trend. Therefore, they deﬁne the post-ultrasound period as 1985-2005. Nevertheless,
as already mentioned in the introduction, amniocentesis techniques were available in Delhi as
early as 1975; that is why the baseline speciﬁcation considers all women in the sample, even
when the ultrasound was not supposed to be available. Furthermore, remember that skewed sex
ratios are due not only to prenatal sex selection but also to excess postnatal mortality of girls,
which may diﬀer from the mortality reported by mothers.
169
rights issues. Similarly, Oswald and Powdthavee (2010) ﬁnd that daughters (sons)
make people more likely to vote for left-(right-)wing political parties. As for this
chapter, it might be that a ﬁrstborn son helps women to improve the relation-
ship with their husbands such that they do not get battered anymore (in case
they were) and so, women now ﬁnd wife beating justiﬁed. On the other hand,
a ﬁrstborn girl may turn women more progressive and make them stand against
patriarchal norms. The results in the ﬁrst column of Table A3.5 relate to a uni-
variate model with the baby's gender, and a constant, as the only covariates, and
those in the second column to a model that controls for the confounding factors
x outlined in Section 3.4.1. Endogeneity does not seem to be present.
Table A3.6 in the Appendix presents the results from estimating the ﬁrstborn's
sex equation using a simpler progressivity index. That is, one that was constructed
as the arithmetic mean of the four progressivity binary indicators. The results
show that a fully progressive woman (i.e. one who decides by herself on her
own healthcare, is free to go on her own to the health clinic, does not justify
wife beating under any circumstance, and thinks that refusing sex to husbands
is justiﬁed) is 8.3 percentage points more likely to report a girl as the ﬁrstborn
compared to women who have not yet given birth, and who are not progressive at
all as measured by the four progressivity indicators in the previous parenthesis.
Table A3.7 in the Appendix shows in turn the results obtained from estimating
the ﬁrstborn's sex equation substituting the four binary progressivity measure-
ments for the index. In that case, we see that only the ﬁrst indicator, whether
a woman decides by herself on her own healthcare, signiﬁcantly aﬀects the (re-
ported) biological sex of the ﬁrstborn. Speciﬁcally, women who decide by them-
selves on their own healthcare are 4.9 percentage points more likely to report a
ﬁrstborn daughter, compared to women who are still childless, and who let others
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decide on the use of healthcare for them.
The baseline progressivity index (i.e., the one estimated using a latent factor
moder) is however the preferred one. The reason is that it has been estimated us-
ing a methodology that takes into account any correlation that may exist between
women's latent, unobserved progressivity, and their observed characteristics. In
order to test the predictive power of that index, equation (3.4) was estimated for
two other Indian states: Kerala and Punjab. The results are shown in Tables A3.8
and A3.9 in the Appendix, respectively. Progressivity is not found to signiﬁcantly
aﬀect the probability of having (reporting) a ﬁrstborn girl in any of those states.
This result is expected in the case of Kerala, as that state does not suﬀer from
an unnaturally imbalanced child sex ratio, but it is less expected in the case of
Punjab, where a problem of `missing' women does exist (see Table 3.1).
The latter result highlights the relevance of the community gender context,
which can be inﬂuential in negating or enhancing the eﬀects of individual progres-
sivity on well-being outcomes. That is, as this chapter has already pointed out,
women in Delhi are collectively more progressive than women in the rest of India,
such that the context may further enhance the eﬀect of individual progressivity.
In contrast, progressive women in Punjab might not ﬁnd a supportive environ-
ment that allows them to turn their progressive thoughts (e.g. defending the life
of their daughters) into action.
This does not mean that there are no women with low progressivity levels in
Delhi. There are (although less than in Punjab (see Figure A3.1)), and that may in
fact partly explain why sex-ratios are unbalanced there, but the idea is that women
who happen to be progressive enough as to want to keep a girl child, manage to do
so because they may not be `punished' by the community for not having conformed
with the patriarchal social norms. This might be true, ﬁrstly perhaps because
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those rules are less entrenched in people's minds in Delhi; and second, because
women there might not be known by the wider community. Therefore, collective
action that aims at empowering communities of women (and instilling gender
egalitarian thoughts in men) may have more far reaching beneﬁts on reducing
gender inequalities, than the increase in progressivity of isolated agents.
In this sense, the mass anti-rape protests that have taken place in New Delhi
in the last months, and in which large numbers of men have also been taking part,
suggest, to some extent, the existance of a more progressive / egalitarian collective
consciousness in Delhi, which probably does not exist elsewhere in India. Because
of this, equation (3.4) was re-estimated using the baseline index, but constraining
the sample to women whose husband was interviewed. This was done in order
to test the hypothesis that those women were beneﬁting from a more progressive
and supporting family environment, which may then enhance the eﬀect of women's
progressivity on the probability of having a ﬁrstborn girl.
That is, although couples who were interviewed are representative of all couples
at the state and national level, that is only in terms of observable characteristics
(e.g. age, caste, religion, education, etc.) Nevertheless, those men must have
made themselves available to answer a demographic and health survey, which
may signal that they conferred importance to it. Those men might thus be more
progressive, supportive, and understanding than other husbands, ceteris paribus.
Such characteristics would allow their wives to enjoy a more progressive, peaceful,
and supporting environment at home.
The results in Table A3.10 in the Appendix provide suggestive evidence that
something like that may indeed be at play. In particular, the eﬀect of progressivity
on the probability of reporting a daughter as the ﬁrst child is almost twice as
large as in the baseline speciﬁcation. More speciﬁcally, a one-standard deviation
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increase in the women's progressivity index is associated with an 11.4-percentage
point increase in the likelihood of having (reporting) a female ﬁrstborn, compared
to women who have not yet given birth.
3.5 Duration from marriage to ﬁrst birth
3.5.1 Model and estimation
The second outcome under investigation is the duration from marriage to ﬁrst
birth. In particular, a competing risk discrete hazard model was used to inves-
tigate the number of months, m, that a woman, i, spends childless nine months
after her ﬁrst marriage (m=9, 10, 11, . . . ,M). Such a model was needed as the
dataset records children's births in months, and women can exit the childless state
by either having a boy or a girl. Women who had not yet given birth at the time
of the interview, and those who gave birth more than 5 years after their ﬁrst
marriage were coded as censored. That is, the longest duration to exit, M, was
ﬁxed at 60 months. The latter was done as long durations might signal infertility,
which may be due to successive abortions.
To identify each hazard, the one leading to a boy and the one leading to a girl,
enough observations exiting in each period to each of the two destination states are
needed. Therefore, several months were merged to obtain a time index t=1,2,...,7
as follows. The ﬁrst period (t=1) combines months 9, 10 and 11 after marriage
(m=9,10,11); t=2 includes months, m, 12 to 15; t=3 stands for m=16,...,20; t=4
for m=21,...,26; t=5 for m=27,...,35; t=6 for m=36,...,60. Finally, the censored
observations, where m>60, were coded as t=7.120 Given this recoding of the
120The longest duration to the time of the interview among childless women is 349 months.
173
duration variable, there are about 15 percent of all observations exiting in each
of the ﬁrst six periods (t=1,...,6), and 10 percent are censored (t=7).
Deﬁne Ti as the length of a completed spell (time to ﬁrst birth) of woman
i. This is a discrete non-negative random variable which takes the value of t if
the spell ends in the interval (It−1, It] by one of the two destination states, j 
{1,2}.121 The discrete time hazard rate hij(t) for the tth interval thus denotes the
conditional probability of woman i transiting from the childless state (j = 0) to
the destination state j  {1,2} (giving birth to either a boy, j=1 or a girl, j=2) in
the tth interval (t=1,...,6) conditional on not having given birth before:
hij(t|τjt, xi, progressi, θij) = Prj(Ti = t|Ti ≥ t; τjt, xi, progressi, θij)
∀ j = 1, 2 (3.5)
Where:
τjt= Baseline hazard for outcome j, common to all women.
xi= Woman i 's observed characteristics as outlined in Section 3.4.1. That is,
age at marriage, age diﬀerence between spouses, own and husband's educational
attainment, wealth quintile, religion, caste, family structure, and rural residence.
progressi= Woman i's estimated progressivity index.
θij= Individual random intercept that is allowed to diﬀer across exits j  {1,2}.
The hazard rate for an exit at time t to any destination j  {1,2} is the sum of
the individual destination speciﬁc hazard rates:
hi(t|τjt, xi, progressi, θij) =
∑2
j=1 hij(t|τjt, xi, progressi, θij) (3.6)
The survival function, the unconditional probability of remaining childless at the
The longest duration to ﬁrst birth is 199 months, but durations longer than 60 months were
coded as censored.
121The state in which a woman ﬁnds herself is thus indexed by j = 0,1,2; and the subset j =
1,2 are destination states.
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end of the interval t, is given by the product of the probabilities of remaining in
a spell in all previous periods up to t :
Si(t|τjt, xi, progressi, θij) = Pr(Ti > t|τjt, xi, progressi, θij) =∏t
k=1[1− hi(k|τjk, xi, progressi, θij)] (3.7)
The unconditional probability of transition in period t for woman i into the des-
tination state j  {1,2} is thus given by:
Prj(Ti = t|τjt, xi, progressi, θij) =
hij(t|τjt, xi, prgoressi, θij)
∏t−1
k=1[1−hi(k|τjk, xi, progressi, θij)]∀j {1, 2} (3.8)
To account for the competing risk nature of the problem, assume the hazard to be
a multinomial logit, where the alternatives are "not yet given birth / censored"
(j=0), "ﬁrstborn is a boy" (j=1), "ﬁrstborn is a girl" (j=2). Taking the ﬁrst
alternative (j=0) as the reference category for identiﬁcation, the hazard is given
by:
hij(t|τjt, xi, progressi, θij) = exp(x
′
iβj+τjt+ψjprogressi+θij)
1+
∑2
g=1 exp(x
′
iβg+τgt+ψgprogressi+θig)
∀ j = 1, 2 (3.9)
Given the recoding of the time variable, this is a discrete time, three choice
model as each woman will have multiple observations (maximum 7) for the out-
come variable. Speciﬁcally, the latter will take the value of 0 in all periods starting
9 months after marriage until she gives birth, when it takes the value of either 1
if the oﬀspring is a boy, or 2 if it is a girl.122 For instance, a woman exiting the
childless state 10 months after marriage due to giving birth to a girl will have only
one indicator, taking the value of 2. A woman exiting 37 months after marriage
to a boy will have 6 observations for the dependent variable, all taking the value
of zero except the last one, which will be a 1; and a woman who was interviewed
122That is, from the original data, where births were recorded in monthsm, the discrete variable
t (t = 1,...,6) was created as previously explained. From it, the ﬁnal categorical, outcome variable
was created and it can take the values 0,1,2.
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22 months after marriage but has not yet given birth will have 4 observations for
the outcome variable, all taking the value of 0.
Given a random sample of women and keeping the ﬁrst alternative (j=0) as
the reference category, the sample likelihood function with random intercepts,
θj,is:
L =
´∞
−∞
∏N
i=1
∏6
t=1
∏2
j=0
{
exp(x′iβj+τjt+ψjprogressi+θj)
1+
∑2
g=1 exp(x
′
iβg+τgt+ψgprogressi+θg)
}dijt
f(θ)dθ
∀ j = 1, 2 (3.10)
where dijt =

1 if woman imakes transition to destination j in period t
0 otherwise
The maximization of equation (3.10) was approximated through Gauss-Hermite
quadrature using the gllamm routine in Stata under the assumptions that the
unobserved heterogeneity θ is identically and independently distributed across
individuals, and that it follows some bivariate normal distribution f(). That
is, θ = (θ1, θ2) ∼ f

 a1
a2
 ,
 σ2θ1 σθ1θ2
σθ1θ2 σ
2
θ2

 , where θ is assumed to be
independent of the included regressors.123
3.5.2 Results
Table 3.8 shows the results from estimating the duration model in equation (3.9)
using the whole sample of 2032 women in Delhi. Four diﬀerent speciﬁcations were
estimated by consecutively adding covariates. Model [1] relates to the univariate
model, where the outcome variable (for each woman, a series of up to six zeros, if
she has not yet given birth, or zeros followed by either a 1 or a 2 at the time spell of
ﬁrst childbearing) was regressed on the baseline progressivity index and a constant
only. In that case, a one-standard deviation increase in the progressivity index
123An approximation was needed as there is no analytical solution for the integral in equation
(3.10), as one needs to integrate over the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity, θ.
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is associated with a signiﬁcant 3.1 percentage-point increase in the probability of
exiting the childless state due to giving birth to a girl. By contrast, there is no
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability of exiting due to giving birth to
a boy.
Model [2] added time spell indicators to the unadjusted model. A one-standard
deviation increase in the progressivity index is now associated with a signiﬁcant
13 percentage-point increase in the probability of exiting due to giving birth to a
girl. There continues to be no signiﬁcant eﬀect of progressivity on the probability
of exiting due to giving birth to a boy. Model [3] extends the model by adding
the exogenous covariates x (as described in both Section 3.4.1 and 3.5.1). In that
case, the eﬀect of progress is not statistically signiﬁcant for either gender.
Finally, Model [4] adds interaction terms between progress and each of the
six time spell indicators. A one-standard deviation increase in the level of pro-
gressivity is now associated with a 9-percentage point increase in the probability
of exiting due to giving birth to a girl in the ﬁrst time spell (9-11 months after
marriage). There is also a large and positive eﬀect on the probability of exiting
in later periods due to having a daughter, but the eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁ-
cant. In contrast, the eﬀect on the probability of exiting in later periods (at least
21 months after marriage) due to giving birth to a son is very large, negative, and
signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. These results are consistent with more progres-
sive women being less likely to sex-select their ﬁrst child. That is, under normal
conditions one would expect more progressive women to delay the initiation of
childbearing, ceteris paribus. In a context of very strong son preferences however,
long birth intervals might be the result of successive abortions (presumably of fe-
male foetuses). Therefore, the fact that each period more progressive women are
more likely to exit the childless state by giving birth to a daughter is consistent
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with them being less likely to sex-select their ﬁrstborn.
In the most complete model, Model [4], we may want to know whether more
progressive women are overall more or less likely to exit the childless state. As
already discussed, in a context of very strong son preferences, we may see more
progressive women exiting earlier for a given baby's gender. On the other hand,
if boys' and girls' hazards were compared given a certain progressivity level, the
boys' hazard should be slightly above that of girls simply because it is (5 percent)
more likely to give birth to a boy than to a girl. Finding the opposite might
be evidence of sex-selective abortions. That is, girls' hazard may be higher than
that of boys because women whose ﬁrstborn is female did not have a particular
preference for boys, so they did not undergo any abortion and exited the childless
state at the normal, natural, pace. In contrast, women with a ﬁrstborn male are
not only those who had a boy by chance but also those who ﬁrst aborted a girl
/ girls and then gave birth to a boy, such that they exited at a rate slower than
normal, making the length of intervals leading to a boy longer than normal.
In order to assess these hypotheses, the probability of exiting the childless
state by giving birth to a son / daughter (j=1,2) in the tth time spell (t=1,...,6)
was calculated for each woman using the estimated parameters and three diﬀerent
values of progress. The ﬁrst one is the "average" progressivity level, calculated
as the sample mean of progress, X¯progress. The other two values add / subtract
one sample standard deviation to the mean, (X¯progress ± sprogress), to obtain the
"high" / "low" progressivity levels. In each case, the actual values of the other
covariates were used. The average of the individual probabilities was then taken
and plotted. The resulting hazards are referred as "average", "high", and "low".
Figure 3.4 plots the hazards for girls, and Figure 3.5 shows those of boys.124
124Each hazard is thus based on six average probabilities, and a total of 36 probabilities,
Pjtp, were estimated for each woman. This is because there are 36 diﬀerent combinations of
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Figure 3.4 shows that, except for t=5 (27-35 months after marriage), the
high girl hazard is always above the respective average one, which is in turn
above the respective low one. At t=5, the low hazard has almost reached
its maximum and it is therefore slightly higher than the other two hazards (39
versus 38 and 36 percent probability of having a ﬁrstborn daughter). In the ﬁnal
period, t=6 (3-5 years after marriage), the high hazard is again at the top
and it is there where the largest diﬀerence between the three hazards is found.
Speciﬁcally, whilst the high hazard almost achieves the biologically normal sex
ratio at birth at that point, with a 48.6 percent probability of having a ﬁrstborn
daughter, the respective probablities are 44.8 and 40.9 percent if evaluated at the
average and low progressivity levels instead. This fact is even more important
if one takes into account that at t=6, the probability of being childless is the
lowest at the high progressivity level (4 percent compared to 3 percent at the
low progressivity level). Therefore, there remains less probability to share out
between the two destination states (boys and girls) at the high progressivity
level than at the low level (96 versus 97 percent) but the girl's share in the total
probability is much higher in the former case. These results are consistent with
more progressive women not interfering with nature and so, exiting at the normal,
natural pace.
Figure 3.5 is also consistent with that hypothesis. At early spells, up to t=4
(26 months after marriage), the average probability of exiting the childless state
by giving birth to a son is the highest if evaluated at the "high" progressivity
level, whilst the average hazard is in the middle and the low hazard is at the
exiting time spells (t=1,...6), progressivity levels (ρ="average"=1, "high"=2, "low"=3), and
destination states (j=1=boy, 2=girl). Thus, 6*3*2=36. Each ﬁgure P jtρwas calculated using
equation (3.9). For instance, P231, the probability of exiting the childless state by giving birth
to a daughter, j=2, in the third time spell, t=3, (16-20 months after marriage) calculated at
the average progressivity level, ρ = 1, is: P231 =
exp((β02+δt32)+x
′
iβ2+(ψ2+δtp32)X¯progressi)
1+
∑2
g=1 exp((β0g+δt3g)+x′iβg+(ψg+δtp3g)X¯progressi)
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bottom. However, from t=5 (27-35 months after marriage) onwards, the low
hazard is at the top and the "high" hazard at the bottom. Speciﬁcally, in the
last period, t=6 (3-5 years after marriage), the average probability of exiting the
childless state by giving birth to a boy is 56 percent if evaluated at the "low"
progressivity level, and 52 and 47 percent if evaluated at the average, and high
level respectively. Like this, as noted earlier, the average probability of having a
ﬁrstborn girl in the last period is almost at the biologically normal, even when
the probability of remaining childless is positive.
Figures 3.6 to 3.8 plot both male and female hazards for the low, average,
and high progressivity levels respectively. Apart from the high hazards (Figure
3.8) in the last period (t=6), the boys' hazard is always above the respective girls'
hazard. In the case of the low and average hazards (Figures 3.6 and 3.7
respectively), the largest diﬀerence between the boys' and girls' hazards occur
in the ﬁnal period (3-5 years after marriage), being 15 and 7 percentage points
respectively. These ﬁgures are much higher than the biologically normal diﬀerence.
In contrast, as already mentioned, at t=6 the girls' hazard evaluated at the high
progressivity level is slightly above the respective hazard for boys. Speciﬁcally,
at that point there is a 49 percent probability of having a ﬁrstborn daughter
compared to 47 percent probability of having a ﬁrstborn son. Although these
diﬀerences are not statistically signiﬁcant, they do point in the right direction
(more progressive women being more likely to have a ﬁrstborn girl) and as such
have economic signiﬁcance.
3.6 Conclusions
Using a latent factor model this chapter has constructed an index to measure
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Indian women's level of progressivity. Progressive women are those who decide
on their own healthcare, are free to visit the health facility on their own, do not
justify wife beating, and think that it is justiﬁed to refuse sex to husbands under
certain circumstances. The chapter has then assessed the eﬀect of progressivity
on the sex of the ﬁrstborn and on the length of the ﬁrst birth interval in Delhi,
India's National Capital Territory. The latter has, unlike other Indian states /
territories, a deﬁcit of girls even among ﬁrst order births, and a skewed child sex
ratio that did not improve between 2001 and 2011, according to census data.
The chapter ﬁnds that more progressive women are more likely to have a
ﬁrstborn daughter. In particular, a one-standard deviation increase in the pro-
gressivity index is associated with a 5.8-percentage point increase in the likelihood
of a ﬁrstborn girl relative to women who have not yet given birth. The eﬀect is
robust to the set of covariates used to create the index; and it increases for diﬀer-
ent subsamples, mainly the ones that shorten the period of study to account for
the introduction and availability of the ultrasound.
The eﬀect of progressivity on the girl equation almost doubles if the sam-
ple is restricted to women whose husband was interviewed, who might be more
progressive, supportive, and understanding than other husbands, ceteris paribus.
Furthermore, a simpler alternative index estimated as the arithmetic mean of the
four progressivity indicators yields a higher impact (8.3 percentage points) on the
probability of reporting a female ﬁrst child. Additionally, more progressive women
experience shorter ﬁrst birth intervals. This, together with the fact that they are
more likely to have a ﬁrstborn girl, may indicate that they are less inclined to
sex-select their ﬁrst child.
Lastly, the chapter has estimated the ﬁrstborn's sex equation for two other
Indian states: Kerala and Punjab. Progressivity is not found to signiﬁcantly
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aﬀect the sex of the ﬁrstborn in any of those two states. This result was expected
in the case of Kerala, as that state does not suﬀer from an imbalanced child sex
ratio. As for Punjab, the chapter conteds that that ﬁnding, along with the ones in
Delhi, can be explained by structural considerations, such that they highlight the
importance of the community gender context which can be inﬂuential in negating
or enhancing the eﬀects of individual-level empowerment on well-being outcomes.
Speciﬁcally, the chapter shows that women in Delhi are collectively more pro-
gressive than women in the rest of India, such that the context may further en-
hance the eﬀect of individual progressivity. In contrast, progressive women in
Punjab might not ﬁnd a supportive environment that allows them to turn their
progressive thoughts (e.g. defending the life of their daughters) into action. This
does not mean that there are no women with low progressivity levels in Delhi.
There are (although less than in Punjab), and that may in part explain why
sex-ratios are unbalanced there, but the idea is that women who happen to be
progressive enough as to want to keep the baby girl, manage to do so because
they may not be `punished' by the community for not having conformed with the
patriarchal social norms.
Larger structural change may thus have more far reaching beneﬁts on reducing
gender inequalities, than the increase in progressivity of isolated agents. As Kabeer
(1999, 457) points out: in a context where cultural values constrain women's
ability to make strategic life choices, structural inequalities cannot be addressed
by individuals alone. Women's organizations and social movements may thus
be crucial in creating the conditions for change, and in reducing the costs of not
conforming to the social norms for individual women. The mass anti-rape protests
that have taken place in New Delhi in the last months, and in which large numbers
of men have also taken part, suggest that these conditions may, to some extent,
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already exist in a fraction of Delhi's society, but perhaps not elsewhere in India.
Indian families tend to prefer boys over girls due in part to economic and
cultural reasons, regional governments should thus introduce new, and expand
the already existing interventions aimed at subsidising and empowering girls. For
instance: (i) given that parents traditionally lose their daughters to in-laws while
their sons remain at home and provide for them, a pension for the elderly could
be launched; (ii) subsidised education and training for girls could be oﬀered in
order to improve their employment prospects and reduce the cost of (theoretically
outlawed) dowries; (iii) the whole society should be taught, both in school since
early ages and through permanent media campaigns, about women's human rights
and gender equality; (iv) crucially, for female foeticide and infanticide to stop,
culture has to change such that a massive media campaign could be launched to
promote the idea that dowries and son preference are old-fashioned; (v) equal-
rights rulings, laws protecting women from violence, and those intended to halt
sex-selective abortions should be (passed and) strictly enforced. Such strategies
have successfully worked in South Korea, which in the 1990s had a skewed sex-ratio
just as India's today, and currently has an almost normal sex ratio at birth.125
125In 1990, the sex ratio at birth hit 116.9 boys for every 100 girls, the highest in the world at
that time. In 2007, the Korean government announced that it had reached normal sex ratios at
birth (Hudson and den Boer (2004)), and in 2011 the United States Central Inteligence Agency
put that ratio at 107 (US CIA (2013)).
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Tables & Figures
Table 3.1: Sex ratios for Indian states / union territories
Source Census Census NFHS-3
Sample Overall pop. Children aged 0-6 years First order births
Men per Boys per Prop. of Proportion of
100 women 100 girls girls girls
State 2001 2011 2001 2011 2001 2011 N Female P-value
Jammu&K 112 113 106 116 0.485 0.462 1851 0.493 0.65
Himachal P 103 103 112 110 0.473 0.475 2097 0.499 0.32
Punjab 114 112 125 118 0.444 0.458 2440 0.469 0.06
Uttaranchal 104 104 110 113 0.476 0.470 1913 0.492 0.70
Haryana 116 114 122 120 0.450 0.454 1922 0.502 0.22
Delhi 122 115 115 115 0.465 0.464 2189 0.462 0.01
Rajasthan 109 108 110 113 0.476 0.469 2648 0.464 0.01
Uttar P 111 110 109 111 0.478 0.473 7928 0.483 0.41
Bihar 109 109 106 107 0.485 0.483 2478 0.490 0.82
Sikkim 114 112 104 106 0.491 0.486 1252 0.462 0.06
Arunachal P 112 109 104 104 0.491 0.490 1057 0.459 0.06
Nagaland 111 107 104 106 0.491 0.486 2285 0.498 0.32
Manipur 103 101 104 107 0.489 0.483 2593 0.487 0.93
Mizoram 107 103 104 103 0.491 0.493 1108 0.458 0.04
Tripura 105 104 104 105 0.491 0.488 1248 0.486 0.91
Meghalaya 103 101 103 103 0.493 0.492 1228 0.485 0.81
Assam 107 105 104 104 0.491 0.489 2487 0.484 0.70
West Bengal 107 106 104 105 0.490 0.487 4552 0.491 0.71
Jharkhand 106 106 104 106 0.491 0.485 2030 0.496 0.50
Orissa 103 102 105 107 0.488 0.483 2931 0.481 0.48
Chhatisgarh 101 101 103 104 0.494 0.491 2516 0.483 0.64
Madhya P 109 108 107 110 0.482 0.477 4416 0.482 0.42
Gujarat 109 109 113 113 0.469 0.470 2534 0.485 0.73
Maharashtra 108 108 110 113 0.477 0.469 5981 0.493 0.45
Andhra P 102 101 104 106 0.490 0.485 4791 0.478 0.16
Karnataka 104 103 106 106 0.486 0.485 4008 0.493 0.51
Goa 104 103 107 109 0.484 0.479 1849 0.473 0.20
Kerala 95 92 104 104 0.490 0.490 2318 0.491 0.81
Tamil Nadu 101 101 106 106 0.485 0.486 4024 0.493 0.50
India 107 106 108 109 0.481 0.478 80674 0.485 0.07
Source: Own calculation using census data, where sex ratios are given as the number of females for
every 1000 males, and the NFHS-3. In the latter case, the sample includes ever married women who
are usual residents in the state where they were interviewed and whose ﬁrst child was a singleton. P-
value for the test: H0 : Π = .488 v H1 : Π 6= .488, where 0.488 is the biollogically normal proportion
of females at birth. In the ﬁrst column, P stands for pradesh, which means province in Hindi.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics: Sample means (s.d.)
Variable Urban Rural Delhi
Age at marriage 18.82 17.31 18.49
(4.10) (3.63) (3.74)
Current age 33.01 31.79 33.01
(8.10) (8.51) (7.95)
Age diﬀerence between spouses (husband-wife)
[Diﬀerence -2 to 5 years] 0.55 0.56 0.72
Wife 2+ years older than husband 0.01 0.01 0.00
Husband 6+ years older than wife 0.44 0.43 0.28
Highest Education
[None / incomplete primary] 0.31 0.61 0.34
Completed primary 0.06 0.07 0.06
Some secondary 0.38 0.26 0.28
Completed secondary 0.24 0.05 0.32
Caste
[Normal / no answer / missing] 0.47 0.32 0.64
Scheduled caste 0.16 0.18 0.21
Scheduled tribe 0.07 0.17 0.01
Other backward caste 0.31 0.33 0.14
Religion
[Hindu] 0.72 0.76 0.86
Muslim 0.16 0.11 0.09
Christian 0.07 0.08 0.01
Sikh 0.01 0.03 0.03
Budhist 0.01 0.01 0.00
Other religion / none / no answer 0.02 0.02 0.01
Wealth quintile
[Poorest] 0.02 0.21 0.00
Poor 0.05 0.23 0.03
Middle 0.12 0.24 0.12
Richer 0.28 0.20 0.19
Richest 0.53 0.12 0.66
Family structure [Extended]
Nuclear family 0.56 0.51 0.58
Media contact [No contact / no answer]
Reads newspaper 0.55 0.25 0.54
Listens to the radio 0.46 0.43 0.59
Watches TV 0.90 0.57 0.91
Place of residence [Urban]
Rural 0.07
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Table 3.2: Continued: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Urban Rural Delhi
State of residence
Jammu and Kashmir 0.02 0.03
Himachal Pradesh 0.02 0.03
Punjab 0.02 0.03
Uttaranchal 0.02 0.03
Haryana 0.01 0.03
Delhi 0.06 0.00
Rajasthan 0.03 0.04
Uttar Pradesh [Base, rural sample] 0.09 0.11
Bihar 0.03 0.04
Sikkim 0.01 0.02
Arunachal Pradesh 0.01 0.02
Nagaland 0.03 0.02
Manipur 0.03 0.03
Mizoram 0.01 0.01
Tripura 0.01 0.02
Meghalaya 0.01 0.02
Assam 0.02 0.04
West Bengal 0.06 0.05
Jharkhand 0.02 0.03
Orissa 0.02 0.05
Chhatisgarh 0.02 0.04
Madhya Pradesh 0.06 0.05
Gujarat 0.03 0.03
Maharashtra [Base, urban sample] 0.11 0.04
Andhra Pradesh 0.08 0.04
Karnataka 0.04 0.05
Goa 0.03 0.02
Kerala 0.02 0.03
Tamil Nadu 0.06 0.04
N (total=83556) 36795 46761 2032
Source: NHFS-3 (2005-2006). The sample includes currently married women who are usual
residents in the state where they were interviewed. The sum of individual proportions may add
up to more / less than 1 due to rounding. Base category in square brackets.
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Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics: Means of progressivity measurements
Variable Urban Rural Delhi
ω1 : Decides on her own healthcare 0.31 0.27 0.35
ω2 : Allowed alone to the health clinic 0.67 0.5 0.73
ω3 : Wife beating is not justiﬁed 0.53 0.37 0.62
ω4 : Refusing sex to husband is justiﬁed 0.76 0.68 0.77
N (total = 83556) 36795 46761 2032
Source: Own calculation using data from the NHFS-3 (2005-2006). The sample includes cur-
rently married women who are usual residents in the state where they were interviewed. Each
measurement takes the value of either 0 or 1, so the means are the proportion of women an-
swering 'yes' to each question. The urban and rural subsamples include all women in India.
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Table 3.4: Estimation Results - Equation (3.1)
Intercepts (λ0q) Urban Rural
Constant -1.185*** -1.676***
(0.034) (0.032)
ω1 : Decides own healthcare Base Base
ω2 : Allowed alone to the health clinic 1.027*** -6.041***
(0.051) (0.556)
ω3 : Wife beating not justiﬁed -1.003*** 1.100***
(0.114) (0.035)
ω4 : Refusing sex justiﬁed 1.386*** 2.224***
(0.054) (0.033)
Slopes (Factor Loadings (λ1q))
ω1 : Decides own healthcare 1 1
ω2 : Allowed alone to the health clinic 2.628*** 12.79***
(0.185) (1.012)
ω3 : Wife beating not justiﬁed 6.706*** 0.099***
(0.500) (0.026)
ω4 :Refusing sex justiﬁed 2.993*** 0.339***
(0.226) (0.028)
Variance of the progressivity trait 0.019*** 0.17***
(0.003) (0.011)
Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks denote the signiﬁcance level (double sided): * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 3.5: Estimation Results - Equation (3.2)
Variable Urban Rural
Age at marriage 0.002*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)
Current age 0.004*** 0.014***
(0.000) (0.001)
Age diﬀerence between spouses (husband-wife) [-2 to 5 years]
Wife is 2+ years older than husband -0.039** -0.066***
(0.019) (.023)
Husband 6+ years older than wife -0.001 0.008
(0.004) (.006)
Highest Education [None / incomplete primary]
Completed primary 0.026*** -0.017
(0.008) (.011)
Some secondary 0.061*** 0.024***
(.007) (.009)
Completed secondary 0.165*** 0.134***
(0.013) (.017)
Caste ['Normal']
Scheduled caste -0.041*** 0.026***
(.006) (.009)
Scheduled tribe -0.025** 0.003
(0.010) (.010)
Other backward caste -0.032*** -0.008
(.005) (.007)
Religion [Hindu]
Muslim -0.026*** -0.071***
(0.005) (.010)
Christian 0.048*** 0.075***
(.010) (.015)
Sikh 0.039** 0.012
(0.017) (.026)
Budhist -0.013 0.113***
(0.015) (.029)
Other religion / none / no answer 0.042*** 0.191***
(0.015) (.024)
Wealth quintile [Poorest]
Poor 0.029* -0.013
(.015) (0.008)
Middle 0.050*** -0.010
(0.014) (0.009)
Richer 0.065*** -0.025**
(0.014) (0.011)
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Table 3.5: Continued: Estimation Results - Equation (3.2)
Variable Urban Rural
Wealth quintile [Poorest]
Richest 0.104*** -0.001
(0.016) (0.014)
Family structure [Extended]
Nuclear family 0.021*** 0.105***
(0.004) (0.006)
Media contact [No contact / no answer]
Reads newspaper 0.038*** 0.059***
(.006) (0.009)
Listens to the radio 0.009** 0.014**
(.004) (0.006)
Watches TV 0.026*** 0.076***
(0.006) (0.007)
State of residence [Urban: Maharashtra][Rural: Uttar Pradesh]
Jammu and Kashmir -0.053*** 0.298***
(0.015) (-0.020)
Himachal Pradesh 0.202*** 0.403***
(-0.022) (-0.021)
Punjab -0.068*** 0.072***
(-0.014) (-0.024)
Uttaranchal 0.011 0.119***
(-0.015) (-0.018)
Haryana 0.026* 0.076***
(-0.016) (-0.018)
Delhi 0.042*** 0.260***
(-0.010) (-0.047)
Rajasthan 0.069*** 0.059***
(0.013) (0.015)
Uttar Pradesh 0.128***
(0.011)
Bihar 0.012 -0.002
(0.012) (0.016)
Sikkim -0.046*** 0.438***
(0.016) (0.028)
Arunachal Pradesh -0.126*** 0.139***
(0.022) (0.025)
Nagaland -0.348*** -0.180***
(0.029) (0.025)
Manipur -0.276*** 0.176***
(0.023) (0.020)
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Table 3.5: Continued: Estimation Results - Equation (3.2)
Variable Urban Rural
Mizoram -0.255*** 0.683***
(0.025) (0.042)
Tripura -0.044** 0.064***
(0.020) (0.019)
Meghalaya -0.147*** 0.226***
(0.021) (0.028)
Assam -0.021 0.000
(0.013) (0.016)
West Bengal 0.148*** 0.060***
(0.013) (0.014)
Jharkhand 0.135*** 0.048***
(0.016) (0.017)
Orissa -0.071*** -0.229***
(0.014) (0.017)
Chhatisgarh 0.144*** -0.067***
(0.016) (0.017)
Madhya Pradesh 0.152*** -0.012
(0.013) (0.014)
Gujarat -0.047*** 0.106***
(0.011) (0.017)
Maharashtra 0.127***
(0.016)
Andhra Pradesh -0.106*** -0.023
(0.011) (0.015)
Karnataka -0.106*** -0.038***
(0.013) (0.014)
Goa -0.026** 0.249***
(0.012) (0.023)
Kerala -0.227*** 0.091***
(0.020) (0.018)
Tamil Nadu -0.120*** 0.325***
(0.012) (0.018)
Log-Likelihood -86336.111 -115293.36
N 36795 46761
Base category in square brackets. Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks denote the signif-
icance level (double sided): * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3.6: Estimation Results - Firstborn's gender (Equation (3.4))
Coeﬃcient Estimates Marginal Eﬀects
Variable Boys Girls Boys Girls
Progress 1.338*** 1.411*** 0.029 0.058**
(0.222) (0.221) (0.029) (0.029)
Age at marriage -0.166*** -0.169*** -0.005 -0.006
(0.033) (0.033) (0.004) (0.004)
Age diﬀerence -0.015 -0.003 -0.003 0.002
(0.032) (0.032) (0.004) (0.004)
Highest Education [None / incomplete primary]
Woman: Completed primary -0.355 -0.393 -0.004 -0.020
(0.295) (0.298) (0.034) (0.034)
Woman: Completed secondary -1.263*** -1.144*** -0.068 -0.008
(0.422) (0.425) (0.051) (0.051)
Husband: Completed primary 0.199 -0.019 0.054 -0.048
(0.295) (0.297) (0.034) (0.033)
Husband: Completed secondary 0.283 -0.034 0.078* -0.069
(0.380) (0.383) (0.044) (0.044)
Caste [None]
Scheduled caste / tribe 0.620** 0.648** 0.015 0.025
(0.279) (0.281) (0.031) (0.031)
Other backward caste 0.226 0.165 0.021 -0.008
(0.277) (0.281) (0.035) (0.035)
No sikh / hindu 0.006 0.038 -0.007 0.008
(0.308) (0.311) (0.038) (0.038)
Wealth quintile [Richest]
Less than richer 0.496 0.265 0.067 -0.042
(0.370) (0.375) (0.043) (0.043)
Richer 0.384 0.293 0.033 -0.011
(0.306) (0.309) (0.036) (0.036)
Nuclear family 0.357* 0.454** -0.009 0.035
(0.198) (0.200) (0.024) (0.024)
Rural household -0.603 -0.338 -0.078 0.047
(0.367) (0.367) (0.058) (0.057)
Rural*Progress -0.514 -0.556 -0.008 -0.026
(0.419) (0.419) (0.057) (0.056)
Constant 4.690*** 4.679***
(0.721) (0.726)
Log-Likelihood -1767.0283
N 2032
This is the baseline speciﬁcation: it includes all women in the sample and the baseline progres-
sivity index (see Section 3.3.2). Base category in square brackets. Standard errors in parentheses
(bootstrapped (1000 reps.) for progress). * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 3.7: Results summary: Eﬀect of progressivity on the ﬁrstborn's gender
Model Coeﬃcient Estimates Marginal Eﬀects Log-Likelihood N
Boys Girls Boys Girls
[1] 1.338*** 1.411*** 0.029 0.058** -1767.0283 2032
(0.222) (0.221) (0.029) (0.029)
[2] 1.359*** 1.420 *** 0.035 0.059** -1679.0818 1912
(0.220) (0.221) (0.030) (0.030)
[3] 1.453*** 1.495*** 0.040 0.054** -1761.7118 2032
(0.210) (0.208) (0.027) (0.027)
[4] 0.958*** 1.124*** 0.005 0.076** -1394.4039 1543
(0.256) (0.255) (0.034) (0.034)
[5] 0.630** 0.803*** 0.010 0.077* -819.15234 841
(0.296) (0.296) (0.049) (0.047)
 [1] Is the baseline speciﬁcation. It includes all women in the sample (the baseline sample) and
controls for all covariates as detailed in Section 3.4.1 and the baseline progressivity index. That
is, the one estimated using all covariates as detailed in Section 3.3.2. [2] Uses only the subsample
of women who are either censored or whose ﬁrstborn is still alive. [3] Uses the baseline sample
and a progressivity index estimated using only hard covariates. That is: age at marriage,
current age, age diﬀerence between spouses, education, religion, caste, and state indicators. [4]
Uses only the post-ultrasound sample. That is, women who married in or after 1985. [5] Uses
only the sample of women who married when the ultrasound was widely available. That is, in or
after 1994. Standard errors in parentheses (bootstrapped (1000 reps.) in the case of progress).
Asterisks denote the signiﬁcance level (double sided): * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3.8: Duration to ﬁrst birth: Univariate model
[1]
Coeﬃcient Estimates Marginal Eﬀects
Boys Girls Boys Girls
Progress 0.178*** 0.264*** -0.004 0.031**
(0.039) (0.043) (0.013) (0.013)
RE -0.006 2.20e-08
(0.043) (1.50e-07)
corr. -1
logL -5289.1085
N 2032
Robust standard errors for cluster-correlated data (White / Huber / sandwich estimator) in
parentheses. Asterisks denote the signiﬁcance level (double sided): * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01
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Table 3.8: Continued - Duration to ﬁrst birth: Final model
[4]
Coeﬃcient Estimates Marginal Eﬀects
Boys Girls Boys Girls
Progress: exit period
t=1 0.311 0.609** -0.033 0.090*
(0.269) (0.302) (0.049) (0.053)
t=2 -0.136 -0.484** 0.082 0.139
(0.204) (0.230) (0.162) (0.185)
t=3 0.034 -0.310 -0.329 0.207
(0.231) (0.242) (0.225) (0.294)
t=4 0.004 -0.327 -0.874*** 0.302
(0.239) (0.260) (0.292) (0.393)
t=5 -0.554** -0.872*** -1.638*** 0.417
(0.246) (0.285) (0.385) (0.500)
t=6 -0.671** -0.756** -2.556*** 0.534
(0.270) (0.301) (0.498) (0.626)
Time spell indicators
t=2 1.721*** 2.046*** 0.021 -0.002
(0.449) (0.756) (0.047) (0.050)
t=3 2.803*** 3.124*** 0.032 0.009
(0.659) (1.176) (0.051) (0.051)
t=4 4.192*** 4.562*** 0.027 0.011
(0.883) (1.573) (0.050) (0.052)
t=5 6.102*** 6.533*** -0.013 -0.019
(1.175) (2.044) (0.048) (0.046)
t=6 8.525*** 8.750*** -0.063 0.030
(1.463) (2.567) (0.051) (0.047)
RE 3.313*** 1.015
(0.635) (1.009)
corr. .953
logL -4913.043
N 2032
The equivalence between the time spell indicators, t , and the number of months between
marriage and ﬁrst birth, m, is: t=1 refers to m=9-11; t=2 to m=12-15; t=3 to m=16-20; t=4
to m=21-26; t=5 to m=27-35; and t=6 to m=36-60. Observations having m>60 were coded as
censored. The model also controls for age at marriage, age diﬀerence between spouses, woman's
and partner's education, caste, religion, wealth quintile, co-residence with in-laws, and rural
residence. Those results are shown in Table A3.12 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors for
cluster-correlated data (White / Huber / sandwich estimator) in parentheses. Asterisks denote
the signiﬁcance level (double sided): * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  The marginal eﬀects
under Progress: exit period refer to the progressivity index in the speciﬁc exit time period and
were calculated adding up the point estimate from the index on its own and the one from the
interaction of the index and the relevant time spell indicator.
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Path Diagram 3.1: Relationship between latent factor model and outcome 
model 
 
Figure 3.1: Progressivity index: Delhi versus whole of India 
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Figure 3.2: Predicted probabilities - Rural sample
†
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Figure 3.3: Predicted probabilities - Urban sample
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Figure 3.4: Predicted hazard for firstborn girls by level of progressivity
†
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In terms of months after marriage, m, the time spell indicators, t, are as follows. t=1 refers to 
m=9-11; t=2 to m=12-15; t=3 to m=16-20; t=4 to m=21-26; t=5 to m=27-35; and t=6 to m=36-60. 
Observations having m>60 were coded as censored. 
Figure 3.5: Predicted hazard for firstborn boys by level of progressivity
†
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†
In terms of months after marriage, m, the time spell indicators, t, are as follows. t=1 refers to 
m=9-11; t=2 to m=12-15; t=3 to m=16-20; t=4 to m=21-26; t=5 to m=27-35; and t=6 to m=36-60. 
Observations having m>60 were coded as censored. 
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Figure 3.6: Predicted hazard for firstborns at one-standard deviation lower 
than the average progressivity level
†
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In terms of months after marriage, m, the time spell indicators, t, are as follows. t=1 refers to 
m=9-11; t=2 to m=12-15; t=3 to m=16-20; t=4 to m=21-26; t=5 to m=27-35; and t=6 to m=36-60. 
Observations having m>60 were coded as censored. 
Figure 3.7: Predicted hazard for firstborns at the average progressivity level
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In terms of months after marriage, m, the time spell indicators, t, are as follows. t=1 refers to 
m=9-11; t=2 to m=12-15; t=3 to m=16-20; t=4 to m=21-26; t=5 to m=27-35; and t=6 to m=36-60. 
Observations having m>60 were coded as censored. 
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Figure 3.8: Predicted hazard for firstborns at one-standard deviation higher 
than the average progressivity level
†
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In terms of months after marriage, m, the time spell indicators, t, are as follows. t=1 refers to 
m=9-11; t=2 to m=12-15; t=3 to m=16-20; t=4 to m=21-26; t=5 to m=27-35; and t=6 to m=36-60. 
Observations having m>60 were coded as censored. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix
A Questions used for the construction of the pro-
gressivity index.
1. Who usually makes the following decisions: mainly you, mainly your husband,
you and your husband jointly, or someone else?
a. Decisions about healthcare for yourself?
2. Are you usually allowed (by your husband) to go to the following places
alone, only with someone else, or not at all?
a. To the health facility?
3. Sometimes a husband is annoyed or angered by things that his wife does. In
your opinion, is a husband justiﬁed in hitting or beating his wife in the following
situations: [Response options: Yes / No / Do not know]
a. If she goes out without telling him?
b. If she neglects the house or the children?
c. If she argues with him?
d. If she refuses to have sex with him?
e. If she does not cook food properly?
f. If he suspects her of being unfaithful?
g. If she shows disrespect for in-laws?
4. Please tell me if you think a wife is justiﬁed in refusing to have sex with
her husband when:
a. She knows her husband has a sexually transmitted disease.
b. She knows her husband has sex with other women.
c. She is tired or not in the mood.
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B Tables & Figures
Table A2.1: Chapter 2: Deﬁnition of Variables
Variable name Deﬁnitions
Dependent variables
birthwe Birthweight in grams (babies born between 1997-2003)
treatint Number of months between program enrolment and
date of birth for beneﬁciary births
Program indicator variables
beneﬁciary 1 if birth occurred 2+ months after household enrolled
in Oportunidades and before it withdrew from it
hh2 1 if household has 2+ members who gave birth (97-2003)
add_mem_benef beneﬁciary*hh2
Maternal and infant characteristics
Birth order
ﬁrstbir 1 if the baby is the ﬁrst birth to her mother
second 1 if the baby is the second birth
third 1 if the baby is the third birth
Sex - female 1 if the baby is female
daysafwe Number of days after birth when the baby was weighed
Maternal age
young Aged less than 20 years
old Aged more than 34 years
smoked 1 if the mother smoked during pregnancy
Prenatal care quality index
qualindex 0-1: Either a physician or a nurse undertook the check-
up; the mother was weighed; her uterus was measured
Household characteristics before the program's inception
indig 1 if the household head speaks an indigenous language
Household head's education
edu6head 1 if 1-6 years of education
edplushead 1 if 6+ years of education
agehead Household head's age
famsize Household size
propage5 Proportion of household members aged 0-5 years old
prage6_17 Proportion of household members aged 6-17 years old
Asset index
econindex 0-1: The dwelling has water and electricity; a fridge
and a gas stove; its ﬂoor is covered; the household
owns agricultural land
Locality Characteristics
altitude Locality's altitude in meters
Sources: Fertility survey (maternal and infant variables), ENCASEH (household variables), 2005
short census (altitude), Transfers Database and socioeconomic ENCEL 2003 (beneﬁciary).
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Table A2.2: Chapter 2: Estimation results for sample [2] in Table 2.4
Quantiles: 20% 50% 80% OLS
beneﬁciary 144.3** 137.4*** 201.0*** 153.3***
(73.44) (51.41) (72.16) (48.27)
ﬁrstbir 1.621 -135.5 -191.1 -153.0
(152.5) (122.7) (118.3) (103.2)
second -108.7 -113.0 2.495 -104.0
(109.5) (117.8) (129.9) (85.42)
third -101.2 -46.56 85.43 -41.82
(91.36) (75.86) (108.6) (73.38)
female -146.3** -191.6*** -187.4*** -166.5***
(65.73) (50.16) (67.34) (44.78)
daysafwe 5.631 5.552** 5.741 6.101**
(3.824) (2.278) (3.851) (2.649)
young -104.7 -198.4* -353.4*** -244.8**
(202.8) (106.8) (132.3) (113.2)
old -4.890 17.01 -9.548 49.47
(88.90) (65.83) (94.02) (58.47)
smoked -484.4* 67.06 78.47 -11.56
(278.8) (163.8) (191.6) (144.6)
qualindex 283.5* 186.9 32.80 98.02
(150.7) (128.4) (220.6) (124.9)
indig -142.4 -149.0** -112.8 -150.5**
(92.39) (71.29) (85.00) (61.63)
edu6head -187.2** -27.41 -50.74 -109.5*
(91.08) (62.38) (88.19) (59.48)
edplushead -26.75 63.03 112.2 2.841
(82.07) (72.30) (111.6) (67.55)
agehead 2.277 3.974 3.559 3.793
(4.211) (3.395) (3.727) (2.587)
famsize -9.283 -11.37 -38.12** -24.01*
(22.88) (14.77) (17.60) (12.47)
propage5 107.4 87.57 158.8 119.1
(358.4) (327.6) (393.1) (289.2)
prage6_17 144.6 425.4 692.6** 336.3
(315.4) (286.4) (344.1) (241.3)
econindex -79.39 -185.6 -259.9 -135.8
(160.2) (137.5) (160.6) (108.4)
altitude -0.0119 -0.0654 -0.0311 -0.0283
(0.0456) (0.0408) (0.0438) (0.0346)
Constant 2620*** 3031*** 3582*** 3190***
(284.2) (262.1) (394.1) (249.6)
N=760; R2 (OLS): 0.088. (Std. errors (robust for OLS, bootstrapped (1000
reps.) for quantile regs.)) Signiﬁcance level: *: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%
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Table A2.3: Chapter 2: Estimation results for sample [3] in Table 2.4
Quantiles: 20% 50% 80% OLS
beneﬁciary 141.0** 136.2** 201.1*** 155.6***
(70.19) (54.23) (71.68) (48.00)
ﬁrstbir -0.350 -145.5 -204.9* -153.8
(161.3) (127.6) (118.3) (103.2)
second -111.5 -95.24 0.196 -103.5
(108.9) (116.1) (123.4) (85.45)
third -103.5 -49.12 77.03 -43.56
(99.29) (78.09) (106.6) (73.37)
female -149.3** -188.9*** -192.5*** -165.4***
(64.47) (49.86) (71.92) (44.76)
daysafwe 5.590 5.440** 5.689 6.064**
(3.860) (2.277) (3.932) (2.647)
young -94.03 -194.5* -345.8*** -245.7**
(206.7) (112.1) (130.6) (113.3)
old -1.064 13.28 -11.29 49.79
(87.50) (69.72) (96.39) (58.42)
smoked -477.1* 101.7 79.97 -13.25
(286.0) (161.0) (167.9) (144.6)
qualindex 285.2* 182.7 34.44 99.91
(159.8) (124.2) (215.6) (124.8)
indig -147.6 -155.2** -116.3 -152.7**
(95.49) (69.37) (82.18) (61.82)
edu6head -193.1** -27.33 -53.53 -109.7*
(92.26) (67.26) (88.47) (59.52)
edplushead -27.86 72.94 111.2 2.741
(84.47) (78.75) (113.1) (67.62)
agehead 2.031 4.116 3.546 3.786
(4.265) (3.299) (3.657) (2.588)
famsize -7.573 -12.73 -37.54** -24.32*
(22.92) (14.32) (18.19) (12.47)
propage5 103.8 78.80 145.3 119.7
(361.2) (324.6) (386.6) (289.3)
prage6_17 132.3 446.5 668.6* 339.4
(311.2) (284.5) (353.4) (241.6)
econindex -59.96 -180.5 -262.7* -137.1
(175.8) (142.3) (159.0) (108.5)
altitude -0.0138 -0.0636 -0.0307 -0.0293
(0.0462) (0.0412) (0.0435) (0.0347)
Constant 2627*** 3031*** 3597*** 3191***
(301.9) (262.3) (385.7) (249.6)
N=760; R2 (OLS): 0.089. (Std. errors (robust for OLS, bootstrapped (1000
reps.) for quantile regs.)) Signiﬁcance level: *: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%
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Table A2.4: Chapter 2: Estimation results for sample [4] in Table 2.4
Quantiles: 20% 50% 80% OLS
beneﬁciary 79.49 114.1** 151.3* 109.0**
(76.80) (51.71) (83.21) (51.16)
ﬁrstbir 37.66 -153.8 -177.4 -150.1
(158.3) (118.7) (129.7) (102.5)
second -32.96 -133.4 -40.18 -91.41
(112.8) (112.4) (131.0) (85.55)
third -83.42 -50.18 72.90 -29.73
(94.80) (72.93) (108.7) (74.07)
female -152.4** -181.8*** -187.6*** -159.2***
(67.65) (49.74) (70.08) (45.13)
daysafwe 5.891 5.324** 6.437* 6.197**
(3.808) (2.254) (3.861) (2.667)
young -93.21 -186.8* -320.7** -246.7**
(201.9) (106.2) (135.7) (110.5)
old 37.86 16.83 2.522 57.99
(91.51) (67.11) (94.83) (58.78)
smoked -555.8* 22.19 70.77 -13.19
(297.3) (156.8) (181.7) (144.9)
qualindex 274.6* 220.4* 11.13 112.8
(159.3) (132.6) (230.1) (124.8)
indig -178.1* -159.1** -94.55 -159.7**
(99.70) (67.72) (76.79) (62.42)
edu6head -127.7 -16.33 -38.62 -96.67
(90.63) (62.56) (85.63) (60.15)
edplushead 55.25 88.34 120.8 11.13
(85.12) (70.54) (113.0) (67.79)
agehead 4.043 4.257 2.862 3.399
(4.310) (3.299) (3.623) (2.537)
famsize -13.18 -16.81 -39.12** -27.32**
(24.74) (14.62) (17.99) (12.88)
propage5 342.1 79.14 105.4 151.0
(352.3) (314.1) (385.9) (287.8)
prage6_17 273.1 467.3* 584.4* 397.7
(327.1) (273.5) (345.5) (246.2)
econindex -40.32 -180.6 -255.4* -152.4
(169.6) (140.0) (151.4) (107.8)
altitude -0.00692 -0.0664 -0.00661 -0.0343
(0.0462) (0.0417) (0.0418) (0.0350)
Constant 2438*** 3016*** 3658*** 3207***
(300.7) (251.1) (410.3) (248.7)
N=767; R2 (OLS): 0.083. (Std. errors (robust for OLS, bootstrapped (1000
reps.) for quantile regs.)) Signiﬁcance level: *: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%
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Table A2.5: Chapter 2: Estimation results for sample [5] in Table 2.4
Quantiles: 20% 50% 80% OLS
beneﬁciary 102.6 163.7*** 184.0** 161.9***
(73.26) (50.00) (81.07) (50.41)
hh2_benef -252.4 -293.9 -617.9* -432.8*
(420.1) (275.4) (315.2) (231.9)
hh2 145.0 186.4 451.1 243.2
(392.5) (255.7) (306.5) (214.7)
ﬁrstbir -117.8 -114.9 -144.4 -176.8*
(165.2) (106.5) (107.3) (94.21)
second -80.18 -99.36 -42.56 -98.34
(105.0) (105.9) (123.9) (82.74)
third -61.85 -30.01 99.83 -20.11
(94.28) (76.77) (111.4) (71.67)
female -173.1*** -173.2*** -188.5*** -170.7***
(62.87) (50.39) (64.08) (43.75)
daysafwe 5.104 6.277*** 6.978* 5.949**
(3.329) (2.415) (3.759) (2.545)
young -58.91 -191.7* -414.8*** -239.1**
(185.9) (99.87) (107.0) (99.02)
old -73.37 -31.43 -30.26 -0.0535
(87.87) (66.96) (88.84) (58.17)
smoked -556.4** 140.1 34.31 -46.35
(277.5) (168.3) (148.3) (143.3)
qualindex 301.9* 66.60 31.70 51.56
(165.2) (147.1) (191.0) (126.5)
indig -154.3* -164.0** -106.2 -171.9***
(90.39) (65.96) (81.94) (62.00)
edu6head -140.8* -16.66 -42.88 -94.39
(84.38) (61.47) (80.99) (59.88)
edplushead 21.69 64.67 89.83 9.395
(82.90) (72.98) (101.5) (68.07)
agehead 3.580 3.465 3.075 4.441*
(4.258) (3.188) (3.401) (2.549)
famsize 19.04 -2.562 -24.56* -14.58
(21.00) (13.17) (14.74) (11.81)
propage5 184.5 77.99 118.7 147.0
(345.5) (299.7) (371.9) (278.2)
prage6_17 76.10 428.0 627.6* 361.4
(305.5) (265.0) (322.0) (229.5)
econindex -179.4 -197.2 -267.9* -184.7
(164.5) (140.5) (161.2) (112.7)
altitude 0.00518 -0.0566 -0.0273 -0.0251
(0.0449) (0.0401) (0.0427) (0.0345)
Constant 2406*** 3076*** 3564*** 3154***
(306.2) (258.0) (368.3) (246.0)
N=805; R2 (OLS): 0.092. (Std. errors (robust for OLS, bootstrapped (1000 reps.) for
quantile regressions)). Signiﬁcance level:*: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%
Table A2.6: Chapter 2: Estimation results for sample [2] in Table 2.5
Quantiles: 20% 50% 80% OLS
treatint 2.481* 1.726 3.667** 2.589**
(1.386) (1.298) (1.549) (1.023)
ﬁrstbir 35.13 -213.0 -263.4** -187.9*
(159.6) (130.8) (131.7) (103.7)
second -155.9 -147.9 -71.88 -120.5
(112.4) (113.2) (125.9) (87.79)
third -81.87 -68.11 58.85 -39.85
(93.78) (81.37) (105.4) (75.64)
female -185.2*** -187.6*** -178.4** -170.6***
(65.09) (53.34) (69.47) (45.58)
daysafwe 5.389 7.013*** 4.850 6.003**
(3.916) (2.715) (3.657) (2.695)
young -120.9 -132.1 -357.2** -243.2**
(215.0) (114.7) (148.0) (115.8)
old -21.70 23.07 1.104 42.46
(86.59) (75.02) (93.33) (60.11)
smoked -464.7* 74.33 -15.18 -12.88
(281.3) (174.4) (188.7) (149.4)
qualindex 335.7** 106.1 52.66 90.52
(167.7) (159.4) (213.9) (133.5)
indig -156.5 -114.0 -125.7 -143.9**
(95.63) (70.88) (78.53) (62.17)
edu6head -189.3** -1.536 -70.21 -107.9*
(88.62) (72.58) (92.84) (60.82)
edplushead -15.77 76.40 60.27 0.814
(81.38) (86.55) (112.7) (69.13)
agehead 4.353 1.420 3.652 3.931
(4.471) (3.651) (3.852) (2.726)
famsize -2.997 3.891 -25.39 -23.97*
(22.37) (14.87) (17.74) (12.90)
propage5 191.0 -200.6 -75.32 86.44
(341.1) (331.0) (401.0) (298.6)
prage6_17 115.6 175.4 413.8 313.2
(304.4) (293.0) (353.0) (250.9)
econindex -63.85 -206.6 -206.7 -124.7
(166.3) (152.2) (162.4) (112.0)
altitude 0.0135 -0.0436 -0.0341 -0.0253
(0.0430) (0.0425) (0.0453) (0.0355)
Constant 2466*** 3269*** 3728*** 3257***
(300.7) (299.3) (392.3) (264.8)
N=744; Treatint coeﬀ.=birthweight gain per month for babies born in benef.
families. (Std. errors (robust for OLS, bootstrapped (1000 reps.) for quantile
regs.)) Sig.level:*:10%,**:5%,***:1% 208
Table A2.7: Chapter 2: Estimation results for sample [3] in Table 2.5
Quantiles: 20% 50% 80% OLS
beneﬁciary 109.8 120.2** 184.3** 120.4**
(71.38) (47.92) (71.97) (46.85)
ﬁrstbir -8.673 -126.7 -126.6 -158.2
(149.0) (115.2) (120.6) (99.94)
second -79.03 -124.8 5.239 -112.8
(105.7) (114.3) (127.1) (81.78)
third -121.6 -59.38 -15.97 -69.32
(96.52) (70.67) (100.8) (69.14)
female -170.3*** -148.1*** -112.9* -144.9***
(64.05) (50.00) (66.89) (43.75)
daysafwe 6.644* 5.229** 4.183 5.738**
(3.577) (2.306) (3.732) (2.566)
young -55.44 -131.7 -308.6** -192.3*
(211.4) (114.6) (151.9) (114.3)
old 9.003 25.01 26.26 62.00
(88.59) (69.33) (95.62) (57.58)
smoked -543.4* 95.56 124.4 -6.182
(289.7) (164.1) (164.9) (144.5)
qualindex 275.1 237.0** -113.4 65.59
(168.4) (119.4) (252.5) (128.4)
indigo -91.41 -185.6*** -128.1* -143.1**
(88.97) (61.85) (75.98) (57.93)
edu6head -148.9* -45.57 -56.08 -107.5*
(90.17) (64.58) (86.07) (59.17)
edplushead 17.94 46.39 110.1 12.36
(84.56) (78.39) (104.0) (67.09)
agehead 1.314 1.825 0.470 2.397
(4.242) (3.298) (3.695) (2.542)
famsize -0.289 -10.14 -42.36** -20.96*
(22.53) (12.95) (16.41) (12.00)
propage5 71.71 -53.22 7.125 -22.82
(337.5) (244.2) (383.8) (252.1)
prage6_17 22.88 387.6* 605.9* 220.7
(293.2) (229.5) (322.0) (211.5)
econindex -35.16 -83.03 -97.09 -98.62
(164.8) (134.1) (153.5) (106.8)
altitude 0.00441 -0.0773* -0.0214 -0.0249
(0.0452) (0.0422) (0.0414) (0.0331)
Constant 2610*** 3096*** 3847*** 3326***
(297.8) (224.4) (402.0) (229.1)
Results obtained using the post-matching sample (N=785); (Std. errors (ro-
bust for OLS, bootstrapped (1000 reps.) for quantile regs.)) Sig.level: *:10%,
**:5%,***:1% 209
Table A2.8: Chapter 2: Estimation results for model [4] in Table 2.5
Quantiles: 20% 50% 80% OLS
beneﬁciary 135.2** 155.0** 206.5*** 157.2***
(66.5) (63.2) (68.3) (50.61)
ﬁrstbir -8.6 -142.3 -204.2* -157.4
(145.1) (125.8) (121.8) (103.8)
second -125.9 -142.0 0.552 -114
(106.7) (108.9) (120.8) (87.25)
third -81.7 -56.4 77.70 -44.33
(93.6) (87.4) (104.9) (74.87)
female -182.4*** -191.3*** -190.9*** -168.3***
(59.5) (55.1) (60.5) (45.40)
daysafwe 5.886* 5.358* 5.787* 6.114**
(3.484) (2.896) (2.969) (2.674)
young -88.7 -198.6 -355.2*** -250.1**
(163.0) (131.3) (135.7) (115.6)
old -34.6 11.1 -16.00 44.31
(80.2) (74.8) (81.8) (59.93)
smoked -458.7** 69.4 77.59 -9.786
(261.6) (164.5) (159.2) (149.5)
qualindex 308.3* 124.9 36.96 80.98
(158.2) (165.4) (179.7) (133.5)
indig -123.7 -149.7** -113.3 -144.2**
(81.4) (75.5) (77.8) (62.19)
edu6head -179.1** -48.5 -51.44 -110.0*
(76.8) (74.6) (78.8) (60.53)
edplushead -12.9 61.5 110.3 1.338
(79.0) (86.4) (97.5) (68.65)
agehead 2.898 3.438 3.47 3.551
(4.032) (3.548) (3.614) (2.668)
famsize -6.507 -13.731 -36.90** -23.29*
(20.38) (16.75) (18.15) (12.84)
propage5 209.4 22.3 156.3 109.1
(345.3) (331.2) (375.0) (293.9)
prage6_17 186.5 402.1 688.8** 326.3
(311.0) (301.2) (339.7) (247.6)
econindex -58.6 -132.3 -263.6* -125.3
(155.8) (149.4) (148.3) (112.4)
altitude 0.001 -0.058 -0.030 -0.0248
(0.046) (0.043) (0.044) (0.0354)
Constant 2510*** 3129*** 3581*** 3207***
(315.9) (302.3) (337.9) (258.3)
N=744. Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance
level (double sided): * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A2.9: Chapter 2: Estimation results for model [5] in Table 2.5
Quantiles: 20% 50% 80%
beneﬁciary 141.5* 141.6** 174.4**
(74.26) (67.38) (75.80)
ﬁrstbir -136.2 -95.68 -220.8
(174.0) (130.4) (135.4)
second -81.92 -92.06 -32.01
(119.9) (103.9) (121.7)
third -0.704 -15.02 7.989
(89.51) (87.72) (99.37)
female -198.1*** -195.6*** -180.3***
(64.80) (60.55) (65.75)
daysafwe 4.185 6.979** 8.918**
(2.677) (2.877) (4.423)
young -55.48 -378.7*** -225.4*
(197.2) (142.0) (119.8)
old -47.31 16.36 60.64
(79.35) (74.89) (83.69)
smoked -275.5 49.93 183.9
(175.5) (137.2) (185.9)
qualindex 231.5 182.9 20.73
(164.2) (143.4) (164.6)
indig -87.00 -145.7** -109.0
(76.82) (70.27) (73.51)
edu6head -151.1** -54.01 -111.8
(74.61) (80.91) (95.21)
edplushead 6.536 2.928 52.39
(81.86) (88.76) (107.7)
agehead 4.725 1.631 0.991
(3.533) (3.673) (3.984)
famsize -2.256 -8.344 -30.36
(18.49) (19.90) (19.25)
propage5 626.6* 6.502 -91.75
(363.6) (297.1) (347.6)
prage6_17 330.0 396.2 432.1
(321.4) (272.8) (303.4)
econindex -89.59 -139.2 -171.1
(155.0) (145.9) (161.0)
altitude -0.00662 -0.0122 -0.0180
(0.0425) (0.0427) (0.0453)
Constant 2365*** 3090*** 3827***
(316.5) (256.4) (342.7)
Sample size=744. Bootstrapped standard errors (800 repetitions) in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance level (double sided): * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A3.1: Chapter 3: Estimation results for sample [2] in Table 3.7
Coeﬃcient Estimates Marginal Eﬀects
Variable Boys Girls Boys Girls
Progress 1.359*** 1.420*** 0.035 0.059**
(0.220) (0.221) (0.030) (0.030)
Age at marriage -0.168*** -0.169*** -0.006 -0.006
(0.033) (0.033) (0.004) (0.004)
Age diﬀerence -0.013 -0.004 -0.002 0.002
(0.032) (0.032) (0.004) (0.004)
Highest Education [None / incomplete primary]
Woman: Completed primary -0.342 -0.383 -0.003 -0.021
(0.297) (0.300) (0.035) (0.035)
Woman: Completed secondary -1.241*** -1.165*** -0.060 -0.021
(0.423) (0.426) (0.053) (0.053)
Husband: Completed primary 0.212 0.016 0.049 -0.041
(0.298) (0.300) (0.035) (0.035)
Husband: Completed secondary 0.318 0.045 0.070 -0.057
(0.383) (0.385) (0.046) (0.046)
Caste [None]
Scheduled caste / tribe 0.613** 0.623** 0.019 0.022
(0.280) (0.283) (0.033) (0.032)
Other backward caste 0.195 0.151 0.016 -0.005
(0.279) (0.282) (0.036) (0.036)
No sikh / hindu 0.050 0.016 0.009 -0.007
(0.312) (0.315) (0.039) (0.039)
Wealth quintile [Richest]
Less than richer 0.423 0.290 0.044 -0.019
(0.374) (0.378) (0.045) (0.045)
Richer 0.366 0.282 0.031 -0.009
(0.309) (0.311) (0.037) (0.037)
Nuclear family 0.329* 0.439** -0.012 0.038
(0.199) (0.200) (0.024) (0.024)
Rural household -0.548 -0.345 -0.063 0.032
(0.368) (0.371) (0.059) (0.059)
Rural*Progress -0.586 -0.513 -0.036 -0.001
(0.421) (0.421) (0.058) (0.057)
Constant 4.621*** 4.605***
(0.731) (0.736)
Log-Likelihood -1679.0818
N 1912
This includes only women who are either censored or whose ﬁrstborn is still alive and the
baseline progressivity index (see Section 3.3.2). Base category in square brackets. Standard
errors in parentheses (bootstrapped (1000 reps.) for progress). *: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%.
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Table A3.2: Chapter 3: Estimation results for model [3] in Table 3.7
Coeﬃcient Estimates Marginal Eﬀects
Variable Boys Girls Boys Girls
Progress 1.453*** 1.495*** 0.040 0.054**
(0.210) (0.208) (0.027) (0.027)
Age at marriage -0.176*** -0.178*** -0.006 -0.006
(0.033) (0.033) (0.004) (0.004)
Age diﬀerence -0.017 -0.005 -0.003 0.002
(0.032) (0.032) (0.004) (0.004)
Highest Education [None / incomplete primary]
Woman: Completed primary -0.473 -0.503* -0.009 -0.022
(0.299) (0.302) (0.034) (0.034)
Woman: Completed secondary -1.551*** -1.408*** -0.083 -0.011
(0.434) (0.436) (0.053) (0.052)
Husband: Completed primary 0.197 -0.021 0.054 -0.048
(0.297) (0.299) (0.034) (0.033)
Husband: Completed secondary 0.264 -0.048 0.077* -0.069
(0.383) (0.386) (0.044) (0.044)
Caste [None]
Scheduled caste / tribe 0.717** 0.740*** 0.019 0.027
(0.281) (0.284) (0.032) (0.031)
Other backward caste 0.278 0.211 0.024 -0.008
(0.279) (0.283) (0.035) (0.035)
No sikh / hindu 0.057 0.088 -0.005 0.009
(0.311) (0.313) (0.038) (0.038)
Wealth quintile [Richest]
Less than richer 0.197 -0.060 0.062 -0.057
(0.358) (0.363) (0.041) (0.041)
Richer 0.212 0.103 0.031 -0.021
(0.300) (0.302) (0.035) (0.034)
Nuclear family 0.443** 0.551*** -0.008 0.040*
(0.196) (0.197) (0.023) (0.023)
Rural household -0.613 -0.337 -0.080 0.050
(0.376) (0.375) (0.060) (0.059)
Rural*Progress -0.564 -0.598 -0.012 -0.025
(0.423) (0.423) (0.057) (0.056)
Constant 4.982*** 4.964***
(0.735) (0.740)
Log-Likelihood -1761.7118
N 2032
This speciﬁcation uses the baseline sample and a progressivity index estimated using only hard
covariates (see Section 3.4.3). Base category in square brackets. Standard errors in parentheses
(bootstrapped (1000 reps.) for progress). *: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%.
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Table A3.3: Chapter 3: Estimation results for model [4] in Table 3.7
Coeﬃcient Estimates Marginal Eﬀects
Variable Boys Girls Boys Girls
Progress 0.958*** 1.124*** 0.005 0.076**
(0.256) (0.255) (0.034) (0.034)
Age at marriage -0.113*** -0.155*** 0.004 -0.015***
(0.034) (0.035) (0.005) (0.005)
Age diﬀerence -0.013 -0.007 -0.002 0.001
(0.033) (0.033) (0.004) (0.004)
Highest Education [None / incomplete primary]
Woman: Completed primary -0.185 -0.367 0.030 -0.051
(0.320) (0.325) (0.042) (0.042)
Woman: Completed secondary -0.863* -0.870* -0.034 -0.034
(0.457) (0.462) (0.062) (0.061)
Husband: Completed primary 0.302 0.081 0.059 -0.043
(0.307) (0.311) (0.040) (0.040)
Husband: Completed secondary 0.350 0.076 0.072 -0.054
(0.392) (0.396) (0.052) (0.051)
Caste [None]
Scheduled caste / tribe 0.504* 0.527* 0.016 0.024
(0.284) (0.288) (0.036) (0.036)
Other backward caste 0.177 0.152 0.013 0.000
(0.288) (0.293) (0.040) (0.040)
No sikh / hindu 0.200 0.312 -0.015 0.035
(0.334) (0.337) (0.042) (0.042)
Wealth quintile [Richest]
Less than richer 0.554 0.077 0.122** -0.096*
(0.391) (0.398) (0.051) (0.051)
Richer 0.358 0.157 0.057 -0.036
(0.321) (0.325) (0.042) (0.042)
Nuclear family 0.361* 0.417** 0.003 0.027
(0.207) (0.210) (0.028) (0.028)
Rural household -0.630* -0.375 -0.079 0.039
(0.379) (0.383) (0.063) (0.063)
Rural*Progress -0.184 -0.168 -0.011 -0.003
(0.460) (0.461) (0.067) (0.066)
Constant 3.340*** 4.246***
(0.780) (0.789)
Log-Likelihood -1394.4039
N 1543
This speciﬁcation uses only women who married in or after 1995 (post-ultrasound), and the
baseline progressivity index (see Section 3.3.2). Base category in square brackets. Standard
errors in parentheses (bootstrapped (1000 reps.) for progress). *: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%.
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Table A3.4: Chapter 3: Estimation results for model [5] in Table 3.7
Coeﬃcient Estimates Marginal Eﬀects
Variable Boys Girls Boys Girls
Progress 0.630** 0.803*** 0.010 0.077*
(0.296) (0.296) (0.049) (0.047)
Age at marriage -0.086** -0.116*** 0.000 -0.012*
(0.040) (0.041) (0.007) (0.007)
Age diﬀerence 0.016 0.008 0.002 -0.001
(0.039) (0.040) (0.006) (0.006)
Highest Education [None / incomplete primary]
Woman: Completed primary 0.088 -0.420 0.099* -0.116**
(0.361) (0.373) (0.058) (0.057)
Woman: Completed secondary -0.385 -0.401 -0.022 -0.025
(0.524) (0.532) (0.087) (0.085)
Husband: Completed primary 0.312 0.121 0.055 -0.028
(0.349) (0.358) (0.055) (0.054)
Husband: Completed secondary 0.270 -0.060 0.078 -0.064
(0.442) (0.450) (0.072) (0.070)
Caste [None]
Scheduled caste / tribe 0.653** 0.652** 0.043 0.036
(0.320) (0.329) (0.049) (0.048)
Other backward caste 0.025 0.105 -0.013 0.021
(0.311) (0.318) (0.053) (0.052)
No sikh / hindu 0.163 0.312 -0.017 0.045
(0.367) (0.372) (0.058) (0.057)
Wealth quintile [Richest]
Less than richer 0.814* 0.155 0.174 -0.112**
(0.443) (0.460) (0.071) (0.071)
Richer 0.444 0.180 0.077 -0.038
(0.358) (0.369) (0.058) (0.058)
Nuclear family 0.118 0.108 0.010 0.004
(0.233) (0.238) (0.038) (0.037)
Rural household -0.784* -0.382 -0.125 0.052
(0.429) (0.425) (0.080) (0.077)
Rural*Progress -0.007 -0.013 0.001 -0.002
(0.566) (0.562) (0.097) (0.093)
Constant 2.164** 3.071***
(0.942) (0.958)
Log-Likelihood -819.15234
N 841
This includes only women who married in or after 1994 (ultrasound widely available), and the
baseline progressivity index (see Section 3.3.2). Base category in square brackets. Standard
errors in parentheses (bootstrapped (1000 reps.) for progress). *: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%.
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Table A3.5: Chapter 3: Progress on the ﬁrstborn's gender
Variable
Female 0.012
(0.021)
Age at marriage 0.024***
(0.004)
Age diﬀerence 0.003
(0.003)
Highest Education [None / incomplete primary]
Woman: Completed primary 0.354***
(0.030)
Woman: Completed secondary 0.988***
(0.040)
Husband: Completed primary -0.058*
(0.031)
Husband: Completed secondary 0.111***
(0.041)
Caste [None]
Scheduled caste / tribe -0.234***
(0.028)
Other backward caste -0.224***
(0.032)
No sikh / hindu -0.051
(0.035)
Wealth quintile [Richest]
Less than richer -0.545***
(0.037)
Richer -0.361***
(0.032)
Nuclear family 0.207***
(0.021)
Rural household 0.621***
(0.041)
Constant -0.357***
(0.076)
Adj. R2 0.709
N 1893
The sample includes only women who already had a ﬁrst child. Standard errors in parentheses.
Asterisks denote the signiﬁcance level (double sided): * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A3.6: Chapter 3: Firstborn's biological sex in Delhi using a simple index
Coeﬃcient Estimates Marginal Eﬀects
Variable Boys Girls Boys Girls
Average progressivity 1.181*** 1.376*** -0.002 0.083*
(0.373) (0.377) (0.045) (0.045)
Age at marriage -0.131*** -0.132*** -0.004 -0.004
(0.031) (0.031) (0.004) (0.004)
Age diﬀerence -0.015 -0.004 -0.003 0.002
(0.031) (0.031) (0.004) (0.004)
Highest Education [None / incomplete primary]
Woman: Completed primary 0.024 -0.002 0.006 -0.006
(0.283) (0.286) (0.033) (0.032)
Woman: Completed secondary -0.205 -0.043 -0.042 0.034
(0.369) (0.372) (0.044) (0.044)
Husband: Completed primary 0.166 -0.050 0.052 -0.048
(0.293) (0.295) (0.033) (0.033)
Husband: Completed secondary 0.426 0.109 0.083* -0.065
(0.376) (0.378) (0.044) (0.044)
Caste [None]
Scheduled caste / tribe 0.292 0.305 0.007 0.012
(0.269) (0.271) (0.030) (0.030)
Other backward caste -0.050 -0.124 0.014 -0.020
(0.271) (0.274) (0.034) (0.034)
No sikh / hindu -0.124 -0.102 -0.009 0.002
(0.303) (0.305) (0.038) (0.038)
Wealth quintile [Richest]
Less than richer -0.099 -0.353 0.052 -0.066
(0.352) (0.356) (0.041) (0.041)
Richer -0.050 -0.159 0.022 -0.028
(0.293) (0.296) (0.034) (0.034)
Nuclear family 0.601*** 0.706*** -0.003 0.044*
(0.190) (0.192) (0.023) (0.023)
Rural household -0.563* -0.283 -0.079* 0.052
(0.331) (0.330) (0.044) (0.043)
Constant 3.434*** 3.301***
(0.698) (0.704)
Log-Likelihood -1782.6642
N 2032
This speciﬁcation uses the baseline sample and an index which is the arithmetic mean of the
four progressivity indicators. Base category in square brackets. Standard errors in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance level (double sided): * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A3.7: Chapter 3: Firstborn's sex in Delhi using progressivity indicators
Coeﬃcient Estimates Marginal Eﬀects
Variable Boys Girls Boys Girls
ω1 : Decides on her own healthcare 0.384* 0.535** -0.020 0.049**
(0.212) (0.213) (0.024) (0.023)
ω2 : Allowed alone to the health clinic 0.910*** 0.872*** 0.039 0.018
(0.203) (0.205) (0.027) (0.027)
ω3 : Wife beating is not justiﬁed -0.060 -0.090 0.005 -0.009
(0.211) (0.213) (0.025) (0.025)
ω4 : Refusing sex to husband is justiﬁed -0.139 -0.027 -0.029 0.024
(0.239) (0.242) (0.028) (0.028)
Age at marriage -0.131*** -0.132*** -0.004 -0.004
(0.031) (0.032) (0.004) (0.004)
Age diﬀerence -0.014 -0.002 -0.003 0.002
(0.031) (0.031) (0.004) (0.004)
Highest Education [None / incomplete primary]
Woman: Completed primary -0.011 -0.030 0.004 -0.005
(0.283) (0.286) (0.033) (0.032)
Woman: Completed secondary -0.228 -0.043 -0.048 0.039
(0.371) (0.374) (0.044) (0.044)
Husband: Completed primary 0.237 0.016 0.056 -0.047
(0.292) (0.294) (0.034) (0.033)
Husband: Completed secondary 0.509 0.186 0.087* -0.064
(0.375) (0.377) (0.044) (0.044)
Caste [None]
Scheduled caste / tribe 0.242 0.250 0.006 0.009
(0.269) (0.271) (0.031) (0.030)
Other backward caste -0.131 -0.208 0.012 -0.023
(0.273) (0.276) (0.034) (0.034)
No sikh / hindu -0.070 -0.051 -0.006 0.003
(0.304) (0.307) (0.038) (0.038)
Wealth quintile [Richest]
Less than richer -0.079 -0.336 0.053 -0.066
(0.352) (0.357) (0.041) (0.041)
Richer -0.075 -0.185 0.021 -0.029
(0.295) (0.297) (0.034) (0.034)
Nuclear family 0.499** 0.613*** -0.008 0.043*
(0.194) (0.196) (0.023) (0.023)
Rural household -0.615* -0.336 -0.081* 0.050
(0.334) (0.333) (0.044) (0.043)
Constant 3.596*** 3.467***
(0.711) (0.717)
Log-Likelihood -1774.0568
This uses the baseline sample (N=2032). Std. errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A3.8: Chapter 3: Estimation results for the ﬁrstborn's gender in Kerala
Coeﬃcient Estimates Marginal Eﬀects
Variable Boys Girls Boys Girls
Progress 0.995*** 1.021*** 0.027 0.040
(0.278) (0.277) (0.034) (0.034)
Age at marriage -0.159*** -0.158*** -0.006 -0.005
(0.026) (0.026) (0.003) (0.003)
Age diﬀerence -0.113*** -0.112*** -0.004 -0.003
(0.025) (0.025) (0.003) (0.003)
Highest Education [None / incomplete primary]
Woman: Completed primary -0.187 -0.208 -0.002 -0.011
(0.365) (0.366) (0.039) (0.039)
Woman: Completed secondary -0.802* -0.932** 0.002 -0.059
(0.435) (0.435) (0.050) (0.050)
Husband: Completed primary -0.064 -0.015 -0.013 0.010
(0.283) (0.283) (0.032) (0.032)
Husband: Completed secondary -0.050 0.185 -0.052 0.057
(0.376) (0.376) (0.045) (0.045)
Caste [None]
Scheduled caste / tribe -0.351 -0.424 0.004 -0.030
(0.320) (0.322) (0.040) (0.040)
Other backward caste 0.189 0.081 0.029 -0.021
(0.203) (0.203) (0.024) (0.024)
No sikh / hindu -0.186 -0.086 -0.028 0.019
(0.204) (0.204) (0.024) (0.024)
Wealth quintile [Richest]
Less than richer -0.043 -0.233 0.039 -0.049
(0.356) (0.358) (0.038) (0.039)
Richer -0.541** -0.605*** -0.004 -0.034
(0.217) (0.217) (0.026) (0.026)
Nuclear family 1.084*** 1.119*** 0.028 0.045**
(0.229) (0.229) (0.023) (0.023)
Rural household -0.621* -0.801** 0.018 -0.066
(0.351) (0.350) (0.041) (0.040)
Rural*Progress -0.360 -0.313 -0.022 0.000
(0.296) (0.295) (0.036) (0.036)
Constant 7.024*** 7.122***
(0.867) (0.867)
Log-Likelihood -1828.8189
N 2120
This uses the baseline progressivity index extracted for Kerala from the all-India sample (see
Section 3.3.2). Standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance level: *: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%
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Table A3.9: Chapter 3: Estimation results for the ﬁrstborn's gender in Punjab
Coeﬃcient Estimates Marginal Eﬀects
Variable Boys Girls Boys Girls
Progress 1.360*** 1.345*** 0.039 0.027
(0.269) (0.272) (0.031) (0.031)
Age at marriage -0.114*** -0.111*** -0.003 -0.002
(0.033) (0.034) (0.004) (0.003)
Age diﬀerence -0.086*** -0.086*** -0.002 -0.002
(0.025) (0.026) (0.003) (0.003)
Highest Education [None / incomplete primary]
Woman: Completed primary -0.921*** -0.798*** -0.051* 0.010
(0.297) (0.299) (0.028) (0.028)
Woman: Completed secondary -2.303*** -2.354*** -0.048 -0.065
(0.413) (0.420) (0.048) (0.048)
Husband: Completed primary 0.067 -0.124 0.045 -0.046*
(0.276) (0.277) (0.027) (0.027)
Husband: Completed secondary 0.032 -0.018 0.012 -0.012
(0.424) (0.428) (0.046) (0.046)
Caste [None]
Scheduled caste / tribe -0.400* -0.355 -0.020 0.002
(0.232) (0.234) (0.026) (0.025)
Other backward caste 0.128 0.141 0.000 0.006
(0.388) (0.391) (0.038) (0.038)
No sikh / hindu 0.127 -0.292 0.097* -0.101*
(0.507) (0.521) (0.058) (0.058)
Wealth quintile [Richest]
Less than middle -0.485 -0.386 -0.035 0.013
(0.578) (0.579) (0.052 (0.051)
Middle -0.944** -0.620* -0.097** 0.058
(0.371) (0.371) (0.039) (0.039)
Richer -0.363 -0.392 -0.003 -0.015
(0.271) (0.274) (0.029) (0.028)
Nuclear family 0.535** 0.641*** -0.010 0.038*
(0.246) (0.247) (0.023 (0.023)
Rural household 0.023 -0.018 0.010 -0.010
(0.252) (0.254) (0.027) (0.026)
Rural*Progress -0.579* -0.503 -0.032 0.006
(0.312) (0.314) 0.034 0.034
Constant 6.145*** 5.954***
(0.777) (0.782)
Log-Likelihood -1890.8637
Baseline index extracted for Punjab (N=2285). (std. errors). * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A3.10: Chapter 3: Firstborn's sex - Delhi women with husband interviewed
Coeﬃcient Estimates Marginal Eﬀects
Variable Boys Girls Boys Girls
Progress 1.258*** 1.550*** -0.012 0.114**
(0.435) (0.437) (0.057) (0.055)
Age at marriage -0.139** -0.177*** 0.003 -0.014*
(0.060) (0.061) (0.008) (0.007)
Age diﬀerence 0.027 -0.024 0.012 -0.012
(0.061) (0.063) (0.008) (0.008)
Highest Education [None / incomplete primary]
Woman: Completed primary -0.166 -0.049 -0.031 0.023
(0.519) (0.530) (0.064) (0.064)
Woman: Completed secondary -1.258* -1.056 -0.092 0.007
(0.696) (0.710) (0.094) (0.094)
Husband: Completed primary -0.574 -0.876 0.041 -0.093
(0.577) (0.585) (0.065) (0.065)
Husband: Completed secondary -0.306 -0.894 0.112 -0.154*
(0.729) (0.739) (0.086) (0.085)
Caste [None]
Scheduled caste / tribe 0.133 0.498 -0.072 0.094
(0.473) (0.481) (0.059) (0.059)
Other backward caste -0.210 -0.006 -0.051 0.043
(0.518) (0.528) (0.071) (0.071)
No sikh / hindu -0.618 -0.263 -0.099 0.066
(0.588) (0.589) (0.080) (0.078)
Wealth quintile [Richest]
Less than richer 0.431 0.192 0.067 -0.044
(0.694) (0.708) (0.088) (0.088)
Richer 0.517 0.102 0.108 -0.084
(0.557) (0.569) (0.069) (0.069)
Nuclear family -0.131 0.115 -0.057 0.056
(0.373) (0.379) (0.048) (0.047)
Rural household -0.880 -1.011 -0.007 -0.062
(0.567) (0.626) (0.114) (0.118)
Rural*Progress -0.608 -0.635 -0.018 -0.027
(0.674) (0.708) (0.113) (0.114)
Constant 4.938*** 5.632***
(1.335) (1.354)
Log-Likelihood -483.97018
N 555
This uses only women with husbands interviewed and the baseline progressivity index. Standard
errors in parentheses (bootstrapped (1000 reps.) for progress). * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A3.11: Chapter 3: Results for other covariates in Model [3] in Table 3.8
Coeﬃcient Estimates Marginal Eﬀects
Variable Boys Girls Boys Girls
Age at marriage 0.234*** 0.296*** 0.005 0.029*
(0.064) (0.074) (0.014) (0.015)
Age diﬀerence 0.043* 0.078** -0.003 0.011
(0.025) (0.037) (0.006) (0.007)
Highest Education [None / incomplete primary]
Woman: Completed primary 0.769*** 0.973*** 0.015 0.095
(0.278) (0.336) (0.062) (0.068)
Woman: Completed secondary 0.457 0.848* -0.040 0.121
(0.379) (0.485) (0.074) (0.087)
Husband: Completed primary -0.509 -0.024 -0.122* 0.086
(0.412) (0.510) (0.069) (0.083)
Husband: Completed secondary -0.091 -0.180 0.010 -0.027
(0.293) (0.388) (0.052) (0.065)
Caste [None]
Scheduled caste / tribe 0.158 0.315 -0.018 0.047
(0.214) (0.303) (0.043) (0.054)
Other backward caste -0.167 -0.251 0.004 -0.030
(0.306) (0.383) (0.047) (0.059)
No sikh / hindu 0.286 0.473 -0.014 0.062
(0.241) (0.336) (0.053) (0.064)
Wealth quintile [Richest]
Less than richer 0.085 -0.337 0.082 -0.096
(0.320) (0.427) (0.057) (0.071)
Richer 0.122 -0.085 0.045 -0.042
(0.286) (0.368) (0.046) (0.058)
Nuclear family -0.270 -0.094 -0.050 0.026
(0.204) (0.262) (0.032) (0.040)
Rural household -0.826** -0.742 -0.071 -0.029
(0.355) (0.456) (0.070) (0.082)
Log-Likelihood -4924.899
N 2032
 Base category in square brackets. Robust standard errors for cluster-correlated data (White
/ Huber / sandwich estimator) in parentheses. Signiﬁcance level (double sided): * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A3.12: Chapter 3: Results for other covariates in Model [4] in Table 3.8
Coeﬃcient Estimates Marginal Eﬀects
Variable Boys Girls Boys Girls
Age at marriage 0.253*** 0.248*** 0.018 0.014
(0.057) (0.077) (0.015) (0.017)
Age diﬀerence 0.041*** 0.059** 0.000 0.007
(0.028) (0.030) (0.006) (0.006)
Highest Education [None / incomplete primary]
Woman: Completed primary 0.929 0.895** 0.069 0.047
(0.339) (0.351) (0.067) (0.067)
Woman: Completed secondary 0.661 0.795* 0.020 0.071
(0.477) (0.468) (0.083) (0.080)
Husband: Completed primary -0.538 -0.045 -0.125* 0.086
(0.440) (0.436) (0.067) (0.064)
Husband: Completed secondary -0.110 -0.157 0.001 -0.018
(0.320) (0.324) (0.050) (0.049)
Caste [None]
Scheduled caste / tribe 0.139 0.242 -0.009 0.033
(0.228) (0.258) (0.039) (0.043)
Other backward caste -0.198 -0.219 -0.009 -0.017
(0.371) (0.353) (0.050) (0.044)
No sikh / hindu 0.320 0.393 0.008 0.037
(0.247) (0.274) (0.048) (0.051)
Wealth quintile [Richest]
Less than richer 0.042 -0.292 0.063 -0.078
(0.352) (0.365) (0.057) (0.057)
Richer 0.124 -0.051 0.040 -0.034
(0.293) (0.295) (0.044) (0.043)
Nuclear family -0.302 -0.118 -0.054* 0.026
(0.215) (0.218) (0.030) (0.030)
Rural household -1.124** -0.754 -0.111 0.010
(0.456) (0.464) (0.067) (0.069)
Rural*Progress 0.452 0.229
(0.410) (0.385)
Log-Likelihood -4913.043
N 2032
 Base category in square brackets. Robust standard errors for cluster-correlated data (White
/ Huber / sandwich estimator) in parentheses. Signiﬁcance level (double sided): * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Figure A3.1: Progressivity index: Punjab versus Delhi 
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